

ONTARIO ENERGY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 15, Schedule B;

AND IN THE MATTER OF an application by Ontario Power Generation Inc. pursuant to section 78.1 of the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998 for an Order or Orders determining payment amounts for the output of certain of its generating facilities;

AND IN THE MATTER OF a motion by Ontario Power Generation Inc. pursuant to Rule 42 of the Ontario Energy Board's *Rules of Practice and Procedure* for an order or orders to vary the Decision with Reasons EB-2013-0321.

**SUPPLEMENTARY MOTION RECORD OF ONTARIO POWER GENERATION
(on Motion To Review and Vary)**

January 26, 2015

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6. Ontario Energy Board, *Rules of Practice and Procedure*, Rule 42.01

TAB 1

1 To confirm the results of the financial analysis, management obtained an independent third-
2 party assessment. This assessment, done by Access Capital, was presented to the MPC
3 prior to recommending approval of the project to OPG Board. The assessment concluded
4 that OPG's financial analysis team was proficient, and that the financial model produced
5 accurate, verifiable results and correct calculations of various costs. The Access Capital
6 report noted that the 90-year life of the project was longer than would be typically used for
7 evaluating power projects, but that it was consistent with the project's design life, and, in any
8 event, OPG's model allowed for analyzing shorter lives. The report also noted that the
9 potential variability in available water would make private financing of this project difficult
10 without mitigation or a significant reserve, but noted that the existence of rate regulation with
11 a variance account to recognize the impacts of both favourable and adverse water conditions
12 would mitigate this risk.

13

14 The BCS also included the results of the sensitivity analyses, which were undertaken to test
15 the impacts of alternative assumptions. Among the assumptions tested were:

- 16 • periods of high and low water availability (based on the upper and lower quartiles of
17 historical water availability, respectively) during the project's first five years of operation;
- 18 • an overall five per cent decline in available water from historical levels throughout the 90-
19 year life of the NTP;
- 20 • ten percent higher cost;
- 21 • a service life of 30 years; and
- 22 • elimination of the 10-year Gross Revenue Charge ("GRC") payment holiday.

23

24 Under most of these scenarios, the project remained competitive with the 8 cents/kWh price,
25 then used as a proxy for the price of renewable energy alternatives.

26

27 **5.0 DESIGN-BUILD AGREEMENT**

28 The DBA between OPG and Strabag was signed on August 18, 2005. An electronic copy of
29 the DBA is included in the CD of NTP Key Documents accompanying this Exhibit. It
30 remained in effect until December 1, 2008, the effective date of the Amended Design Build

1 Agreement (“ADBA”) as discussed below. The DBA consisted of a main agreement and
2 numerous appendices, which together set out the terms that governed Strabag’s construction
3 of the project and OPG’s requirements and payment for this work. This section summarizes
4 the major provisions of the DBA.

5

6 The main body of the DBA specified that the intake canal and structure, tunnel, outlet canal
7 and structure, and associated facilities comprise the project. It provided that Strabag will
8 construct these facilities in accordance with the DBA (including the Owner’s Mandatory
9 Requirements, the Contractor’s Proposal Documents, Final Submittals, Applicable Law and
10 other terms of the agreement) and good industry practices. It contained a date for Substantial
11 Completion of the project, which is defined as the date the tunnel is ready for its intended use
12 with water flowing through it. GBR C formed part of the DBA and is the basis on which any
13 claims for differing subsurface conditions (“DSC”) were to be assessed. The DBA explicitly
14 allocated risk between OPG and Strabag in a manner that both parties accepted on an
15 informed basis. It also specified that OPG would not supervise or direct Strabag’s means and
16 methods of completing the project.

17

18 The DBA (Section 11.1) provided for the establishment of a Dispute Review Board (“DRB”) to
19 assist OPG and Strabag in resolving any performance disputes that were not resolved by
20 good faith negotiation. Once a dispute was referred to the DRB, it was charged with
21 preparing fully reasoned written recommendations on an appropriate resolution. The parties
22 could either accept the recommendations or either party could indicate its rejection by giving
23 the other party notice of its intent to take the matter to arbitration under the Rule of Arbitration
24 of the International Chamber of Commerce.¹⁵ Recommendations not rejected by notice
25 within 30 days were to be deemed accepted by both parties.

26

27 In the DBA, Strabag warranted that it had the requisite experience and qualifications to
28 successfully complete the project and that it would only engage competent and qualified sub-

¹⁵ The DBA originally provided that a dissatisfied party could seek judicial review rather than arbitration, but this was changed in Amendment 1 made on March 15, 2006. Amendment 1 also substantially modified the operation of the DRB.

1 contractors. Strabag also represented that it prepared its proposal documents with the same
2 care and skill that would be applied by leading professional engineers in Canada and the
3 United States for a similar type of project. The DBA named certain key project personnel that
4 could not be changed without OPG's approval. Furthermore, the DBA identified that worker
5 and public safety are primary goals of the project. It also required Strabag to protect the
6 environment and to meet all of the conditions of approval in the project's EA.

7
8 In terms of financial security, the DBA required that Strabag provide one or more letter(s) of
9 credit in a total amount of not less than \$70M. Strabag was also required to provide parental
10 indemnities guaranteeing its performance and indemnifying OPG for any damages resulting
11 from a breach by Strabag. Prior to Final Completion of the project as determined under the
12 DBA, Strabag was required to deliver a maintenance bond of 10 per cent of the contract
13 price. This bond remains in force until the end of the warranty period, which is one year
14 following the date of Substantial Completion, but may be extended if any defects require
15 correction during the warranty period.

16
17 The DBA additionally required Strabag to procure and maintain the following insurance:
18 worker's compensation coverage, motor vehicle liability (\$5M), errors and omissions (\$10M),
19 and, as required, marine watercraft hull and liability (\$25M). Strabag was required to self-
20 insure for construction equipment. OPG was required to procure and maintain builders' all
21 risk insurance (\$80M), wrap-up liability insurance (\$25M) and, as required, marine cargo
22 insurance.

23
24 Finally, the DBA contained certain bonus and liquidated damages clauses that recognized
25 the benefits of early completion and the costs of delay, respectively, and the possibility that
26 the tunnel would deliver greater or lesser flow than the contract required. The DBA provided
27 Strabag an incentive of \$125,000 during the period November to March inclusive and
28 \$90,000 during the period April to October inclusive for each complete day that actual
29 Substantial Completion occurred before the contracted date. For each complete day that
30 actual Substantial Completion occurred after the contracted date Strabag was obligated to

1 pay OPG liquidated damages of \$250,000, from November to March inclusive, and
2 \$180,000, from April to October inclusive. If flow testing revealed that the tunnel delivered
3 more than the contracted flow ($500 \text{ m}^3/\text{s} \pm 2$ per cent for measurement error), OPG was to
4 pay a bonus based on a sliding scale established in the contract. Similarly, if the tunnel
5 delivered less than the contracted flow, Strabag was obligated to pay graduated liquidated
6 damages. The liquidated damages amounts are twice the bonus amounts. In any event, the
7 total liquidated damages or bonus from all provisions could not exceed 20 per cent of the
8 contract price.

9
10 The DBA contained numerous appendices that form part of the agreement. Among the most
11 significant were:

- 12 • Appendix 1.1 (j), which established the contract price of \$622.6M by major components,
13 the major items being a) the diversion tunnel at \$406.9M, b) the TBM at \$78.2M, and c)
14 the Intake Channel, Accelerating Wall and Approach Wall at \$54.9M;
- 15 • Appendix 1.1(t), which contained the specifications for the TBM;
- 16 • Appendix 1.1 (vv), which set out the Owner's mandatory requirements, including that the
17 primary elements of the Niagara Tunnel Facility Project were required to be designed and
18 constructed for a service life of 90 years with no tunnel outages during that time, and that
19 Strabag was required to install, test and commission a new high-powered TBM suitable
20 for safely excavating in the ground conditions as described in the GBR;
- 21 • Appendix 1.1 (sss), which summarized all of the work that the contractor is expected to
22 perform;
- 23 • Appendix 2.2(a), which presented an organization chart of the contractor's personnel
24 showing the key personnel that require OPG approval for changes;
- 25 • Appendix 2.4(d), which presented the safety and security plans;
- 26 • Appendix 2.12(c2), which showed an outline of Strabag's Quality Assurance/Quality
27 Control programs;
- 28 • Appendix 5.4, which was the GBR underlying the contract; and
- 29 • Appendix 11.1(a), which was the Dispute Review Board Agreement.

TAB 2

**STRABAG INC.
NIAGARA TUNNEL FACILITY PROJECT**

2520 Stanley Avenue
Niagara Falls, ON L2E 6S4

Tel: (905) 353 – 5500
Fax: (905) 353 – 0636
niagara@strabag.ca

Filed: 2014-03-19
EB-2013-0321
Exhibit L
Tab 4.5
Schedule 17 SEC-039
Attachment 1



**Dispute Notice as per Appendix 5.7 (a), DBA
Intent to Resolve Dispute Notice**

To: Hatch Mott MacDonald in association with Hatch Acres Acting as Owner's Representatives to Ontario Power Generation Inc. Niagara Tunnel Project 2520 Stanley Avenue, RR1 Niagara Falls, ON L2E 6S4	Contract: Design/Build Agreement between Ontario Power Generation Inc. and Strabag AG (the " Contractor ") dated August 18, 2005, (the " Agreement ")
	Dispute Notice No. 001
Attention: Mr. Harry Charalambu, Project Manager	Date: November 05, 2007

Defined terms used in this Notice have the same meanings given to those terms in the Agreement.

In accordance with Section 5.7 (a) of the Agreement, the undersigned hereby gives notice to the addressee that the undersigned wishes to have the Dispute related to the following matter resolved in accordance with Section 5.7 of the Agreement.

The events leading to the dispute commenced during the night shift on May 16, 2007. At that time, the tunnel crown showed increasing and systematic overbreak resulting in a major collapse. To date, the following conditions have been identified as the causes of this unexpected and catastrophic event.

- 1) Low stress conditions
- 2) Major high angle joints
- 3) RMR values lower than described in the GBR
- 4) Large block failure in the tunnel crown
- 5) Insufficient stand up time to allow installation of rock support

These conditions were not indicated in the GBR for this reach of tunnel. In addition the conditions as encountered were inadequate for the safe operation of the Project approved TBM. If these conditions had persisted, the Project itself would have been seriously jeopardized.

STRABAG provided Initial Notice of Differing Subsurface Conditions (DSC) in accordance with Section 5.5 (a) of the DBA to OR on May 18. A Project Change Notice followed the Initial Notice on May 23, 2007 stating that STRABAG encountered significantly more adverse rock mass conditions than those described in the GBR between tunnel chainage 0+806.50 and tunnel chainage 0+839.70.


Since the collapse STRABAG has reacted immediately and in continuous consultation with the Designer and its local geotechnical expert, outside experts and the OR to mitigate the delay and to ensure the progress of the project. The main mitigation measures included the development of pre-excavation rock support and the modification of TBM and equipment as a consequence. Only with these substantial changes has it been possible to safely overcome the Differing Subsurface Conditions.

On October 31, 2007 OR submitted the response to STRABAG's additional information supporting the existence of a DSC dated August 30, 2007 by rejecting the merit of STRABAG's claim. STRABAG and the OR agree that this matter is critically important and of significant complexity that the 5 business day time periods in Sections 5.7(b) and (c) for STRABAG's further submissions and the OR's Decision are impractical. STRABAG requests that within the next 5 business days, the OR and STRABAG consult and agree on a schedule allowing each party a reasonable period of time to complete its obligations under section 5.7 or agree to waive such obligations and refer the dispute immediately to the DRB. Once either a Section 5.7 schedule is agreed upon or waived, STRABAG and the OR should next agree to develop a schedule in conjunction with the DRB for completion of the disputes process pursuant to Section 11.4(d).

STRABAG INC.

By: 

Name: Ernst Gschnitzer
Title: Project Manager

By: 

Name: Marcus Gottschling
Title: Contract Manager

**STRABAG INC.
 NIAGARA TUNNEL FACILITY PROJECT**

2520 Stanley Avenue
 Niagara Falls, ON L2E 6S4

Tel: (905) 353 - 5500
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 niagara@strabag.ca



DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL

FROM	Ernst Gschnitzer, Project Manager STRABAG Inc.	TO	Harry Charalambu, Project Manager Hatch Mott MacDonald / Hatch Acres
DATE	February 27, 2008	VIA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Hand - Delivered <input type="checkbox"/> Pick Up <input type="checkbox"/> Email
DOC No	DT-0708-R00	FILE No	00600-01-04

CODE	A - For Information Only B - Preliminary C - Issued for Construction D - Superseded	TYPE	O - Original E - Electronic C - CD
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WORK ELEMENT	Other
REGARDING	Dispute Notice No. 002

DESCRIPTION	OPG SCI	CODE	AMT / TYPE
Dispute Notice No. 002		A	2 O
Dispute Notice No. 002		A	1 E

PREPARED BY
 Kim Krkljus
 Office Administrator

APPROVED BY
 Marcus Gottschling
 Contract Manager

Attachment Included

COMMENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT		
Sign, Date and Return Second Copy	Signature	Date

**STRABAG INC.
NIAGARA TUNNEL FACILITY PROJECT**

2520 Stanley Avenue
Niagara Falls, ON L2E 6S4

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niagara@strabag.ca

STRABAG

Filed: 2014-03-19
EB-2013-0321
Exhibit L
Tab 4.5
Schedule 17 SEC-039
Attachment 2

**Dispute Notice as per Appendix 5.7(a) and Section 5.7(c), DBA
Intent to Resolve Dispute Notice**

<p>To: Hatch Mott MacDonald in association with Hatch Acres Acting as Owner's Representatives to Ontario Power Generation Inc.</p> <p>Niagara Tunnel Project 2520 Stanley Avenue, RR1 Niagara Falls, ON L2E 6S4</p> <p>Attention: Mr. Harry Charalambu, Project Manager</p>	<p>Contract: Design/Build Agreement between Ontario Power Generation Inc. and Strabag AG (the "Contractor") dated August 18, 2005, (the "Agreement")</p> <p>Dispute Notice No. 002 Date: February 27, 2008</p>
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Defined terms used in this Notice have the same meanings given to those terms in the Agreement.

