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Executive Summary

Earlier this year, the Board initiated a consultative process to assist the Board in reviewing its cost of capital policies. The consultative process began in February 2009 and has culminated in this policy report of the Board. All materials in relation to this consultation are available on the Board’s web site.

The Board affirms its view that the Fair Return Standard frames the discretion of a regulator, by setting out three requirements that must be satisfied by the cost of capital determinations of the tribunal. Meeting the standard is not optional; it is a legal requirement. Notwithstanding this obligation, the Board notes that the Fair Return Standard is sufficiently broad that the regulator that applies it must still use informed judgment and apply its discretion in the determination of a rate regulated entity’s cost of capital. The Board also confirms other key principles with respect to its cost of capital policy.

The Board has analyzed submissions, discussions at the consultation and the final written comments of participants to the consultation with these general principles in mind. In light of the information and supporting empirical analysis provided in consultation with stakeholders, the following refinements to the Board’s policies with regard to the cost of capital are set out in this report.

1. Need to Reset and Refine Existing Return on Equity Formula: The Board will continue to use a formula-based equity risk premium approach. Also, the Board is of the view that the Long Canada Bond Forecast (the “LCBF”) continues to be an appropriate base upon which to begin the return on equity calculation. However, in order to ensure that on an ongoing basis changing economic and financial conditions are adequately and appropriately accommodated in the Board’s formulaic approach for determining a utility’s equity cost of capital, the Board has determined that its current formula-based return on equity approach needs to be reset and refined.
• **Reset the Formula:** The formula needs to be reset to address the difference between the allowed return on equity arising from the application of the formula and the return on equity for a low-risk proxy group that cannot be reconciled based on differences in risk alone. Based on the equity risk premium recommendations derived from multiple approaches that were provided by all participants in this consultation, the Board has determined that an initial equity risk premium of 550 basis points is appropriate for the purposes of deriving the initial return on equity to be embedded in the Board’s reset and refined return on equity formula. This includes an implicit 50 basis points for transactional costs. Consequently, assuming a forecast long-term government of Canada bond yield of 4.25%, the initial return on equity to be embedded in the Board’s reset and refined return on equity formula will be 9.75% (i.e., 4.25% + 550 basis points = 9.75%).

• **Refine the Formula:** The formula also needs to be refined to reduce its sensitivity to changes in government bond yields due to monetary and fiscal conditions that do not reflect changes in the utility cost of equity. First, the Board views the determination of the LCBF adjustment factor to be an empirical exercise, and as such, based on the empirical analysis provided by participants in conjunction with the consultation, the Board is of the view that the LCBF adjustment factor should be set at 0.5. Second, based on the analysis provided by participants to the consultation, the Board concludes that there is a statistically significant relationship between corporate bond yields and the cost of equity, and that a corporate bond yield variable should be incorporated in the return on equity formula. The Board has determined that it will use a utility bond spread based on the difference between the Bloomberg Fair Value Canada 30-Year A-rated Utility Bond index yield and the long Canada bond yield and that the utility bond spread reflected will be subject to a 0.50 adjustment factor, consistent with the empirical analyses provided by participants to the consultation.

2. **Refine Long-term Debt Guidelines and Approach to Determine Rate:** The determination of the cost of long-term debt was not a primary focus of the consultation and the Board notes that the comments made by participants in the consultation largely
supported the continuation of the Board’s existing policies and practices. However, in the report the Board formalizes certain approaches to reflect recent determinations regarding long-term debt costs. Further, the deemed long-term debt rate will be estimated including the A-rated utility bond index yield consistent with refinement to the return on equity formula.

3. **Refine Approach to Determine Deemed Short-term Debt Rate:** The determination of the cost of short-term debt also was not a primary focus of the consultation. However, to better reflect utility short-term debt costs, the Board has determined that the spread over the Bankers’ Acceptance rate used to derive the deemed short-term debt rate should be based on real market quotes for issuing spreads over Bankers’ Acceptance rates for the cost of short-term debt.