In accordance with Section 5.7(a) of the Agreement, the undersigned hereby gives Notice to the addressee that the undersigned wishes to have the Dispute related to the following matter resolved in accordance with Section 5.7 of the Agreement.

STRABAG has issued PCN No. 17 which was initiated by excessive overbreak leading to a collapse of the tunnel crown that required the stoppage of work between May 17 and June 11, 2007. The TBM drive could only be resumed once extensive modifications to improve and stabilize the ground conditions prior to the excavation had been carried out.

On June 1, 2007 the OR rejected STRABAG's claim based on their investigations of the subsurface conditions and provided confirmation of their intent to review any further information provided by STRABAG.

STRABAG submitted the additional information on August 30, 2007, describing three main differences in the actual ground conditions versus those described in the GBR.

On August 31, 2007 the OR provided confirmation to review the information but reiterated OPG's position as stated in the letter dated June 1, 2007.

On October 31, 2007 the OR summarily rejected the claim, briefly reiterating OPG's position that the claim described in PCN 017 is without merit and there is no basis to change the Contract Price or the Contract Schedule. In rejecting the merit of PCN 017, no technical elaboration was provided.

With the prospect of the difficult ground conditions persisting for an unforeseeable period of time, both parties agreed to actively pursue without prejudice all the technical options to optimize the tunnel alignment and to negotiate the necessary changes to the contract.


STRABAG submitted its Proposal for Optimized Alignment and Revised Schedule with the related additional cost of all known claims to date along with a forecast of the added costs to be incurred through completion by February 4, 2008.

On February 20, 2008, STRABAG received a response stating only OPG's contractual position, without addressing some of the key elements included in PCN 017. STRABAG continues to assert that it has encountered Differing Subsurface Conditions within the meaning of Article 5.5 of the Design Build Agreement and further asserts that the financial responsibility for those Differing Subsurface Conditions rests with OR.

Since other contractual means to obtain a satisfactory resolution have been exhausted, and the Parties have agreed that the Dispute is ripe for the DRB, STRABAG is hereby giving this dual Notice of Dispute under Section 5.7(a) and notice of intention to have the Dispute resolved under Section 11.

Best regards


Ernst Gschnitzer
Project Manager – Niagara Tunnel


Marcus Gottschling
Contract Manager – Niagara Tunnel

TAB 3

1 adopted as an expert witness? Okay. I see people shaking
2 their heads no. Everybody is in agreement. That's good,
3 thank you.

4 MR. SMITH: I will come back to you, Mr. Ilsley, but I
5 should just hit the other members of the panel.

6 Mr. Young, I understand that you were until very
7 recently in your retirement the vice-president
8 hydroelectric and thermal project execution?

9 MR. YOUNG: That's correct.

10 MR. SMITH: And am I correct, sir, that you have a
11 science -- an engineering degree from the University of New
12 Brunswick?

13 MR. YOUNG: Yes.

14 MR. SMITH: You have an MBA from the University of
15 Toronto?

16 MR. YOUNG: Yes.

17 MR. SMITH: And you a PhD in management sciences from
18 the University of Waterloo?

19 MR. YOUNG: Yes.

20 MR. SMITH: And am I correct, sir, that you held
21 positions with OPG of increasing responsibility beginning
22 in about 1979?

23 MR. YOUNG: That's correct.

24 MR. SMITH: And in the latter half of your career,
25 sir, do I understand that you were the project sponsor for
26 both the Niagara Tunnel project as well as OPG' Lower
27 Mattagami River project?

28 MR. YOUNG: Yes.

1 MR. SMITH: Mr. Everdell, I understand you have
2 recently retired as well, but you were the director,
3 project management, hydrothermal operations at OPG?

4 MR. EVERDELL: Correct.

5 MR. SMITH: And you have an engineering degree from
6 the University of Waterloo?

7 MR. EVERDELL: Yes, that's correct.

8 MR. SMITH: And you held position of increasing
9 responsibility with OPG beginning in 1976?

10 MR. EVERDELL: Correct.

11 MR. SMITH: Am I correct, sir, your experience with
12 the Niagara Tunnel goes back some 30 years?

13 MR. EVERDELL: That's correct.

14 MR. SMITH: And over that 30-year period, you
15 obviously held position of increasing responsibility in
16 relation to that project?

17 MR. EVERDELL: Yes.

18 MR. SMITH: And that experience and your positions are
19 obviously set out in the CV?

20 MR. EVERDELL: Yes.

21 MR. SMITH: Perhaps, Mr. Young, I can just ask you, on
22 behalf of yourself and Mr. Everdell, whether you adopt
23 OPG's prefiled evidence in relation to the Niagara Tunnel
24 project, and interrogatories and technical conference
25 questions and undertakings in relation to that project for
26 the purpose of testifying here today.

27 MR. YOUNG: Yes, we do.

28 MR. SMITH: Thank you.

1 985 million originally approved, that entire amount is
2 caused by adverse subsurface conditions? Correct?

3 MR. YOUNG: That is correct. I think it's well
4 summarized in the conclusion, page 129 of our evidence.

5 MR. DeROSE: Okay. But I -- again, I just wanted to
6 be clear that this is -- so all of the dispute resolution
7 board issues and the assessment of the -- I was about to
8 say "GBR" -- the geological baseline report, a hundred
9 percent of the cost increase relates to whether the
10 geological baseline report was or was not deficient, and
11 the extent to which the appropriate behaviour or the
12 appropriate actions were taken during the course of the
13 construction?

14 MR. YOUNG: I think I would term it that it relates to
15 differing subsurface conditions, as defined contractually.

16 MR. DeROSE: Fair enough.

17 Okay. Again, still at the 10,000-foot level, and this
18 question actually I think is most appropriately made for
19 Dr. -- sorry, is it Ilsley?

20 MR. ILSLEY: Ilsley. It's not Doctor, by the way.

21 MR. DeROSE: Well, I read your resume. It should be a
22 Doctor.

23 MR. ILSLEY: I don't cure people.

24 MR. DeROSE: Now, Dr. Ilsley - sorry, Mr. Ilsley.
25 Again, it was your credentials.

26 In the cross-examination by Mr. Crocker, he talked to
27 the OPG panel about a contingency amount built into the
28 budget. It was approximately 100 million, which was about

1 10 percent of the overall project cost.

2 First of all, would you agree that that is -- to build
3 a contingency amount into a design-build contract such as
4 this, that is a common feature; is it not?

5 MR. ILSLEY: Yes.

6 MR. DeROSE: And in your experience, is an amount of
7 approximately 10 percent, is that sort of industry
8 standard?

9 MR. ILSLEY: I can't say that it would be a standard.
10 I mean, it would depend upon the parties' evaluation of the
11 risk, in the sense that how well are the conditions
12 defined. I mean, some cases, say you are putting a tunnel
13 under the mountains. It's very difficult to get
14 information on the ground conditions. Therefore, the
15 contract formed would likely have higher contingencies
16 because of those risks, perceived risks by the parties,
17 which they would then put into the contract.

18 MR. DeROSE: So is it fair to say that the appropriate
19 contingency is directly related to the perception or the
20 level of confidence in the geological tests and the
21 information available at the time of contract award?

22 MR. ILSLEY: Yes, you could term it that way. I mean,
23 in this project there was risk register, which is a --
24 basically a list of risks perceived at various points in
25 the development of the design of the project: How it's
26 formed, the participants, the owner's representative, that
27 is Hatch Mott MacDonald, the designer, personnel and OPG
28 personnel would start that list and say, well, what are the

1 MR. DeROSE: This is a new strategy.

2 Okay. Now, for the two members from OPG, could I have
3 you pull up -- it's Exhibit D1, tab 2, schedule 1,
4 attachment 7. This is the report from the dispute
5 resolution board. It's 19 pages. If I could have you turn
6 up -- we will start at page 13 of -- well, actually we will
7 back up.

8 Again, at the 10,000-foot level, this dispute dealt
9 with, broadly speaking, five areas of dispute. And they
10 are the -- what I would describe as: large block failures;
11 secondly, the St. David's Gorge issue; third, insufficient
12 stand-up time issue; fourth, the excessive outbreak issue;
13 and, five, the inadequate table rock conditions and rock
14 characteristics. Is that -- those are the five big issues
15 that it's dealing with; is that fair?

16 MR. YOUNG: That is correct.

17 MR. DeROSE: And let's just start with the large block
18 failures. In terms of quantifying the value of that
19 particular dispute, are you able to provide the Board with
20 the amount that Strabag was claiming for that issue and the
21 amount that OPG felt -- and OPG's responding number? Is
22 that something that was -- I have to tell you, I didn't see
23 it in the evidence.

24 MR. YOUNG: We cannot. The individual issues were not
25 quantified.

26 MR. DeROSE: Okay. And so, for instance, the dispute
27 resolution board would not have known whether -- and let's
28 just take large block failures as an example -- whether

1 that issue represented 50 million or 75 million or \$50 of
2 overrun costs?

3 MR. EVERDELL: No, those costs were not identified.
4 They were not broken down.

5 MR. DeROSE: And was there a reason why you would not
6 have quantified these on an issue-by-issue basis to
7 understand what you were dealing with?

8 MR. ILSLEY: If I may, usually the procedural aspects
9 for the dispute review board is that you listen to the
10 merit of the allegations first and then deal with the costs
11 later, after the decision or recommendations come through.

12 MR. DeROSE: Okay. Fair --

13 MR. ILSLEY: That is to provide a more simple hearing,
14 because the costs end to be complicated and lengthy in
15 presentation.

16 MR. DeROSE: And that's from the dispute resolution
17 board, so if you are sitting on a board, you wouldn't
18 necessarily expect to know the number?

19 MR. ILSLEY: Right. I mean, it's all agreed
20 beforehand, but it's usual, to speed up the hearings, that
21 you only hear the merit side first and then the
22 recommendations of parties, and then based on your
23 recommendations can negotiate the costs. And if they
24 further disagree as to those costs, they can bring those
25 disputes to the board also. That's the usual form.

26 MR. DeROSE: Okay. Thank you for that. Now, from
27 OPG's perspective -- and I appreciate that it may not have
28 been presented to the board -- internally, did you not

1 provide some sort of internal assessment of how much each
2 of these disputes that were going to the resolution board
3 were potentially valued at? That's just not anything you
4 undertook?

5 MR. EVERDELL: I think they were all interconnected.
6 I mean, they are not really discrete items, so they
7 overlap. And Strabag had been claiming a \$90 million loss
8 in total for all of this DSC claim.

9 MR. DeROSE: While they were interrelated, the board
10 was actually able to say, for instance, that the large
11 block failures were adequately covered by the geological
12 baseline report and the other ones should be shared
13 equally, so is it not important to understand what each of
14 these represent of the 90 million?

15 MR. EVERDELL: We addressed the whole package.

16 MR. DeROSE: Okay. And what about subsequent to
17 getting the decision? Did you ever try and break it out?

18 MR. EVERDELL: I don't believe so.

19 MR. DeROSE: And with respect to, for instance, the
20 large block failures, the way I would describe it is, OPG
21 won that one. The Board outright agreed with OPG that this
22 should have been -- that this was a means and method issue,
23 that this was something that Strabag -- the risk lay with
24 Strabag; is that fair?

25 MR. EVERDELL: Yes.

26 MR. DeROSE: And when you then subsequently negotiated
27 with Strabag, if you didn't know whether the large block
28 failures represented 100,000 of the 90 million or

1 89 million of the 90 million, how did you take into
2 consideration or ensure that that particular win was
3 appropriately quantified and that you didn't end up paying
4 for the large block failures inadvertently?

5 MR. EVERDELL: The large block failures were a
6 relatively minor part of the claim. There was large block
7 failures when the TBM entered into the Queenston shale
8 formation directly under the whirlpool sandstone, and then
9 the contractor modified some of their support techniques,
10 including the use of pipe pile umbrella method to pre-
11 support the rock over top of the cutter head, which then
12 resulted in no further large block failures, so it was a
13 relatively minor part.

14 MR. DeROSE: But you don't -- but no one knows what
15 the value of it is, because you didn't undertake that
16 analysis; is that fair?

17 MR. EVERDELL: Yes.

18 MR. DeROSE: And the same thing can be said of St.
19 David's George -- or Gorge; correct? That was a win. You
20 won that one outright.

21 MR. EVERDELL: Yes. There was an 800-metre-long
22 section of the tunnel under the buried St. David's Gorge
23 that was entirely Strabag's responsibility.

24 MR. DeROSE: Okay. And then if we turn to the
25 insufficient stand-up time, would you describe that
26 particular issue as -- well, what was the finding of the
27 board? How would you summarize that?