The Board will apply the methods set out in this report annually to derive the values for the return on equity and the deemed long-term and short-term debt rates for use in cost of service applications. If the application of these methods produces numerical results that, in the view of the Board, raise doubt that the Fair Return Standard is met, the Board may then use its discretion to begin a consultative process. Also, the Board has determined that a review period of five years provides an appropriate balance between the need to ensure that the formula-generated return on equity continues to meet the Fair Return Standard and the objective of maintaining regulatory efficiency and transparency. Accordingly, the Board intends to conduct its first regular review in 2014.

The remainder of this Report sets out in greater detail the Board’s policy as summarized above, as well as the considerations underlying the different elements of the Board’s approach.
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1 Introduction

The Ontario Energy Board (the “Board”) adopted a formula-based approach using the Equity Risk Premium (“ERP”) method for determining the fair rate of return on common equity for Ontario natural gas utilities in March, 1997. Application of the approach was extended to the electric utilities when the Board’s regulatory oversight expanded to include the electricity sector in 1999. The Board’s current approach for determining the cost of capital is set out in the Report of the Board on Cost of Capital and 2nd Generation Incentive Regulation for Ontario’s Electricity Distributors, dated December 20, 2006 (the “December 20, 2006 Report”).

Earlier this year, the Board initiated a consultative process to assist the Board in reviewing its cost of capital policies. The consultative process, detailed below, began in February 2009 and has culminated in this policy report of the Board. All materials in relation to this consultation are available on the Board’s web site.

This report sets out the Board’s updated approach to cost of capital and the methods that the Board will use to annually update the cost of capital parameters for all rate-regulated utilities. Specifically, this report refines the Board’s policies regarding the cost of capital in the following five ways: (i) resetting and refining the return on equity (“ROE”) formula; (ii) refining long-term debt guidelines and the approach to determining the deemed long-term debt rate; (iii) refining the approach to determining the deemed short-term debt rate; and (iv) setting out an annual review process to be used by the Board in conjunction with each application of the methodology to ensure that the results meet the Fair Return Standard (“FRS”); and (v) developing a framework within which to conduct a periodic review of the Board’s cost of capital policies.

Organization of this Report

This report is organized as follows: The consultative process is detailed in Chapter 2. Important principles in the regulation of cost of capital are discussed in Chapter 3. The Board’s policy for and analysis of cost of capital are outlined in Chapter 4. Certain
implementation considerations are identified in Chapter 5, and the annual update process and provision for periodic review of the cost of capital policies are addressed in Chapter 6. A summary of the formula-based ROE guidelines in effect in the 2009 rate year is provided in Appendix A. The new methods that the Board will use to annually update the cost of capital parameters as set out in this report are contained in the Appendices.
2 Consultative Process

On February 24, 2009, the Board issued a letter which set out its determination on the values for the ROE and the deemed long-term and short-term debt rates for use in the 2009 rate year cost of service applications. These cost of capital parameter values were calculated based on the methodologies and formulae set out in the December 20, 2006 Report. In that letter, the Board advised participants that it would be initiating a review of its current policy regarding the cost of capital.

2.1 Overview

Initial Consultation

On March 16, 2009, the Board initiated a consultation process to help it to determine whether current economic and financial market conditions warrant an adjustment to any of the cost of capital parameter values (i.e., the ROE, long-term debt rate, and/or short-term debt rate) set out in the Board’s February 24, 2009 letter. The consultation was initiated, in part, by (i) the fact that the difference between the cost of equity and the cost of long-term debt values determined by the Board for the 2009 Cost of Service Applications was only 39 basis points (8.01% and 7.62%), versus a difference of 247 basis points in 2008; and (ii) concern that the Board did not have a sufficiently robust approach within which to exercise its discretion to adjust any or all of the values produced by the application of the methodology. The Board indicated that the objective of the consultation was to test whether the values produced, and the relationships among them, are reasonable in the current economic and financial market conditions, and to allow the Board to determine if, when and how to make any appropriate adjustments to any of the values.
Cost of Capital Review

In light of stakeholders’ comments, the Board determined not to vary the 2009 parameter values for 2009 rates. In its June 18, 2009 letter setting out this determination, the Board explained that it was not persuaded that there was a sufficient basis to do so, in a timely manner. Nevertheless, the Board determined that further examination of its policy regarding the cost of capital was warranted to ensure that, on a going forward basis, changing economic and financial conditions are accommodated if required. Therefore, the Board advised that it would proceed with a review of its policy regarding the cost of capital. The Board indicated that any changes to the policy made as a result of this review would apply to the setting of rates for the 2010 rate year.