28 MR. EVERDELL: Basically, the way -- the board decided

TAB 4

AMENDED DESIGN/BUILD AGREEMENT

NIAGARA TUNNEL FACILITY PROJECT

December 1, 2008

Between

ONTARIO POWER GENERATION INC.

and

STRABAG INC.

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TAB 5

Ontario Energy Board **Commission de l'Énergie
de l'Ontario**



EB-2006-0322
EB-2006-0338
EB-2006-0340

MOTIONS TO REVIEW THE NATURAL GAS ELECTRICITY INTERFACE REVIEW DECISION

DECISION WITH REASONS

May 22, 2007

EB-2006-0322
EB-2006-0338
EB-2006-0340

IN THE MATTER OF the *Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998*, S.O. 1998, c.15, (Schedule B);

AND IN THE MATTER OF a proceeding initiated by the Ontario Energy Board to determine whether it should order new rates for the provision of natural gas, transmission, distribution and storage services to gas-fired generators (and other qualified customers) and whether the Board should refrain from regulating the rates for storage of gas;

AND IN THE MATTER OF Rules 42, 44.01 and 45.01 of the Board's *Rules of Practice and Procedure*.

BEFORE: Pamela Nowina
Vice Chair, Presiding Member

Paul Vlahos
Member

Cathy Spoel
Member

DECISION WITH REASONS

May 22, 2007

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In November of 2006 the Board issued a Decision with Reasons in the Natural Gas Electricity Interface Review proceeding (the “NGEIR Decision”). This proceeding was initiated by the Ontario Energy Board in response to issues first raised in the Board’s Natural Gas Forum Report issued in 2004. The NGEIR Decision addressed the key issues of natural gas storage rates and services for gas-fired generators, and storage regulation.

In the NGEIR Decision, the Board determined that it would cease regulating the prices charged for certain storage services but that the rates for storage services provided to Union and Enbridge distribution customers will continue to be regulated by the Board.

The Board received three Notices of Motion for review of certain parts of the NGEIR Decision. The Board held an oral hearing to consider the threshold questions that the Board should apply in determining whether the Board should review those parts of the NGEIR Decision and whether the moving parties met the test or tests.

The Board finds that the motions do not pass the threshold tests applied by the Board, except in two areas.

First, the Board finds that the decision to cap the storage available to Union Gas Limited’s in-franchise customers at regulated rates to 100 PJ is reviewable.

Second, the Board finds that the decisions regarding additional storage requirements for Union Gas Limited’s in-franchise gas-fired generator customers and Enbridge’s Rate 316 are reviewable.

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Section A: Introduction

The Board received three Notices of Motion for review of its Decision in the Natural Gas Electricity Interface Review proceeding¹ (“NGEIR”). Motions were filed by the City of Kitchener (“Kitchener”) and the Association of Power Producers of Ontario (“APPrO”). There was also a joint notice by the Industrial Gas Users’ Association (“IGUA”), the Vulnerable Energy Consumers Coalition (“VECC”) and the Consumers Council of Canada (“CCC”)

On January 25, 2007, the Board issued a Notice of Hearing and Procedural Order which established a schedule for the filing of factums by the moving parties, any responding parties’ factums, and an oral hearing date for hearing the threshold question. On February 8, 2007, factums were filed by Kitchener, APPrO, IGUA, and jointly by CCC and VECC.

Responding factums were filed on February 15, 2007 by Board Staff, Union Gas Limited, Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc., Market Hub Partners Canada Ltd., School Energy Coalition, The Independent Electricity System Operator and BP Canada Energy Company.

In its Procedural Order No.2, the Board indicated that, at the upcoming oral hearing, parties should confine their submissions to the material in their factums and to responding to the factums of other parties. The Board also stated that parties should address only the issues set out in the Board’s Procedural Order No. 1, namely:

- 1) What are the threshold questions that the Board should apply in determining whether the Board should review the NGEIR Decision? and
- 2) Have the Moving Parties met the test or tests?

¹ EB-2008-0551 (November 7, 2006)

On March 5 and 6, 2007, the Board heard the oral submissions of all the parties with the exception of the Independent System Operator and BP Canada who had advised the Board that they would not be appearing at the oral hearing.

The NGEIR Decision

On November 7, 2006 the Board issued its Decision with Reasons in the Natural Gas Electricity Interface Review proceeding (the “NGEIR Decision”). This proceeding was initiated by the Ontario Energy Board in response to issues first raised in the Board's Natural Gas Forum Report issued in 2004. The 123-page NGEIR Decision addressed the key issues of:

- 1) Rates and services for gas-fired generators, and
- 2) Storage regulation.

The parties reached settlements with Enbridge and Union on most of the issues related to rates and services for gas-fired generators. These settlements were approved by the Board. The oral hearing and the NGEIR Decision addressed the broad issue of storage regulation and any issues that were not settled in the settlement negotiations.

The issue concerning storage regulation was whether the Board should refrain from regulating the prices charged for storage services under section 29 (1) of the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998. The Board found that the storage market is workably competitive and that neither Union nor Enbridge have market power in the storage market. The Board determined that it would cease regulating the prices charged for certain storage services; however, the Board found that rates for storage services provided to Union and Enbridge distribution customers will continue to be regulated by the Board.

The motions requested the following decisions made in the NGEIR Decision be either reviewed and changed; cancelled, or clarified, in a new Board proceeding:

Kitchener

- The aggregate excess methodology for allocating storage space
- The 100 PJ cap on Union's regulated storage

APPrO

- Whether short notice balancing service should be included on the tariffs of Union and Enbridge

IGUA/CCC/VECC

- Parts of the NGEIR Decision pertaining to storage, storage regulation and storage allocation be cancelled
- Review to be heard by a different Board panel

The parties outlined the grounds for the motions which included allegations of errors of fact and in some cases, errors of law.

Organization of the Decision

In this Decision, the Board organized the issues raised by the parties into sections that cover the same or similar topics. In each section following the section on the threshold test, the Board identifies the issue or issues raised, and makes a finding whether the issues are reviewable by applying the threshold test.

The sections of this Decision are:

- A. Introduction (this section)
- B. Board Jurisdiction to Hear Motions
- C. Threshold Test
- D. Board Process

- E. Board Jurisdiction under Section 29
- F. Status Quo
- G. Onus
- H. Competition in the Secondary Market
- I. Harm to Ratepayers
- J. Union's 100 PJ Cap
- K. Earnings Sharing
- L. Additional Deliverability for Generators and Enbridge's Rate 316
- M. Aggregate Excess Method of Allocating Storage
- N. Orders
- O. Cost Awards

The Board has reviewed the factums and arguments of all parties but has chosen to set out or summarize the factums or arguments by parties only to the extent necessary to provide context to its findings.

Section B: Board Jurisdiction to Hear the Motions

Under Rule 45.01, the Board may determine as a threshold question whether the matter should be reviewed before conducting any review on the merits.

In the case of IGUA's motion, which raises questions of law and jurisdiction, counsel for Board Staff argued that the Board should not, and indeed could not, review the NGEIR Decision as these grounds are not specifically enumerated in Rule 44.01 as possible grounds for review. Counsel for Board Staff argued that the Board has no inherent power to review its decisions and the manner in which it exercises such power must fall narrowly within the scope of the *Statutory Powers Procedure Act (SPPA)*, which grants the Board this power.

The Board's power to review its decisions arises from Section 21.1(1) of the SPPA which provides that:

A tribunal may, if it considers it advisable and if its rules made under section 25.1 deal with the matter, review all or any part of its own decision or order, and may confirm, vary, suspend or cancel the decision or order.

Part VII (sections 42 to 45) of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure deal with the review of decisions of the Board. Rule 42.01 provides that "any person may bring a motion requesting the Board to review all or part of a final order or decision, and to vary, suspend or cancel the order or decision". Rule 42.03 requires that the notice of motion for a motion under 42.01 shall include the information required under Rule 44. Rule 44.01 provides as follows:

Every notice of motion made under Rule 42.01, in addition to the requirements of Rule 8.02, shall:

- (a) set out the grounds for the motion that raise a question as to the correctness of the order or decision, which grounds may include:

- (i) error in fact;
- (ii) change in circumstances;
- (iii) new facts that have arisen;
- (iv) facts that were not previously placed in evidence in the proceeding and could not have been discovered by reasonable diligence at the time; and

(b) if required, and subject to Rule 42, request a stay of the implementation of the order or decision, or any part pending the determination of the motion.

Counsel for Board Staff argued that while the grounds for review do not have to be exactly as those described, they must be of the same nature, and that to the extent the grounds for review include other factors such as error of law, mixed error of fact and law, breach of natural justice, or lack of procedural fairness, they are not within the Board's jurisdiction. He argued that Rule 44 should be interpreted as an exhaustive list, and that as section 21.1(1) of the SPPA requires that the tribunal's rules deal with the matter of motions for review, the Board's jurisdiction is limited to the matters specifically set out in its Rules.

In support of this interpretation of the Rule 44.01, Counsel relied on the fact that an earlier version of the Board's rules specifically allowed grounds which no longer appear in Rule 44.01. Therefore, it must be assumed that the current Rules are not intended to allow motions for review based on those grounds. The relevant section of the earlier version of the Rules read as follows:

63.01 Every notice of motion made under Rule 62.01, in addition to the requirements of Rule 8.02, shall:

(a) set out the grounds for the motion that raise a question as to the correctness of the order or decision, which grounds may include:

- (i) error of law or jurisdiction, including a breach of natural justice;
- (ii) error in fact;
- (iii) a change in circumstances;
- (iv) new facts that have arisen;
- (v) facts that were not previously placed in evidence in the proceeding and could not have been discovered by reasonable diligence at the time;
- (vi) an important matter of principle that has been raised by the order or decision;

(b) request a delay in the implementation of the order or decision, or any part pending the determination of the motion, if required, ...

Counsel for Board Staff argued that the “presumption of purposeful change” rule of statutory interpretation should be applied to the Board’s Rules. This rule applies generally to legislative instruments and is based on the presumption that legislative bodies do not go to the bother and expense of making changes to legislative instruments unless there is a specific reason to do so. Applied to Rule 44, this means that the Board should be presumed to have intended to eliminate the possibility of motions for review based on grounds which are no longer enumerated. He further argued that because the SPPA requires the Board’s Rules “to deal with the matter”, the

Board can only deal with them in the manner allowed for by its Rules, and any deviation from the Rules will cause the Board to go beyond its power to review granted by Section 21.1(1) of the SPPA.

In general Union and Enbridge supported the argument made by counsel for Board Staff.

Other parties made several arguments to counter those put forward by counsel for Board Staff. These included:

- as the Board's rules are not statutes or regulations but deal with procedural matters the rules of statutory interpretation such as the presumption of purposeful change have little if any application
- to the extent rules of statutory interpretation apply, section 2 of the SPPA specifically requires that the Act and any rules made under it be liberally construed:

This Act, and any rule made by a tribunal under subsection 17.1(4) or section 25.1, shall be liberally construed to secure the just, most expeditious and cost-effective determination of every proceeding on its merits

- that the *Interpretation Act* requires that the word "may" be construed as permissive, whereas "shall" is imperative, so the list of grounds in Rule 44 should be considered as examples. In support of this argument, counsel for CCC referred to Sullivan and Dreiger on the Construction of Statutes, Fourth Edition, Butterworths, pp 175ff which cites the Supreme Court of Canada decision in *National Bank of Greece (Canada) v. Katsikonouris* (1990), 74 D.L.R. (4th) 197

- that the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in *Russell v. Toronto(City)* (2000), 52 O.R. (3d) 9 provides that a tribunal (in that case the Ontario Municipal Board) cannot use its own policy or practice to restrict the range of matters which it will consider on a motion to review
- that the *Russell* decision gives tribunals a broad jurisdiction to review in contradistinction to the narrow right of appeal to the Divisional Court.

Findings

In the Board's view, in addition to the specific sections of the SPPA and the Board's Rules dealing with motions to review, it is helpful to look at the overall scheme of the SPPA and the Rules to determine the scope of the Board's jurisdiction to review a decision.

Originally, the SPPA was enacted to ensure that decision making bodies such as the Board provided certain procedural rights to parties that were affected by those decisions. These basic requirements apply regardless of whether a tribunal has enacted rules of practice and procedure. They include such requirements as:

- Parties must be given reasonable notice of the hearing (s 6)
- Hearings must be open to the public, except where intimate personal or financial matters may be disclosed (s 9)
- The right to counsel (s 10)
- The right to call and examine witnesses and present evidence and submissions and to conduct cross-examinations of witnesses at the hearing reasonably required for a full and fair disclosure of all matters relevant to the issues in the proceeding (s 10.1)

- That decisions be given in writing with reasons if requested by a party (s 17 (1))
- That parties receive notice of the decision (s 18)
- That the tribunal compile a record of the proceeding (s 20).

In addition to these requirements there are several practices and procedures that tribunals are allowed to adopt, if provision is made for them in an individual tribunal's rules. These include:

- Alternative dispute resolution. Section 4.8 provides that a tribunal may direct parties to participate in ADR if “it has made rules under section 25.1 respecting the use of ADR mechanisms...”
- Prehearing conferences. Section 5.3 provides that “if the tribunal’s rules under section 25.1 deal with prehearing conferences, the tribunal may direct parties to participate in a pre-hearing conference...”
- Disclosure of documents. Section 5.4 provides that “if the tribunal’s rules made under section 25.1 deal with disclosure, the tribunal may, ..., make orders for (a) the exchange of documents, ...”
- Written hearings. Section 5.1 (1) provides that “a tribunal whose rules made under section 25.1 deal with written hearings may hold a written hearing in a proceeding.”
- Electronic hearings. Section 5.2 provides that “a tribunal whose rules made under section 25.1 deal with electronic hearings may hold an electronic hearing in a proceeding.”