The Board set an issues list to form the basis of its review which took into account the stakeholder comments received in response to the Board’s March 16, 2009 letter and other information that the Board considered relevant (the “Issues List”). This Issues List was posted to the Board’s web site on July 30, 2009. Appended to the Issues List were: a summary of stakeholder options in response to the Board’s March 16, 2009 letter; and a list of references to documents germane to the consultation.

The Issues List

In the cover letter to the Issues List, the Board affirmed its view that the FRS constitutes the over-arching principle for setting the cost of capital, which is one input into the setting of rates. The Board also set the scope for the consultation as follows. First, that the consultation would deal only with the means by which the Board determines the cost of capital. The actual effect, if any, on specific utilities’ revenue requirements as a result of any updated policies arising from this consultation and the determination of just and reasonable rates would not be addressed in this process, but in future rate proceedings. Second, that historically, the Board has found the ERP approach to be pragmatic and efficient given the Ontario market structure and the number of utilities that the Board regulates. The Board concluded that an ERP approach remains the most appropriate in the current circumstances. However, the Board decided to review the application and the derivation of the current ERP approach to determine if it is sufficiently robust to guide the
The Board identified three areas where further information was needed:

- Potential adjustment to the established cost of capital methodology (i.e., based on the ERP approach) to adapt to changes in financial market and economic conditions;
- Determination of reasonableness of the results based on a formulaic approach for setting cost of capital parameter values; and
- Board discretion to adjust those results, if appropriate.

The Board received written comments from stakeholders identifying their views and positions on the listed issues and held a Stakeholder Conference to provide a forum for discussion of the substantive matters contained in the Board’s Issues List.

The Stakeholder Conference

The Stakeholder Conference was held over a three day period, September 21, 22 and October 6, 2009.

The Board identified the objectives of the stakeholder conference as follows:

- To allow participants and their respective experts to clarify and elaborate on their written comments;
- To provide participants with an opportunity to explore in some depth the rationale and merits of alternatives supported by other participants and their respective experts; and
- To help the Board gain, through the presentations and an interactive exchange with participants and their respective experts, a clearer understanding of the positions of participants and of significant issues and areas of concern.
At the start of the Stakeholder Conference, a Capital Markets Panel provided participants with a comprehensive overview of capital markets conditions. The Panel was comprised of practicing capital markets individuals, representing investor, equity analyst, and bond market perspectives. Representatives from Sun Life Financial, TD Securities Inc., Scotia Capital, and Macquarie Capital Markets participated on the Capital Markets Panel. Panel members addressed matters such as:

- What the capital markets have been through, where they are today, and set out key indicators or variables that are of interest prospectively;
- Overall availability of capital and the cost of that capital (both debt and equity);
- Access to bank credit/debt/equity, the absolute cost of debt, spread, term availability, and covenants;
- Spreads that have been and are being observed and under what conditions; and
- Activity that has been and/or is evident in the market in terms of funds flow into the market and between asset classes.