- Motions to review. Section 21.1(1) provides that “a tribunal may, if it considers it advisable and if its rules made under section 25.1 deal with the matter, review all or any part of its own decision or order, and may confirm, vary, suspend or cancel the decision or order.”

Beyond stating that a tribunal’s rules have to “deal with” each of these procedures in order for the tribunal to avail itself of them, there are no restrictions on the way in which they do so. In this regard nothing distinguishes motions to review from the other “optional” procedural matters listed above. A tribunal is free to create whatever procedures it thinks appropriate to handle them, provided they are consistent with the SPPA.

The Board notes that there are situations where the SPPA does not give tribunals full discretion in developing their rules to deal with “optional” procedural powers. For example, section 4.5(3) allows tribunals or their staff to make a decision not to process a document relating to the commencement of a proceeding. This section not only requires a tribunal to have “made rules under section 25.1 respecting the making of such decisions” but also requires that “those rules shall set out ... any of the grounds referred to in subsection 1 upon which the tribunal or its administrative staff may decide not to process the documents relating to the commencement of the proceeding;...” While a tribunal can prescribe the grounds for such a decision in its rules, the grounds must come from a predetermined list found in the SPPA. In that case, it is clear that only certain grounds are permitted, and a tribunal must restrict itself to those grounds enumerated in its rules.

The SPPA could put similar restrictions on the development of a tribunal’s rules dealing with motions to review, but it does not.

While the Court of Appeal’s decision in *Russell v. Toronto* dealt with motions to review under the *Ontario Municipal Board Act* rather than under the SPPA, the power granted to review decisions is effectively the same, so the principles enunciated in the *Russell* decision are applicable to the Board. The Court of Appeal found that the OMB could not

use its own policies and guidelines to restrict the scope of the power to review which was granted to it by statute. The Board therefore finds that it cannot use its Rules to limit the scope of the authority given to it by the SPPA.

The SPPA allows each tribunal to make its own Rules, so as to allow it to deal more effectively with the specific needs of its proceedings. The SPPA does not give the Board the authority to limit the substantive matters within the Board's purview.

The provisions of the SPPA dealing with the making of rules, give tribunals a very wide latitude to meet their own needs, both in the context of creating rules and in each individual proceeding:

25.0.1 A tribunal has the power to determine its own procedure and practices and may for that purpose,

- (a) make orders with respect to the procedures and practices that apply in any particular proceeding; and
- (b) establish rules under section 25.1

25.1 (1) A tribunal may make rules governing the practice and procedure before it.

- (2) The rules may be of general or particular application.
- (3) The rules shall be consistent with this Act and with the other Acts to which they relate.
- (4) The tribunal shall make the rules available to the public in English and in French.
- (5) Rules adopted under this section are not regulations as defined in the *Regulations Act*.
- (6) The power conferred by this section is in addition to any other power to adopt rules that the tribunal may have under another Act.

In the Board's view these sections of the SPPA give the Board very broad latitude to determine the procedure best suited to it from time to time. While consistency with the Act is required, the Rules are not regulations, and can be amended from time to time by the Board to suit its evolving needs.

The Board finds that there is nothing in the SPPA to suggest that rules dealing with motions to review should be interpreted or applied any differently from other provisions of the Board's Rules.

The Board's Rules

In addition to Section 2 of the SPPA which provides for a liberal interpretation of the Act and the Rules, the Board's Rules include the following provisions as a guide to their interpretation.

- 1.03 The Board may dispense with, amend, vary or supplement, with or without a hearing, all or any part of any rule at any time, if it is satisfied that the circumstances of the proceeding so require, or it is in the public interest to do so.

- 2.01 These Rules shall be liberally construed in the public interest to secure the most just, expeditious and cost-effective determination of every proceeding before the Board.

- 2.02 Where procedures are not provided for in these Rules, the Board may do whatever is necessary and permitted by law to enable it to effectively and completely adjudicate on the matter before it.

As these provisions are of general application to all of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Board finds that each of its individual rules should be read as if the above rules 1.03, 2.01 were part of them, except of course where restricted by the SPPA or another Act. Therefore, the Rules which "deal with the matter" of motions to

review, i.e. Rules 42 to 45, should be read in conjunction with Rules 1.03 and 2.01. Similarly, the rules dealing with alternative dispute resolution, written hearings and so on include Rules 1.03 and 2.01.

The Board finds that it should interpret the words “may include” in Rule 44.01 as giving a list of examples of grounds for review for the following reasons:

- It is the usual interpretation of the phrase;
- It is consistent with section 2 of the SPPA which requires a liberal interpretation of the Rules;
- It is consistent with Rule 1.03 of the Board’s rules which allows the Board to amend, vary or supplement the rules in an appropriate case; and
- If the SPPA had intended to require that the power to review be restricted to specific grounds it would have required the rules to include those grounds and would have required the use of the word “shall”.

With respect to the application of the principle of presumption of purposeful change urged by counsel for Board Staff, the Board notes that at the same time that its rules were amended to remove certain grounds of appeal from Rule 44.01, Rule 1.03 was also amended. The previous version of Rule 1.03 (then 4.04) read as follows:

The Board may dispense with, amend, vary, or supplement, with or without a hearing, all or any part of any Rule, at any time by making a procedural order, if it is satisfied that the special circumstances of the proceeding so require, or it is in the public interest to do so.

When compared with the current Rule 1.03, it is apparent that the old rule was more restrictive – amendments had to be made by procedural order, and the circumstances of the proceeding had to be “special”. Given the need for a procedural order, it is reasonable to interpret the old rule as applying only to the sorts of matters dealt with in procedural orders, the conduct of the proceeding and not to other provisions of the rules. No such restriction applies in the current Rule 1.03.

The Board finds that to the extent the Rules were amended to remove specific grounds from the list for motions to review, the contemporaneous amendments to Rule 1.03 give the Board the necessary discretion to supplement this list in an appropriate case. The Board presumably was aware of that at the time of the amendments.

The Board therefore finds that it has the jurisdiction to consider the IGUA motion to review even though the grounds are errors of mixed fact and law which do not fall squarely within the list of enumerated grounds in Rule 44.01.

Even if this interpretation of Rule 44.01 is incorrect, the Board can apply Rule 1.03 to supplement Rule 44.01 to allow the grounds specified by IGUA. Given the number of motions for review, the timing involved, the nature of the hearing and the nature of the alleged errors, the Board concludes that it is in the public interest to avoid splitting this case into Motions reviewed by some parties and appealed by others.

This panel is also aware that Appeals to the Divisional Court can only be based on matters of law including jurisdiction. If the position advanced by counsel for the Board staff was accepted, errors of mixed fact and law could not be effectively reviewed or appealed by any body. This, the Board believes is not consistent with Section 2 of the SPPA.

Section C: Threshold Test

Section 45.01 of the Board's Rules provides that:

In respect of a motion brought under Rule 42.01, the Board may determine, with or without a hearing, a threshold question of whether the matter should be reviewed before conducting any review on the merits.

Parties were asked by the panel to provide submissions on the appropriate test for the Board to apply in making a determination under Rule 45.01.

Board Staff argued that the issue raised by a moving party had to raise a question as to the correctness of the decision and had to be sufficiently serious in nature that it is capable of affecting the outcome. Board Staff argued that to qualify, the error must be clearly extricable from the record, and cannot turn on an interpretation of conflicting evidence. They also argued that it's not sufficient for the applicants to say they disagree with the Board's decision and that, in their view, the Board got it wrong and that the applicants have an argument that should be reheard.

Enbridge submitted that the threshold test is not met when a party simply seeks to reargue the case that the already been determined by the Board. Enbridge argued that something new is required before the Board will exercise its discretion and allow a review motion to proceed.

Union agreed with Board Staff counsel's analysis of the scope and grounds for review.

IGUA argued that to succeed on the threshold issue, the moving parties must identify arguable errors in the decision which, if ultimately found to be errors at the hearing on the merits will affect the result of the decision. IGUA argued that the phrase "arguable errors" meant that the onus is on the moving parties to demonstrate that there is some reasonable prospect of success on the errors that are alleged.

CCC and VECC argued that the moving parties are required to demonstrate, first, that the issues are serious and go to the correctness of the NGEIR decision, and , second, that they have an arguable case on one or more of these issues. They argued that the moving parties are not required to demonstrate, at the threshold stage, that they will be successful in persuading the Board of the correctness of their position on all the issues.

MHP argued that the threshold question relates to whether there are identifiable errors of fact or law on the face of the decision, which give rise to a substantial doubt as to the correctness of the decision, and that the issue is not whether a different panel might arrive at a different decision, but whether the hearing panel itself committed serious errors that cast doubt on the correctness of the decision. MHP submitted that a review panel should be loathe to interfere with the hearing panel's findings of fact and the conclusions drawn there from except in the clearest possible circumstances.

Kitchener argued that jurisdictional or other threshold questions should be addressed on the assumption that the record in NGEIR establishes the facts asserted.

School Energy Coalition argued that an application for reconsideration should only be denied a hearing on the merits in circumstances where the appeal is an abuse of the Board's process, is vexatious or otherwise lacking objectively reasonable grounds.

Findings

It appears to the Board that all the grounds for review raised by the various applicants allege errors of fact or law in the decision, and that there are no issues relating to new evidence or changes in circumstances. The parties' submissions addressed the matter of alleged error.

In determining the appropriate threshold test pursuant to Rule 45.01, it is useful to look at the wording of Rule 44. Rule 44.01(a) provides that:

Every notice of motion... shall set out the grounds for the motion that raise a question as to the correctness of the order or decision...

Therefore, the grounds must “raise a question as to the correctness of the order or decision”. In the panel’s view, the purpose of the threshold test is to determine whether the grounds raise such a question. This panel must also decide whether there is enough substance to the issues raised such that a review based on those issues could result in the Board deciding that the decision should be varied, cancelled or suspended.

With respect to the question of the correctness of the decision, the Board agrees with the parties who argued that there must be an identifiable error in the decision and that a review is not an opportunity for a party to reargue the case.

In demonstrating that there is an error, the applicant must be able to show that the findings are contrary to the evidence that was before the panel, that the panel failed to address a material issue, that the panel made inconsistent findings, or something of a similar nature. It is not enough to argue that conflicting evidence should have been interpreted differently.

The applicant must also be able to demonstrate that the alleged error is material and relevant to the outcome of the decision, and that if the error is corrected, the reviewing panel would change the outcome of the decision.

In the Board’s view, a motion to review cannot succeed in varying the outcome of the decision if the moving party cannot satisfy these tests, and in that case, there would be no useful purpose in proceeding with the motion to review.

Section D: Board Process

IGUA's grounds for review included the following alleged errors in the process used by the panel:

1. The Board has no jurisdiction to conduct what amounts to its own public inquiry in the midst of a contested rates and pricing proceeding between utilities and their ratepayers,
2. In embarking on its own public inquiry with respect to matters in issue between the parties with respect to storage regulation, the Board erred in law in exceeding its adjudicative mandate and engaged in a process which disqualifies it as an adjudicator and invalidates its decision with respect to forbearance.

In particular, IGUA argued that the process adopted by the Board was flawed as it did not adhere to traditional notions of the adversarial process. IGUA's position was that a "contested rates and pricing proceeding between utilities and their ratepayers" is required to be conducted by the Board as if it were litigation between the parties as it is fundamentally an issue between them as to what the rates should be.

In IGUA's view, the Board departed from appropriate practice at the prehearing stage by

- Setting the agenda based on its priorities
- Defining the issues without input from the parties
- Directing the utilities to file evidence pertaining to some of the issues identified by the Board
- Directing that settlement discussions take place on all issues except storage regulation
- Directing all parties to file their evidence at the same time rather than dividing them by interest and having them file evidence in support of and then opposed to the issues identified by the Board

IGUA's largest area of concern however was that once evidence had been filed, "the Board did not confine its future participation in the process to the performance of the adjudicative functions of hearing and determining the matters of fact and law in dispute". IGUA's overriding complaint is that the Board was engaging in its own fact finding mission and was not confining itself to hearing and determining the disputed matters of fact and law which had been raised by parties opposite in interest to one another.

IGUA argued that once a dispute became clear as between the utilities and the ratepayers the Board had to "stay out of the arena" and allow these parties to determine how to present and argue the case, in effect constraining the Board to choose between the cases put forward by the various parties.

Examples of the alleged behaviour objected to by IGUA include:

- The Board advising the parties that it had retained its own expert, but then not filing a report from this expert nor having him made available for cross examination.
- Board members posing questions which indicated that they were searching for a forbearance solution to the Storage Regulation issues, but not asking questions about the ability of the existing regulatory regime to address the concerns which the Board raised.
- The Board advising BP Canada, a party to the hearing, that it wished to hear evidence from it on certain issues and providing a list of questions in advance – at the time counsel for ratepayer interests objected to the question as "rather leading".
- Counsel for the Board hearing team taking a position in argument adverse in interest to the evidence it had led.

Counsel for Board Staff argued that IGUA's complaints ignore critical differences between the Board and the courts and they confuse the role of the hearing panel with the roles of staff counsel in Board proceedings.