Following the Capital Markets Panel discussion, the following individuals provided presentations to participants and the Board at the Stakeholder Conference:

- Dr Laurence D. Booth, Professor, University of Toronto (consultant for the Building Owners and Managers Association of the Greater Toronto Area, the Consumers Council of Canada, Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters, Industrial Gas Users Association, London Property Management Association, and the Vulnerable Energy Consumer's Coalition);
- Mr. Donald A. Carmichael, Independent Consultant (consultant for Enbridge, Fortis Ontario Inc., and Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited);
- Mr. James M. Coyne, Senior Vice President, Concentric Energy Advisors (consultant for Enbridge, Hydro One Networks, Inc. and the Coalition of Large Distributors [Enersource Hydro Missisauga Inc., Horizon Utilities Corporation, Hydro Ottawa Limited, PowerStream Inc., Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited and Veridian Connections Inc.]);
Subsequent to the Stakeholder Conference and in light of the presentations made by participants and discussions at the conference, the Board received final written comments from participants. The Board indicated in its October 5, 2009 letter to participants that following the receipt of final written comments, it would review all of the materials, including Stakeholder Conference transcripts and all of the written comments in making its determination, and that the Board aimed to issue its report in December.

2.2 Approach to Developing Regulatory Policy

In their final comments to the Board, several participants expressed concern regarding the potential scope of outcomes arising from this consultation. In a joint submission, the Consumers Council of Canada, the Vulnerable Energy Consumer's Coalition and the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters describe their understanding that the consultation was intended to have a limited scope, and pointed to several statements made by the Board regarding the scope of the consultation. In summary, the submission states: “[i]n these circumstances, we suggest that the possible outcomes of this consultation are limited to a Board report which evaluates whether any of the information presented during the course of the consultative is sufficient to call into question the continued appropriateness of any element of the Board’s current cost of capital methodology.”1 The School Energy Coalition filed a similar submission, stating: “[t]he primary purpose of this part of the consultation, as

1 Final Comments on behalf of the Consumers Council of Canada, the Vulnerable Energy Consumer's Coalition and the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters. October 30, 2009. p. 3.
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noted by the Board in a number of communications, and reiterated at the stakeholder conference, is to help understand whether the current approach to cost of capital has sufficient robustness to be relied on by the Board in all circumstances.”

Although the Board appreciates the perspectives of these participants about their expectations, it does not agree that the scope of the consultation was limited in the fashion that they suggest. The Issues List set out a comprehensive set of issues that set the scope for this consultation. Amongst the issues are the following: How should the Board establish the initial ROE for the purpose of resetting the methodology? Does the current approach used by the Board to calculate the ERP remain appropriate? If not, how should the ERP be calculated?

In response to a letter it received on August 13, 2009 from Mr. Robert Warren, sent on behalf of the Consumers Council of Canada, the Vulnerable Energy Consumers Coalition and the London Property Management Association, the Board again invited participants to provide any information they felt appropriate in responding to the questions on the Issues List:

Stakeholders are asked to provide in their written comments answers to the questions identified in the Board’s Issues List. To help the Board in its review, the Board invites stakeholders to include in their written comments some analytical support and detailed information to identify their views and support their positions in response to the Board’s questions.

It is the Board’s view, therefore, that the policies determined by the Board in this report are within the scope of the consultation. The Board has benefitted from the materials and submissions received from the participants. This information contributes to the substantive foundation upon which the Board will base its policies. The Board does not believe that the

2 Final Comments on behalf of the School Energy Coalition, p. 2.
extensive body of information before it would be materially improved by a hearing process, as was suggested by some participants.

Courts have long recognized that duties of procedural fairness such as the requirement of a hearing apply to adjudicative decisions and decisions affecting specific rights, interests and privileges. Where a board is engaged, as here, in the development of a policy guideline, courts have held that it falls to the board to decide on the method of consultation to be employed - as long as the legislative requirements, if any, are met. There also is abundant precedent for this approach within the Board’s practice, and it is neither unusual nor improper to develop a guideline through a consultative process.5

The final “product” of this process, of course, is a Board policy. This was not a hearing process, and it does not - indeed cannot - set rates. The Board’s refreshed cost of capital policies will be considered through rate hearings for the individual utilities, at which it is possible that specific evidence may be proffered and tested before the Board. Board panels assigned to these cases will look to the report for guidance in how the cost of capital should be determined. Board panels considering individual rate applications, however, are not bound by the Board’s policy, and where justified by specific circumstances, may choose not to apply the policy (or a part of the policy).