Counsel for Board Staff argued that the Board is not a court of record. It is a highly specialized tribunal that has a strong and important policy-making function. The Board is entitled to commence or initiate proceedings in its own right. It is not required to sit passively as an independent adjudicator and wait for parties to initiate proceedings before it, nor is the Board required to play a purely passive adjudicative role during the course of proceedings once they have been commenced, and particularly once they have been commenced at the instigation of the Board itself.

Counsel for Board Staff also argued that hearing panels of the Board are fully entitled to ask probing questions of witnesses who appear before them, and there is nothing whatsoever untoward about doing so.

The other parties largely supported the position of Board Staff.

Findings

At a minimum, the Board is required to comply with the provisions of the SPPA and the *Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998* ("OEB Act"). The SPPA provides parties with certain procedural rights, none of which IGUA has alleged has been disregarded by the Board in this case:

- Parties must be given reasonable notice of the hearing (s 6)
- Hearings must be open to the public, except where intimate personal or financial; may be disclosed (s 9)
- Parties have the right to counsel (s 10)
- Parties have the right to call and examine witnesses and present evidence and submissions and to conduct cross-examinations of witnesses at the hearing reasonably required for a full and fair disclosure of all matters relevant to the issues in the proceeding (s 10.1)

- Tribunals must give decisions in writing and must provide reasons if requested by a party (s 17 (1))
- Parties are entitled to notice of the decision (s 18)
- The tribunal must compile a record of the proceeding (s 20)

Beyond these basic requirements, the SPPA specifically allows tribunals to require parties to participate in various other procedures. With respect to prehearing conferences, section 5.3 of the SPPA provides that a tribunal may direct parties to participate in a prehearing conference to consider the settlement of any or all of the issues.

Section 19(4) of the OEB Act specifically allows the Board to determine matters on its own motion:

The Board of its own motion may, and if so directed by the Minister under section 28 or otherwise, shall determine any matter that under this Act or the regulations it may upon an application determine, and in so doing the Board has and may exercise the same powers as upon an application.

Section 21 of the OEB Act provides that:

The Board may at any time, on its own motion and without a hearing, give directions or require the preparation of evidence incidental to the exercise of the powers conferred upon the Board by this or any other Act.

Therefore as well as the power to initiate proceedings, the Board is also given the statutory right to require the preparation of evidence incidental to the exercise of its powers.

While the Board accepts IGUA's argument that in a hearing under Section 36 of the OEB Act it has the jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of law and fact, it does not agree with IGUA's characterization of the limits on its exercise of this adjudicative function.

As the Board has an over-riding responsibility to make its decisions in the public interest the parties cannot have the final word in determining the nature of the dispute and the options open to the Board. The Board is not required to accept the position of any of the parties, provided that its process is transparent and open and the parties have a fair opportunity to exercise their rights under the SPPA.

IGUA cited several authorities in support of its argument. The Board found them of little assistance as they arose in quite different contexts, generally that of civil disputes between the parties. That is not the context within which the Board operates. We are not judges in civil disputes and the Board's mandate is much broader than determining rights between the parties.

With respect to the specific allegations made by IGUA, the Board's findings follow.

The Board was fully entitled to issue a notice of proceeding on its own motion in December of 2005 and to delineate the issues it expected the parties and the intervenors to address in the proceeding.

Pursuant to the Board's settlement guidelines and the SPPA, the Board is entitled to exclude from the ambit of a settlement conference particular issues that it believes should be heard in full in the hearing which is what the hearing panel did in this case. This is another example of an area where the Board's practice is fundamentally different from that of the courts.

The Board is fully entitled under its Rules to develop procedural orders to meet the needs of any particular proceeding and there is nothing in the Rules or the SPPA which would restrict it from directing all parties to file their evidence simultaneously. This does

not in any way impede the parties from exercising their statutory rights to have access to the evidence and to cross-examine witnesses.

In a proceeding initiated by the Board, as this one was, where there is no applicant, this procedure is an appropriate one.

With respect to the expert witness retained by Board Staff, Section 14 of the OEB Act expressly permits the Board “to appoint persons having technical or special knowledge to assist the Board.” As there is no suggestion that the Board’s expert played a role in the deliberations of the hearing panel or that the hearing panel relied in any way on the advice of the expert, there is nothing improper arising out of his retainer. Experts consulted by Board Staff are in the same position as staff and are not required to file evidence, or to submit to questioning by any of the parties.

The Board also finds that IGUA’s complaints that the NGEIR panel members asked questions of witnesses, which IGUA complains indicated that they were searching for a forbearance solution to the storage regulation issue, are without merit. Adjudicators are entitled to ask probing questions of witnesses who testify before them, including leading questions. The fact that questions are asked or not asked does not mean that the panel has made up its mind one way or the other on an issue.

The Board also finds that the NGEIR panel was fully entitled as a result of the powers granted in section 21 of the OEB Act to act as it did in putting questions to a witness from BP Canada. It is also not an unusual occurrence for the Board to agree to hear evidence in camera, where there is confidential or sensitive commercial information involved.

The Board also finds no error in the fact that counsel for the Board hearing team made final argument in which she took a position adverse to the expert evidence that the Board hearing team led. The Board hearing team is entitled to take whatever position it chooses based on the evidence that was adduced during the hearing and nothing that Board hearing counsel did could possibly ground a complaint of breaches of the rules of

natural justice against the NGEIR hearing panel itself.

Section E: Board Jurisdiction under Section 29

The joint factum of CCC and VECC and the factum of the IGUA both allege that the original NGEIR panel erred in misinterpreting or overreaching in respect of its jurisdiction under section 29 of the OEB Act.

In particular, the CCC/VECC factum states as follows at paragraph 8:

8. The moving parties submit that the NGEIR Decision raises the following issues:

(i) Whether the Board correctly interpreted Section 29 of the Ontario Energy Board Act (the “Act”). It is the position of the moving parties that the Board erred in its interpretation of Section 29 of the Act, thereby depriving itself of jurisdiction;

(ii) Whether the Board gave effect to the legislative intent underlying Section 29 of the Act. It is the position of the moving parties that the Board failed to give effect to the intention of the Legislature in enacting Section 29 of the Act;

In its factum, IGUA alleged that the Board had no jurisdiction to conduct what IGUA characterized as the Board’s “own public inquiry in the midst of a contested rates and pricing proceeding between utilities and their ratepayers”. (IGUA factum par. 84(a))

IGUA also alleged that:

...the Board erred in law in exceeding its adjudicative mandate and engaged in a process which disqualifies it as an adjudicator and invalidates its Decision with respect to forbearance. (IGUA factum par. 84(b))

In addition to these general submissions by CCC/VECC and IGUA about the NGEIR panel's interpretation of its jurisdiction under Section 29, these parties also argued specifically that the NGEIR panel exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 29 by restructuring the storage businesses of Union and Enbridge. They asserted that the power to restructure the storage business comes under section 36 of the legislation. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 28 and 56-57)

Findings

The NGEIR panel's interpretation and application of section 29 is central to the NGEIR Decision. The NGEIR Decision therefore deals extensively with the question of the legal test to be applied under section 29, the analytical framework for assessing whether the natural gas market is competitive and finally, the assessment of market power in the natural gas sector in Ontario.

The starting point for the NGEIR Decision is the Board's interpretation of section 29 which is set out in Chapter 3 of the Decision and reads as follows:

On an application or in a proceeding, the Board shall make a determination to refrain, in whole or part, from exercising any power or performing any duty under this Act if it finds as a question of fact that a licensee, person, product, class of products, service or class of services is or will be subject to competition sufficient to protect the public interest

In Chapter 3 of the NGEIR Decision, the NGEIR panel discussed the statutory test to be used in the assessment of competition in the storage market and applies the analytical framework mandated by that statutory test. In particular, the panel reviews the history of section 29 and of the concept of forbearance and light-handed regulation.

The NGEIR panel's review of Section 29 is described at two levels. The first is the assessment of competition, which is done by applying the market power tests, and the second is the relationship between competition and the public interest.

The NGEIR panel interprets “competition” within section 29 at page 24 of the NGEIR Decision as follows:

There are degrees of competition in any market. They range from a monopoly, where there is a sole seller, to perfect competition, where there are many sellers and no one seller can influence price and quantity in the market. It is not necessary to find that there is perfect competition in a market to meet the statutory test of “competition sufficient to protect the public interest”; what economists refer to as a “workably competitive” market may well be sufficient.

It is also important to remember that competition is a dynamic concept. Accordingly, in section 29 the test is whether a class of products “is or will be” subject to sufficient competition. In this respect parties often rely on qualitative evidence to estimate the direction in which the market is moving.

The NGEIR panel further interprets its mandate at page 44 as follows:

...Section 29 says that the Board shall make a determination to refrain “in whole or part” which the Board believes allows considerable flexibility in this regard. In addition, the Board concludes that it is required by the statute to address the public interest trade-offs, for example, between price impacts and the development of storage and the Ontario market generally.

The NGEIR panel then proceeds to assess the “level of competition” using the market power tests and finds the storage market in Ontario is subject to “workable competition”.

Following this, it then addresses the question of whether the level of competition is sufficient to protect the public interest. In so doing, the panel addresses what should be

encompassed in its consideration of the public interest in the context of the assessing competition as follows:

The public interest can incorporate many aspects including customers, investors, utilities, the market, and the environment. Union and Enbridge argued for a narrow definition of the public interest. In their view, competition itself protects the public interest, and once the Board has satisfied itself that the market is competitive, the public interest is protected by definition. The Board finds this to be an inappropriate narrowing of the concept. Competition is better characterized as a continuum, not a simple “yes” or “no”. The Board would not be fulfilling its responsibilities if it limited the review in the way suggested without considering the full range of impacts and the potential need for transition mechanisms and other means by which to ensure forbearance proceeds smoothly.

Some of the intervenors took the position that the public interest review should be focussed on the financial impacts. For example, Schools argued that the Board should look at the benefits and costs of forbearance, and in its view, the costs include a possible transfer of between \$50 million and \$174 million from ratepayers to shareholders (arising from the proposed end to the margin-sharing mechanisms and the potential re-pricing of cost-based storage to market prices). The Board agrees that the financial impacts are a relevant consideration, but does not agree that an assessment of the public interest should be limited to an assessment of the immediate rate impacts. [Emphasis added] (pages 42 and 43)

The NGEIR panel then proceeds to balance the Board’s public interest mandate against its legislative objectives and describes the trade-offs. It does this by reviewing each of the relevant objectives (i.e., to facilitate competition in the sale of gas to users, to protect the interests of consumers with respect to prices and the reliability and quality of gas service, to facilitate rational development and safe operation of gas storage) and

conducting an assessment of whether the level of storage competition is sufficient to protect the public interest in light of each of those objectives.

At page 56 of Chapter 5, having determined that part of the storage market is workably competitive and having considered some of the key elements of the public interest, the panel addresses whether and in what circumstances the Board should refrain from setting storage prices and approving storage contracts.

In terms of a section 29 analysis, the goal would be to continue to regulate (and set cost-based rates) for those customers who do not have competitive storage alternatives and to refrain from regulating (allow market-based prices) for those who do have competitive alternatives.

The NGEIR panel then applies its interpretation of the legislative intent of section 29 to the facts before it. That panel's understanding of its mandate under section 29 and its careful application of that mandate are evidenced in its findings at pages 56 and 57 of the decision. The NGEIR panel's application of the requisite elements of section 29 is evident in the balancing between considerations of competition with aspects of public interest.

The parties recognized that bundled customers, in particular, do not acquire storage services separately from distribution services, do not control their use of storage, and do not have effective access to alternatives in either the primary or secondary markets. Competition has not extended to the retail end of the market, and therefore is not sufficient to protect the public interest. However, the Board finds that customers taking unbundled or semi-unbundled service should have equivalent access to regulated cost-based storage for their reasonable needs. The Board finds that it would not further the development of the competitive market, or facilitate the development of unbundled and semi-unbundled services, if these unbundled and semi-unbundled services were to include current storage services at unregulated rates. The Board also agrees with

the parties that noted that re-pricing existing storage will not provide an incentive for investment in new storage and therefore cannot be said to provide that public interest benefit.

However, customers taking unbundled and semi-unbundled services do have greater control over their acquisition and use of storage than do bundled customers. It is also the Board's expectation that these customers will have access to and use services from the secondary market. Therefore, the Board concludes it is particularly important to ensure that the allocation of cost-based regulated storage to these customers is appropriate. This issue is addressed in Chapter 6.

MHP Canada has suggested that the Board adopt full forbearance in storage pricing as a policy direction. Similarly, Union has characterized its allocation proposal and Enbridge has characterized its "exemption" approach for in-franchise customers as being "transitions" to full competition. The Board has found that the current level of competition is not sufficient to refrain from regulating all storage prices; nor do we see evidence that it would be appropriate to refrain from regulating all storage prices in the future. The current structure (for example, the full integration of Union's storage and transportation businesses and the full integration of Union as a provider of storage services and as a user of storage services) is not conducive to full forbearance from storage rate setting. In addition, there would be significant direct and indirect rate impacts associated with full forbearance from rate setting, and there is little evidence of significant attendant public interest benefits. The current situation is that these customers are not subject to competition sufficient to protect the public interest; nor is there a reasonable prospect that they will be at some future time.

The submissions of both CCC/VECC and of IGUA are that the Board misinterpreted and misapplied section 29 of the OEB Act. This panel finds that there is no reviewable error

associated with the NGEIR panel's interpretation of section 29. The NGEIR Decision clearly evidences that the NGEIR panel knew and understood that section 29 was not a section that the Board had invoked in any previous decisions or analyses. For that reason, the Decision provides extensive background regarding the section and goes into significant detail regarding the appropriate framework and analysis required to be undertaken. The Decision shows that the NGEIR panel reviewed the elements of section 29 and considered each of those elements in considerable detail. Where moving parties raised specific questions regarding the application of Section 29, for example, with respect to whether the NGEIR panel had sufficient evidence upon which to make a finding that there was competition sufficient to protect the public interest and whether the NGEIR panel erred in setting a cap on the amount of natural gas storage available to in-franchise customers, the Board makes specific findings elsewhere in this Decision.

With respect to the allegation by CCC/VECC and IGUA that the NGEIR panel exceeded its jurisdiction by restructuring the storage businesses of Union and Enbridge, something which they assert should come under section 36 of the legislation, the Board also finds there is no reviewable error.

The NGEIR panel confined its considerations related to the application of the test under Section 29 in determining whether and to what extent there was competition in the natural gas storage market sufficient to protect the public interest. The portions of the decision that go on to discuss the impacts of the Section 29 decision on the structure of the natural gas storage market flow from the determination under Section 29, but the NGEIR panel does not, in its Decision, describe these as arising out of their Section 29 jurisdiction. The NGEIR proceeding was commenced pursuant to sections 19, 29 and 36 of the *Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998*. As such, the NGEIR panel acted under the authority of Section 29 and 36 in making the determinations in the NGEIR Decision. The decisions made by the NGEIR panel with respect to the allocation of storage available at cost-based rates and the treatment of the premium on market-based storage transactions were made based on evidence filed by the parties to the proceeding and the NGEIR panel considers this evidence as part of the NGEIR Decision.

The Board finds that the allegations of CCC/VECC and IGUA on this point do not raise a question as to the correctness of the decision. The NGEIR panel clearly confined itself to its legislative mandate as provided in Section 29 in determining whether the natural gas market was subject to competition sufficient to protect the public interest. The NGEIR's findings that flow from the Section 29 determination align with the evidence that was before it, did not fail to address any material issue and did not make any inconsistent findings with respect to the evidence before it, except as otherwise noted in this decision.

Section F: Status Quo

The factums and submission of both CCC/VECC and of IGUA allege that the NGEIR panel erred by failing to consider the option of retaining the current regulatory regime in respect of natural gas storage regulation. CCC/VECC and IGUA articulate this alleged error in a number of different ways in different parts of their factums and submissions.

For example, at paragraph 3 of their joint factum, CCC and VECC take the position that:

“... the Board was obligated to consider whether a change in the status quo with respect to the regulation of storage was required and that it erred in failing to do so.” IGUA’s factum states that “...reasonable people, objectively examining the process which led to the Decision, will likely conclude that retaining the status quo was not a decision-making option which the Board considered, either fairly or at all, and that the Board itself was a proponent for forbearance relief.”

Findings

The NGEIR Decision provides evidence in various places, of the NGEIR panel’s recognition of both the current regulatory status with respect on natural gas storage in Ontario and the dynamic nature of competition generally.

In particular, Chapter 2 is described at page 5 of the decision as “...an overview of gas storage in Ontario today – the existing storage facilities, the use of storage by Union’s and Enbridge’s “in-franchise” customers, the “ex-franchise” market for storage, and the prices charged for storage services.”

Later in the NGEIR Decision, as part of its findings on the assessment of assessment of storage competition, the Board expressly disagrees with Mr. Stauff’s testimony that the regulated cost-base price for storage is a reasonable proxy for the competitive price of

storage. Implicit in this finding is the NGEIR panel's consideration of the current regulatory regime.

At page 46 of the Decision, the NGEIR Panel also considered the current regulatory regime in the context of question of the sharing of the premium which exists between the price of market-based storage and the underlying costs. The Board acknowledged the current state as follows:

Currently, that premium is shared between utility ratepayers and utility shareholders. Under the utilities' proposals for forbearance, the premium would be retained by the shareholders. This would result in significant transfer of funds in the case of Union (2007 estimate is \$44.5 million); less so in the case of Enbridge (2007 estimate is \$5 million to \$6 million). The intervenors in general rejects these proposals and, as a result, opposed forbearance.

At page 47, the NGEIR panel specifically considered and expressly acknowledged the importance of the change from the status quo, but ultimately rejected these submissions as follows:

The Board agrees that the distribution of the premium is a significant consideration. In many ways, it has been the underlying focus of the NGEIR Proceeding. However, the impact of removing the premium from rates is the result of removing a sharing of economic rents; it is not the result of competition bringing about a price increase. So while it is an important consideration which the Board must address (see Chapter 7), it is not a sufficient reason, in and of itself, to continue regulating storage prices.

There are a number of other examples throughout the NGEIR Decision that satisfy the Board that the NGEIR panel was conscious of the status quo regulatory regime and bore this in mind throughout its analysis on the narrow issue of competition and the s.

29 analysis as well as in considering the impacts upon both shareholders and ratepayers, of a completely or partial forbearance decision.

The Board also feels that the decision by the NGEIR panel to continue to regulate and set cost-based rates for existing storage services provided to in-franchise customers up to their allocated amounts evidences a clear understanding of the current regulatory framework and under what circumstances, based upon the evidentiary record before the NGEIR panel, it was appropriate to deviate from that current framework.

The Board is not convinced, however, that the analysis mandated by the legislative language of s. 29 requires the Board to consider the status quo in the way that has been suggested by some parties. Although it was important for the NGEIR panel to review the current regulatory framework to set the stage for the analysis, the Board is not convinced by the arguments of CCC/VECC, nor those of IGUA that consideration of the status quo is an integral, or even a necessary part of the s. 29 analysis. The purpose of s. 29 was clearly stated by the NGEIR panel and that is to determine whether there is or will be competition sufficient to protect the public interest. If there is a finding that competition does exist, nothing in the section requires the panel to then consider whether the current regulatory framework is sufficient to accommodate the competitive market. In fact, the section mandates that upon finding competition sufficient to protect the public interest, that "...the Board shall make a determination to refrain, in whole or part, from exercising any power or performing any duty under this Act..." In this case, the Board determined that it would refrain, in part, from regulating the setting of rates and the review of contracts for natural gas storage.

The Board therefore concludes that CCC/VECC and IGUA have not demonstrated that their grounds for review based on the alleged failure of the NGEIR panel to consider retaining the status quo as a viable decision-making option raise an issue that is material and directly relevant to the findings made in the decision. This panel concludes that there is no reviewable error with respect to the NGEIR panel's alleged failure to fairly consider the status quo.

Section G: Onus

At paragraph 84(d) of its factum, IGUA alleges that the Board erred in concluding that there is no onus of proof to be assigned in the rates and pricing proceedings it initiated. IGUA alleges that the NGEIR panel erred in law in not assigning the onus of proof to the utilities.

Findings

Pages 26 to 27 of the NGEIR Decision deal explicitly with this issue. In that part of the Decision, the panel acknowledges that generally, the onus is on the applicant. The panel also, however, pointed out the unique nature of the NGEIR proceeding and the fact that the proceeding was brought on the Board's own motion.

The Board is satisfied that all parties to the NGEIR Proceeding were given a full and fair opportunity to provide submissions on the question of onus and that, based on the Decision, the NGEIR panel heard and understood those submissions. This panel is not satisfied that the question of onus is an issue that is material and directly relevant to the findings made in the Decision, nor that if a reviewing panel did decide the issue differently, that it would change the outcome of the Decision. For these reasons, the Board finds that there is no reviewable error relating to assignment of or the failure to assign onus in the NGEIR proceeding.

Section H: Competition in the Secondary Market

In the NGEIR Decision, the Board concluded that Ontario storage operators compete in a geographic market that includes Michigan and parts of Illinois, Indiana, New York and Pennsylvania, that the market is competitive and neither Union nor Enbridge have market power. This determination was made by employing the following four step process, based on the Competition Bureau's Merger Enforcement Guidelines (MEGs):

- Identification of the product market.
- Identification of the geographic market.
- Calculation of market share and market concentration measures.
- An assessment of the conditions for entry for new suppliers, together with any dynamic efficiency considerations (such as the climate for innovation and the likelihood of attracting new investment).

IGUA alleged that the NGEIR panel made numerous errors in assessing sufficiency of competition in the secondary market. IGUA's allegations of errors can be summarized as follows:

- The NGEIR panel erred in misapprehending and misapplying the analytical tests used for determining market power.
- The NGEIR panel did not recognize that the evidence pertaining to the operation of the secondary market did not quantitatively establish the extent to which storage services, excluding commodity, were available at Dawn, nor their prices, nor whether consumers regarded such services as substitutes for delivery services offered by Union.

- The NGEIR panel failed to recognize that the evidence of Gaz Métropolitain Inc. (GMi) did not establish that Union lacked market power in storage services transacted at Dawn, and indeed this evidence established the opposite.

Findings

IGUA alleges that the Board misapprehended and misapplied the market power analytical frameworks presented in documents from the Competition Bureau, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC). According to IGUA, a 10 step procedure must be followed in order to correctly carry out a market power analysis instead of the four step process used by the NGEIR panel.

The Board notes that, in settling on the four step procedure that should apply to determine whether Union and Enbridge have market power and whether the storage market is competitive, the NGEIR Decision provided substantial review and analysis pertaining to Competition Bureau's Enforcement Guidelines (MEGs) and the FERC's 1996 Policy Statement on Market Power Analysis. It is evidenced in the Decision that this was the result of the review of substantial pre-filed evidence, cross examination and argument on this topic.

In the Board's view, the test to be applied is not whether a review panel of the Board would have adopted a different analytical framework. Rather, it is matter of whether in settling upon a certain analytical process, there was an error of fact or law. In view of the extensive record and the analysis and reasons provided in the NGEIR Decision, the Board finds that IGUA not raised an identifiable error in the NGEIR Decision. Rather the submissions of the moving parties are more in the nature of re-arguing the same points that were made in the original hearing. This evidence was presented and evaluated by the NGEIR panel. As the Board stated in enunciating the threshold test at Section C of this Decision, a motion for review cannot succeed if a party simply argues that the Board should have interpreted conflicting evidence differently. The Board has therefore

determined that there is not enough substance to the issues raised by IGUA such that a review of those issues could result in the Board determining that the NGEIR Decision or Order should be varied, cancelled or suspended. As such, the NGEIR panel's determination on the nature and application of market power analysis to the natural gas storage market in and around Ontario is not reviewable.

IGUA alleges that the NGEIR panel did not recognize that the evidence pertaining to the operation of the secondary market did not quantitatively establish the extent to which storage services were available at Dawn, nor their prices or whether consumers regarded such services as substitutes for delivery services offered by Union.

In the Board's view, this alleged error is essentially an application of the alleged market power analysis framework error discussed above. The NGEIR panel listed several forms of evidence in support of its conclusion that the secondary market in transportation services is unconstrained and therefore serves to enlarge the geographic market from what it would otherwise have been found to be.

The NGEIR panel treated evidence on the operation of primary and secondary markets in transportation as relevant to the determination of the geographic market in a manner consistent with the market power analysis methodology that the NGEIR panel had settled upon. For the reasons stated above, the Board finds that the original NGEIR panel's use of evidence relating to the secondary market in transportation services is not reviewable.

IGUA cites the NGEIR hearing transcript (volume 10, pages 56-120) in support of its allegation that the Board failed to recognize that GMi's evidence actually supported IGUA's view that Union has market power.

The Decision (at page 35, paragraphs 4-5) clearly reflects the statements of GMi witnesses that they regularly contact alternative suppliers for comparisons to Union's services. IGUA has not shown that the NGEIR panel's findings are contrary to the evidence that was before the panel, or that the panel failed to address GMi's evidence

or made inconsistent findings with respect to that evidence. The Board therefore finds that there is no reviewable error with respect to the NGEIR panel's use of the evidence provided by GMi.

Section I: Harm to Ratepayers

IGUA and CCC/VECC alleged that the Board erred when it bifurcated the natural gas storage market between those customers that continue to benefit from storage regulation and those customers who do not. They allege that as a result of this bifurcated market, the Board conferred a windfall benefit on the shareholders of the utilities with no corresponding benefit to ratepayers and that this is unfair.

The parties also alleged that the transitional measures the Board employed to implement the new regime merely serve to underscore the error in the finding that the market should be split. The parties alleged that the market, taken as a whole, was determined not to be workably competitive, and the transitional measures are evidence that a decision to forbear from the regulation of prices was not appropriate.

Finally, CCC and VECC alleged that the Board erred in its interpretation of section 29, and acted in excess of its jurisdiction, by moving assets out of rate base, with no credit to the ratepayer. They argued that the effect of the NGEIR Decision is to allocate the rate base storage assets of the utilities between in-franchise and ex-franchise customers, and to allow for a new shareholder business within each utility. They submitted that doing those things does not naturally follow from a finding that the rates charged by the utilities to ex-franchise customers do not need to be regulated.

Findings

The Board finds that the issues raised in this area have not met the threshold test for the matter to be forwarded to a reviewing panel of this Board. The NGEIR panel did not err in failing to consider the facts, the evidence, or in exercising its mandate. There were no facts omitted or misapprehended in the NGEIR panel's analysis nor are the moving parties raising any new facts.