5 The Board’s current methodology for setting electricity rates through the incentive regulation mechanism, for example, was established through a consultative/guideline process.
3  Context, Background and the Role of the Board

In competitive markets, the outputs of the goods and services of the economy and the prices for these outputs are determined in the market place, in accordance with consumers’ preferences and incomes, as well as producers’ minimization of cost for a given output. In such a market, the outcome is the efficient allocation of resources, including capital, and social welfare is maximized.

However, in some situations, markets fail to achieve such efficient outcomes. Market failure refers to situations in which the conditions required to achieve the market-efficient outcome are not present. Common examples of market failure are the existence of significant externalities, the exercise of market power by a small number of producers or buyers, natural monopolies, and information asymmetry between producers and their customers.

Electric transmission and distribution companies and natural gas distribution utilities are natural monopolies and are subject to rate regulation in Ontario by the Ontario Energy Board. In this context, the purpose of rate regulation, among other things, is to create or emulate an efficient market solution that cannot otherwise be achieved due to the presence of one or more market failures. As it relates to a rate regulated entity’s cost of capital, the role of the regulator is to determine, as accurately as possible, the opportunity cost of capital to ensure that an efficient amount of investment occurs in the public interest for the purpose of setting utility rates.

3.1  Fair Return Standard

On July 30, 2009 the Board issued a letter and its Issues List for the then planned stakeholder consultation. In that letter, the Board communicated its view that the FRS constitutes the over-arching principle for setting the cost of capital, which is one input into the setting of rates. There are a number of key messages in this statement.
First, as set out by the Federal Court of Appeal, the cost of capital to a utility “is equivalent to the aggregate return on investment investors require in order to keep their capital invested in the utility and to invest new capital in the utility.”

Second, the Federal Court of Appeal also stated:

… even though cost of capital may be more difficult to estimate than some other costs, it is a real cost that the utility must be able to recover through its revenues. If the… [Board] does not permit the utility to recover its cost of capital, the utility will be unable to raise new capital or engage in refinancing as it will be unable to offer investors the same rate of return as other investments of similar risk. As well, existing shareholders will insist that retained earnings not be reinvested in the utility.

Thirdly, the Board is of the view that the process to determine the cost of capital aligns the private interest of the utility and its shareholders with the public interest, and notes that the Federal Court of Appeal said:

… in the long run, unless a regulated enterprise is allowed to earn its cost of capital, both debt and equity, it will be unable to expand its operations or even maintain its existing ones…This will harm not only its shareholders, but also the customers it will no longer be able to service. The impact on customers and ultimately consumers will be even more significant where there is insufficient competition in the market to provide adequate alternative service.

The determination of a utility’s cost of capital must meet the FRS. The FRS is a legal concept, and has been articulated in three seminal court determinations as set out below:

1. In *Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia* et. al. 262 U.S. 679 (1923), the FRS is expressed to include concepts of comparability, financial soundness and adequacy:

7  Ibid. Para. 12.
8  Ibid. Para. 13.
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding, risks and uncertainties; but it has no constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures. The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties.

2. In *Northwestern Utilities Limited v. City of Edmonton*, [1929] S.C.R. 186, the FRS concept was described as follows:

By a fair return is meant that the company will be allowed as large a return on the capital invested in its enterprise, which will be net to the company, as it would receive if it were investing the same amount in other securities possessing an attractiveness, stability and certainty equal to that of the company's enterprise.

3. In *Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas* 320 U.S. 591 (1944), the Court expresses that “balance” is achieved in the ratemaking process, and outlines three elements of a fair return:

The rate-making process under the act, i.e., the fixing of “just and reasonable” rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests…the investor interest has a legitimate concern with the financial integrity of the company whose rates are being regulated. From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock…By that standard, the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.
The FRS was further articulated by the National Energy Board in its RH-2-2004 Phase II Decision as:

A fair or reasonable return on capital should:

- be comparable to the return available from the application of invested capital to other enterprises of like risk (the comparable investment standard);
- enable the financial integrity of the regulated enterprise to be maintained (the financial integrity standard); and
- permit incremental capital to be attracted to the enterprise on reasonable terms and conditions (the capital attraction standard). 9

In its letter of July 30, 2009, the Board noted that the National Energy Board’s articulation of the FRS is consistent with the principled approach described on page 2 of the Compendium to the Board’s March 1997 Draft Guidelines on a Formula-Based Return on Common Equity for Regulated Utilities (the “1997 Draft Guidelines”) and the policies set out in the Board’s December 20, 2006 Report.