It was entirely within the NGEIR panel's mandate and discretion how to assess the competitive position of segments of the market and how to address the regulatory treatment of customers within those segments. The NGEIR panel clearly decided that ex-franchise customers of both Union and Enbridge had access to a competitive natural gas storage market. Further, the decision goes on to make clear on page 61, that Enbridge as a utility is ex-franchise to Union and therefore should be subject to market prices. The NGEIR Decision differentiates between the competitive position of a utility (e.g. Enbridge) and the competitive position of that utility's in-franchise customers. For example, the Decision is clear that the in-franchise customers of Enbridge will pay cost-based rates which will continue to be regulated by the Board and are based on EGD's costs of storage service owned by the utility and the costs that EGD pays for procuring these services in the competitive market.

A key issue the parties raise is that the bifurcated market brings about unfair and inconsistent treatment, and therefore constitutes a misapplication of the Board's mandate to protect the public interest. However, on this point, the grounds that the moving parties raised to support a review are in fact the very points used by the NGEIR panel to protect consumers as a natural consequence of the decision to refrain from storage regulation of the ex-franchise market. It is clear that the NGEIR panel took into account the protection of the public interest in its decision to provide transition mechanisms to protect consumers.

With respect to the allegation of a windfall benefit for shareholders of the utilities with no corresponding benefit to ratepayers, the Board is of the view that this is related to the question of earnings sharing. This issue is more fully addressed in Section K of this Decision. It is important to note here, however, that the NGEIR panel's decisions with respect to the profit or earnings sharing mechanism were based on the evidence presented by all parties and flowed from the broader decisions with respect to the competitiveness of the gas storage market. Chapter 7 of the NGEIR Decision clearly described the NGEIR panel's considerations with respect to and its reasoning for changing the earnings sharing mechanism. In the Board's view, the changes related to the earnings sharing mechanism necessarily arise from a recognition by the Board of

the implications of its findings under Section 29 that there is a workably competitive market for storage in the ex-franchise market.

Section J: Union's 100 PJ Cap

In their factum, CCC and VECC allege that, on the one hand the Board in its NGEIR Decision said that a substantial portion of the storage market requires regulatory protection because there is insufficient competition to protect the public interest while on the other hand the Board exposed this same group to the effects of competition from the unregulated market.

Kitchener has also specifically sought the Board's review of an aspect of the NGEIR Decision related to the Board's placement of a "cap" on the amount of Union's storage space that is reserved for in-franchise customers at cost-based rates.

The Board determined at page 83 of the NGEIR Decision that Union should reserve 100 PJ of storage space at cost-based rates for its in-franchise customers. The Decision reads as follows (page 83):

The Board acknowledges that there is no single, completely objective way to decide how much should be reserved for future in-franchise needs. The Board has determined that Union should be required to reserve 100 PJ (approximately 95 Bcf) of space at cost-based rates for in-franchise customers. This compares with Union's estimate of 2007 in-franchise needs of 92 PJ (87 Bcf). At an annual growth rate of 0.5% each year, which Union claims is the growth rate since 2000, in-franchise needs would not reach 100 PJ until 2024. The limit would be reached in 2016 if the annual growth is 1%; at a very annual high growth rate of 2% per annum, the 100 PJ limit would be reached in 2012.

The 100 PJ (95 Bcf) amount is the capacity that Union must ensure is available to in-franchise customers if they need it. Union should continue to charge in-franchise customers based on the amount of space required in any year. If Union's in-franchise customers require less than 95 Bcf in any year, as measured by Union's standard allocation methodology, the

cost-based rates should be based on that amount, not on the full 95 Bcf reserved for their future use. Union will have the flexibility to market the difference between the total amount needed and the 95 Bcf reserve amount.

The Board acknowledged that the cap might be reached at any time between 2012 and 2024, depending on what growth rate assumptions are used. At the current rate of growth (0.5% each year), the cap would not be met until 2024.

In Kitchener's oral submissions (page 187, Volume 1), Mr. Ryder on behalf of Kitchener makes the following comments:

And while the cap of 100 pJs allows for some growth so it won't immediately affect the Ontario consumer, the cap will be reached between 2012 and 2024. That's between 5 and 17 years from now.

Now, that's not far off, and if the public interest requires a margin for growth today in 2007, then the public interest will surely require it in five to 17 years from now when the cap is reached.

And when it is reached, it is my submission that the Board will have wished it had reviewed the decision in 2007, because, when the cap is reached, this decision will be responsible for adding significantly to the costs of energy in Ontario, to the detriment of the Ontario consumer.

Page 7 of the CCC/VECC factum states:

The Board made no finding, however, that at the end of the operation of those transitional measures, the public interest, as represented by in-franchise customers of Union and EGD, would be protected. The moving parties submit that Section 29 required the Board, before making an order to forbear from regulation under Section 29, to find on the evidence that,

at the end of the transitional measures, there would be sufficient competition to protect the public interest. The moving parties submit that, in failing to make that finding, the Board erred.

Findings

On page 57 of the NGEIR decision, in reference to the in-franchise customers of Union the NGEIR panel makes the following statement:

The current situation is that these customers are not subject to competition sufficient to protect the public interest; nor is there reasonable prospect that they will be at some future time.

Later in the decision at page 82, the decision states:

The Board panel concludes that its determination that the storage market is competitive requires it to clearly delineate the portion of Union's storage business that will be exempt from rate regulation. Retaining a perpetual call on all of Union's current capacity for future in-franchise needs is not consistent with forbearance. As evidenced by the arguments from GMi and Nexen, two major participants in the ex-franchise market, retaining such a call is likely to create uncertainty in the ex-franchise market that is not conducive to the continued growth and development of Dawn as a major market centre.

The Board concludes that it would be inappropriate, however, to freeze the in-franchise allocation at the level proposed by Union. Union's proposal implies that a distributor with an obligation to serve would be prepared to own, or to have under contract, only the amount of storage needed to serve in-franchise customers for just the next year. In the Board's view, it is appropriate to allow for some additional growth in in-

franchise needs when determining the “utility asset” portion of Union’s current capacity.

The Board acknowledges that there is no single, completely objective way to decide how much should be reserved for future in-franchise needs.”

The NGEIR panel then goes on to provide its decision on the methodology which was used to determine the cap and says at page 83 of the decision:

The 100 PJ (95 BCF) amount is the capacity that Union must ensure is available to in-franchise customers if they need it.

The NGEIR panel then makes a finding with respect to how the excess capacity should be treated if the in-franchise customers require less than 100 PJ in a given year. The NGEIR panel is silent on the outcome if in-franchise customers require more than 100 PJ of storage per year. Although the NGEIR panel is clear that it does not expect this circumstance to occur for many years, the decision nevertheless appears to raise the possibility that in-franchise customers may, at some point, be subject to unregulated prices.

The Board finds that on this issue the moving parties have raised a question as to the correctness of the order or decision and that a review based on the issue could result in the Board deciding that the decision or order should be varied, cancelled or suspended.

In particular, in this instance, there are unanswered questions that are raised by the NGEIR Decision on the 100 PJ cap issue. Since the NGEIR Decision clearly stated that the in-franchise customers did not have and were not likely to have access to competition in the foreseeable future, a decision that forbears from the regulation of pricing for these customers at some time in the future does not appear to this panel to be consistent. The Board finds that the following questions should have been addressed by the NGEIR panel:

- (a) If the cap of 100 PJ of storage for in-franchise Union customers remain in place in perpetuity, what is the basis for forbearance (under Section 29) of required storage above 100 PJ for in-franchise customers?
- (b) If the cap of 100 PJ of storage for in-franchise Union customers does not remain in place in perpetuity, what mechanism should the Board use to monitor the likelihood of the cap being exceeded?
- (c) If the cap of 100 PJ of storage for in-franchise Union customers is likely to be exceeded, what, if any, remedy is available to in-franchise customers?

The Board therefore finds that the NGEIR panel either failed to address a material issue or made inconsistent findings, that the alleged error is material and relevant to the outcome of the decision, and that if the error is substantiated by a reviewing panel and corrected, the reviewing panel could change the outcome of the decision.

The Board therefore finds that this is a reviewable matter.

Section K: Earnings Sharing

Certain parties, led by VECC, allege that the NGEIR panel erred because one of the effects of the NGEIR Decision on the in-franchise customers of Union is that these customers will lose the benefit of their share of the premium obtained by Union through the sale of storage to ex-franchise customers. The parties stated that the NGEIR Decision will result in a material increase in revenue to the shareholder of Union and, to a lesser extent, an increase in the revenue to EGD's shareholder. They also indicated that at the same time, there will be no corresponding benefit to the ratepayers of either Union or EGD. In fact the moving parties argued that the ratepayers of Union and EGD will suffer adverse impacts, in both the short and the long term. The moving parties maintained that the NGEIR Decision upsets the balance between the interests of ratepayers and shareholders which the regulatory system is supposed to maintain and that the NGEIR Decision is, therefore, contrary to public and regulatory policy.

It was also stated by the moving parties that section 29 of the OEB Act does not permit the Board to re-allocate rate-based storage assets. The effect of the NGEIR Decision was to allocate rate-based storage assets between in-franchise and ex-franchise customers and to allow for a new shareholder business within each utility. The moving parties stated that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by moving assets out of rate base with no credit to the ratepayer.

It was further asserted that rather than requiring utility shareholders to share the premiums derived from the sale of storage to ex-franchise customers, there will now be a separation of utility and non-utility assets and revenues and costs associated therewith. The moving parties stated that this will raise cross-subsidization and other issues pertaining to the performance of utility and non-utility services; a result which they say contravenes the spirit and intent of the pure utility policy adopted by the Ontario government years ago.

Further, the parties allege that the Board erred in concluding that it has the power to forbear under Section 29 of the *OEB Act* when an exercise of the power results in a

windfall benefit to utility shareholders and consequential harm to ratepayers. The parties asserted that changes to the allocation between ratepayers and utility shareholders of financial benefits and burdens produced by a particular regulatory regime must take place under the auspices of regulation.

Findings

The Board notes that the NGEIR Decision deals extensively with the issue of the allocation/sharing of margins (also called premiums, revenues or earnings) associated with the sale of natural gas storage on both a short-term (transactional services) and long-term contractual basis. The Decision canvasses both the status quo (prior to the implementation of the changes required by the NGEIR Decision) and provides an explanation of the rationale for changing the earnings sharing structure, the new mechanisms for earnings sharing and the transitional implementation (where applicable) of those mechanisms.

In particular, chapter 2 of the NGEIR Decision provides, among other things, a description of the current types and volumes of sales of natural gas storage by Union to ex-franchise customers and canvasses the current regulatory treatment of ex-franchise sales, including the rate treatment of margins on storage sales. In Chapter 7, the NGEIR panel goes into greater detail regarding the extent of margin sharing and the regulatory history that underlines premium sharing for both short-term (for both Union and Enbridge) and long-term (for Union only) sales of storage.

Chapter 7 goes on to provide the Board's findings on for the sharing of margins for both short-term and long-term transactions and to describe a transition mechanism related to long-term margins.

The record that the NGEIR panel relied upon included extensive evidence and argument of many parties, including the moving parties to this proceeding and the utilities. The NGEIR Decision refers to various parties' submissions on the issue of premium sharing and the Board reiterated some of the historical evidence with respect

to the margin sharing in its Decision. The NGEIR Decision indicates that the NGEIR panel heard and considered the evidence and submissions before it in making its determinations with respect to this issue.

Importantly, the NGEIR panel's findings relate back to and to a certain extent flow from its broader decision to refrain, in part, from regulating rates for storage services. The Board does not accept the suggestion that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by moving assets (in the case of Union) out of rate-base and by altering the status quo margin sharing mechanism. On the contrary, the NGEIR Decision clearly articulates that the changes to margin sharing flow necessarily and logically from the decision to refrain, in part, from regulated rates for storage services.

The determinations of the NGEIR panel are also consistent with its determination to distinguish between "utility assets" and "non-utility assets". The Decision clearly indicates that the NGEIR panel canvassed past decisions of the Board on this issue and considered the implications of its findings on both the utilities and ratepayers. Part of this consideration is evidenced in the development by the panel of a transition mechanism related to the implementation of the Board's finding that profits from new long-term transactions should accrue entirely to the utility (Union) as opposed to ratepayers. The threshold panel does not accept the argument that this transitional implementation is a form of implicit acknowledgement that the finding is inappropriate. The NGEIR panel exemplified Board precedent for the use of a phase-out mechanism and, in its finding, indicated that it had considered other options for a transitional mechanism.

The Board finds that the NGEIR panel's determinations on the treatment of the premium on market-based storage transactions are not reviewable. The record of the NGEIR proceeding clearly demonstrates that the NGEIR panel considered the evidence, the regulatory history with respect to the issue of premium sharing and parties' submissions and made its determination on the basis of that evidence and those submissions. There is nothing in the moving parties' evidence or arguments that demonstrate to the Board that the NGEIR panel made a reviewable error. For this

reason, the Board has determined that the threshold test has not been met and it will not order a review of the NGEIR Decision as it pertains to the issue of the division of the utilities assets or the sharing of the margin realized from the sale of natural gas storage to ex-franchise customers.

Section L: Additional Storage for Generators and Enbridge's Rate 316

Many of the issues which existed between Union and Enbridge and their generator customers were resolved in the Settlement Proposals which were filed and accepted by the Board in the NGEIR proceeding. These settlements deal with storage space parameters, increased deliverability for that space, and access to that enhanced space to balance on an intra-day basis. What remained unresolved was the pricing for the new high deliverability storage services for in-franchise generators.

The utilities had proposed in the NGEIR proceeding to offer these services at market-based rates and proposed that the Board refrain from regulating the rates for these services. The power generators took the position that storage services provided to them should be regulated at cost-based rates.

In the NGEIR Decision, APPrO's position was described as follows:

The Association of Power Producers of Ontario (APPrO) argued that the product it is more interested in – high deliverability storage – is not currently available in Ontario. APPrO argued that competition cannot exist for a product that is not yet introduced and pointed out that when it is introduced it will be available only from Ontario utilities as ex-Ontario suppliers will be constrained by the nomination windows specified by the North American Energy Standards Board (NAESB).

The NGEIR Decision stated:

With respect to APPrO's position, the Board is not convinced that high deliverability storage service is a different product. High deliverability storage may be a new service, but it is a particular way of using physical storage, which still depends upon the physical parameters of working capacity and deliverability.

In the Motions proceeding, APPrO stated that its position was and continues to be narrower than what was described by the NGEIR panel. APPrO was not seeking high deliverability storage. Rather, it was seeking services that would allow generators to manage their gas supply on an intra-day basis. It is not operationally possible for the generator to increase the rate at which gas can be delivered in and out of the storage space with deliverability from a supplier other than Union. Moreover, APPrO asserted that the frequent nominations windows required for such service are only available in Ontario from the utilities. Since this is a monopoly service, then it should be offered at cost.

Union argued that APPrO has not brought forward any new facts or changes in circumstance, nor has it demonstrated any error in the Board's original decision. It also stated that APPrO's assertion that high-deliverability storage is only available from the utility is demonstrably wrong and that there was sufficient evidence that high deliverability storage is available from others. Union disagreed with APPrO's position that deliverability could not be separated from storage space. Although this is correct in the physical context, Union submitted that there were substitutes for deliverability and storage space and gas-fired power generators could acquire their intra-day balancing needs from sources other than the utilities. This according to Union was clearly addressed in the original proceeding and considered by the Board in its decision and APPrO was simply seeking to re-argue its position that had already been fully canvassed.

Enbridge pointed out that any de-linking of storage and deliverability that occurred was as a result of the settlement agreed to by APPrO and the power generators with Enbridge. The settlement states that the allocation methodology for gas-fired generators' intra-day balancing needs is based on the assumption that high deliverability storage is available to those customers in the market.

APPrO has also raised an issue with some aspects of Rate 316 offered by Enbridge. Rate 316 was part of a proposal submitted by Enbridge during the NGEIR proceeding in response to generators' need for high deliverability storage service. As a result of the

Settlement Proposal, Enbridge's Rate 316 provides an allocation of base level deliverability storage at rolled in cost along with high deliverability storage at incremental cost to in-franchise gas fired generators. Section 1.5 of the Settlement Proposal indicates that generators are entitled to an allocation of 1.2% deliverability storage at rolled-in cost based rates.

Findings

In the Board's view, it is unclear from the NGEIR Decision whether the NGEIR panel took the implications of the Union settlement agreement into consideration. The NGEIR Decision does not provide sufficient clarity regarding the issues raised by APPrO. It appears that there are some practical limitations faced by gas-fired generators in that presently they can only access certain services from the utility. Although Union asserted that it is demonstrably wrong to suggest, as APPrO has, that "high-deliverability storage is only available from the utility" and that "there was sufficient evidence that high deliverability storage is available from others" this was not the finding expressed in the NGEIR Decision. In fact, at page 69 of the NGEIR Decision, the NGEIR Panel acknowledged this by stating that: "These services are not currently offered, indeed they need to be developed, and investments must be made in order to offer them." On the other hand, APPrO asserted that only TCPL offers some intra-day services but only in some parts of Ontario through a utility connection or a direct connection with TCPL. To the extent that APPrO's facts may be correct, there is sufficient question whether the NGEIR Decision erred by requiring that monopoly services be priced at market.

For these reasons, and given the potential material impact on power generators, the Board finds that the alleged errors raised by APPrO with respect to Union are material and relevant to the outcome of the decision, and that if the error is substantiated by a reviewing panel and corrected this could change the outcome of the decision. The Board will therefore pass this matter to a reviewing panel of the Board to investigate and make findings as it sees fit.

With respect to the Rate 316 issue, on page 70 of the NGEIR Decision, the Board stated:

The Board notes that Enbridge committed to offer Rate 316, whether or not the Tecumseh enhancement project goes ahead, and to price it on cost pass-through basis. The Board expects Enbridge to fulfill this commitment.

The Board further noted:

The Board will refrain from regulating the rates for new storage services, including Enbridge's high deliverability service from the Tecumseh storage enhancement and Rate 316, and Union's high deliverability storage, F24-S, UPBS and DPBS services.

At the motion hearing, APPrO indicated that it wanted the Board to issue an order requiring Enbridge to do what the Board has asked them to do, that is, to offer Rate 316 on a cost pass-through basis. Enbridge has already committed to offering this service in the Settlement Proposal and the Board has already noted this commitment in this decision. This panel does not see any further value to issuing an order stating the same.

However, there is some ambiguity with respect to Rate 316. The NGEIR decision seems to indicate that the Board will refrain from regulating Rate 316. Even so, the Enbridge NGEIR Rate Order has a tariff sheet for Rate 316 with storage rates for maximum deliverability of 1.2% of contracted storage space. This seems to indicate that Rate 316 is regulated for 1.2% deliverability storage and the Board has refrained from regulating rates for deliverability higher than 1.2%. It is difficult to recognize this distinction from the NGEIR Decision.

For these reasons, the Board finds that APPrO has raised a question as to the correctness of the order or decision in respect of the Rate 316 issue and that a review

panel of the Board could decide that the decision or order should be varied (by way of clarification or otherwise), cancelled or suspended.

Section M: Aggregate Excess Method of Allocating Storage

In the NGEIR proceeding, Union had proposed the “aggregate excess” method in allocating storage to its customers. The aggregate excess method is the difference between the amount of gas a customer is expected to use in the 151-day winter period and the amount that would be consumed in that period based on the customer’s average daily consumption over the entire year. Kitchener had proposed two alternative methodologies. The NGEIR Decision approved Union’s proposal.

Kitchener argued that the NGEIR Decision failed to take into account that the aggregate excess methodology, because it uses normal weather to estimate a customer’s storage allocation, unnecessarily increases utility rates and therefore offends the requirement of just and reasonable rates under sections 2 and 36 of the Act. Kitchener also argued that there is no evidence to support the Board’s conclusion that aggregate excess meets the reasonable load balancing requirements of the Kitchener utility.

Union argued that these issues were fully considered by the Board in its NGEIR Decision and that Kitchener has not brought forward any new evidence or any new circumstances; it is simply attempting to reargue its case.

Findings

With respect to Kitchener’s allegation that the NGEIR panel did not consider the impact on rates, the Board notes that the record in the NGEIR proceeding indicates that the impact on utility rates was examined extensively. The issue was raised in Kitchener’s pre-filed evidence at page 5 and again at page 14. The transcript from the proceeding also indicates that there was extensive discussion on costs (Volume 12, pages 39-133) during cross examination and additional undertakings were filed on the topic. The record also indicates that the previous Panel questioned the witnesses specifically with respect to the costs and a utility’s exposure to winter spot purchases (Volume 12, pages 183-184). The issue was again raised by Kitchener in argument (Volume 17, page 153)

and once again questions were posed to Kitchener's counsel by the NGEIR panel (Volume 17, pages 159-164).

The NGEIR Decision (pages 93 to 95) refers to Kitchener's alternatives and arguments and deals with that issue squarely when it finds that:

The Board does not agree that the allocation of cost based storage should be determined assuming colder than normal weather or that it should be designed to provide protection against a cold snap in April. To do so would result in in-franchise customers as a group being allocated more cost-based storage than they are expected to use in most winters. As noted in 6.2.2, the Board concludes that the objective of the allocation of cost-based storage space is to assign an amount that is reasonably in line with what a customer is likely to require. In the Board's view, that supports continuing the assumption of normal weather.

In the Board's view, the record clearly indicates that this issue was thoroughly examined in the NGEIR proceeding. The Board believes that Kitchener's claim that the NGEIR panel failed to account for the fact the aggregate excess methodology increases utility rates is without merit. Kitchener presented no new evidence or new circumstances which would convince the Board that this issue is reviewable.

To support its second claim (i.e. the Board erred because there is no evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the aggregate excess method meets the reasonable load balancing requirements of the Kitchener utility), Kitchener argues that the Board ignored the evidence which suggests that the actual allocation to Kitchener over the past 6 years has been at a contractual level which is 10.6% higher than aggregate excess.

The Board disagrees. Contrary to Kitchener's assertions, the NGEIR Decision clearly considers the fact that Kitchener's aggregate excess amount is 10.6% lower than its current contracted amount. Specifically, the NGEIR Decision states:

The current contract expires March 31, 2007 and Kitchener is seeking a long-term storage contract with Union effective April 1, 2007. It is concerned that its allocation of cost-based storage in a new contract will be restricted to the amount calculated under the aggregate excess method. Kitchener's current aggregate excess amount is 3.01 million GJ, 10.6% lower than the amount of cost-based storage in its current contract.

The NGEIR Decision also states:

The issue is whether Kitchener has made a compelling case that its use of storage is so different from the assumed use underlying the aggregate excess method that Union should be required to develop an allocation method just for Kitchener. The Board finds Kitchener has not successfully made that argument.

In view of the above, the Board is convinced that the NGEIR panel considered the evidence before it. The claim by Kitchener that the Board ignored the evidence in question and based its decision only on the evidence provided by Union is demonstrably incorrect.

Kitchener also claims that the Board committed an error in fact by stating (at page 85 of the NGEIR Decision), that Enbridge uses a methodology similar to that of Union's. In the Boards' view, this reference is simply to provide context and is clearly referring to the mathematical formula used to calculate the storage allocation. It is certainly not a matter capable of altering the decision on this point.

In conclusion, the Board finds that the matters raised by Kitchener are not reviewable.

Section N: Orders

Having made its determinations on the Motions, the Board considers it appropriate to make the following Orders.

The Board Orders That:

The Motions for Review are hereby dismissed without further hearing, with the following exceptions. The Board's findings on Union's 100 PJ cap on cost-based storage for in-franchise customers and the additional storage requirements for in-franchise gas-fired generators are reviewable for the purposes set out in this Decision.

Section O: Cost Awards

The eligible parties shall submit their cost claims by June 5, 2007. A copy of the cost claim must be filed with the Board and one copy is to be served on both Union and Enbridge. The cost claims must be done in accordance with section 10 of the Board's Practice Direction on Cost Awards.

Union and Enbridge will have until June 19, 2007 to object to any aspect of the costs claimed. A copy of the objection must be filed with the Board and one copy must be served on the party against whose claim the objection is being made.

The party whose cost claim was objected to will have until June 26, 2007 to make a reply submission as to why their cost claim should be allowed. Again, a copy of the submission must be filed with the Board and one copy is to be served on both Union and Enbridge.

DATED at Toronto, May 22, 2007

Original signed by

Pamela Nowina
Presiding Member and Vice Chair

Original signed by

Paul Vlahos
Member

Original signed by

Cathy Spoel
Member

TAB 6

ONTARIO ENERGY BOARD

Rules of Practice and Procedure

(Revised November 16, 2006, July 14, 2008, October 13, 2011, January 9, 2012, January 17, 2013 and April 24, 2014)

PART VII - REVIEW

40. Request

- 40.01 Subject to **Rule 40.02**, any person may bring a motion requesting the Board to review all or part of a final order or decision, and to vary, suspend or cancel the order or decision.
- 40.02 A person who was not a party to the proceeding must first obtain the leave of the Board by way of a motion before it may bring a motion under **Rule 40.01**.
- 40.03 The notice of motion for a motion under **Rule 40.01** shall include the information required under **Rule 42**, and shall be filed and served within 20 calendar days of the date of the order or decision.
- 40.04 Subject to **Rule 40.05**, a motion brought under **Rule 40.01** may also include a request to stay the order or decision pending the determination of the motion.
- 40.05 For greater certainty, a request to stay shall not be made where a stay is precluded by statute.
- 40.06 In respect of a request to stay made in accordance with **Rule 40.04**, the Board may order that the implementation of the order or decision be delayed, on conditions as it considers appropriate.

41. Board Powers

- 41.01 The Board may at any time indicate its intention to review all or part of any order or decision and may confirm, vary, suspend or cancel the order or decision by serving a letter on all parties to the proceeding.
- 41.02 The Board may at any time, without notice or a hearing of any kind, correct a typographical error, error of calculation or similar error made in its orders or decisions.

42. Motion to Review

- 42.01 Every notice of a motion made under **Rule 40.01**, in addition to the requirements under **Rule 8.02**, shall:

ONTARIO ENERGY BOARD

Rules of Practice and Procedure

(Revised November 16, 2006, July 14, 2008, October 13, 2011, January 9, 2012, January 17, 2013 and April 24, 2014)

- (a) set out the grounds for the motion that raise a question as to the correctness of the order or decision, which grounds may include:
 - (i) error in fact;
 - (ii) change in circumstances;
 - (iii) new facts that have arisen;
 - (iv) facts that were not previously placed in evidence in the proceeding and could not have been discovered by reasonable diligence at the time; and
- (b) if required, and subject to **Rule 40**, request a stay of the implementation of the order or decision or any part pending the determination of the motion.

43. Determinations

43.01 In respect of a motion brought under **Rule 40.01**, the Board may determine, with or without a hearing, a threshold question of whether the matter should be reviewed before conducting any review on the merits.