The Board is of the view that the FRS frames the discretion of a regulator, by setting out three requirements that must be satisfied by the cost of capital determinations of the tribunal. Meeting the standard is not optional; it is a legal requirement. As set out by Enbridge in their final comments, the Supreme Court of Canada has “described this requirement that approved rates must produce a fair return as an ‘absolute’ obligation.”10 Notwithstanding this mandatory obligation, the Board notes that the FRS is sufficiently broad that the regulator that applies it must still use informed judgment and apply its discretion in the determination of a rate regulated entity’s cost of capital.

Informed by the comments made by stakeholders in the context of this consultation and the relevant jurisprudence, the Board offers the following observations about the application of the FRS.

First, the Board notes that the FRS expressly refers to an opportunity cost of capital concept, one that is prospective rather than retrospective.

Second, the Board agrees with the National Energy Board which stated that "[i]t does not mean that in determining the cost of capital that investor and consumer interests are balanced."¹¹ Further, the Board notes that the Federal Court of Appeal was clear that the overall ROE must be determined solely on the basis of a company’s cost of equity capital and that "the impact of any resulting toll increase is an irrelevant consideration in that determination. This does not mean however, that any resulting increase in tolls cannot be considered by a tribunal in determining the way in which a utility should recover its costs."¹² The Federal Court of Appeal also stated that:

> It may be that an increase is so significant that it would lead to “rate shock” if implemented all at once and therefore should be phased in over time. It is quite proper for the Board to take such considerations into account, provided that there is, over a reasonable period of time, no economic loss to the utility in the process. In other words, the phased in tolls would have to compensate the utility for deterring the recovery of its cost of capital.¹³

Third, all three standards or requirements (comparable investment, financial integrity and capital attraction) must be met and none ranks in priority to the others. The Board agrees with the comments made to the effect that the cost of capital must satisfy all three requirements which can be measured through specific tests and that focusing on meeting the financial integrity and capital attraction tests without giving adequate consideration to comparability test is not sufficient to meet the FRS.

Fourth, a cost of capital determination made by a regulator that meets the FRS does not result in economic rent being earned by a utility; that is, it does not represent a reward or payment in excess of the opportunity cost required to attract capital for the purpose of

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investing in utility works for the public interest. Further, the Board reiterates that an allowed ROE is a cost and is not the same concept as a profit, which is an accounting term for what is left from earnings after all expenses have been provided for. The Board notes that while cost of capital and profit are often used interchangeably from a managerial or operational perspective, the concepts are not interchangeable from a regulatory perspective.

Fifth, there was considerable discussion in the consultation about utility bond ratings. The ability of a utility to issue debt capital and maintain a credit rating were generally put forth by stakeholders in the consultation as a sufficient basis upon which to demonstrate that a particular equity cost of capital and deemed utility capital structure meet the capital attraction and financial integrity requirements of the FRS. The Board is of the view that utility bond metrics do not speak to the issue of whether a ROE determination meets the requirements of the FRS. The Board acknowledges that equity investors have, as the residual, net claimants of an enterprise, different requirements, and that bond ratings and bond credit metrics serve the explicit needs of bond investors and not necessarily those of equity investors.

Finally, the Board questions whether the FRS has been met, and in particular, the capital attraction standard, by the mere fact that a utility invests sufficient capital to meet service quality and reliability obligations. Rather, the Board is of the view that the capital attraction standard, indeed the FRS in totality, will be met if the cost of capital determined by the Board is sufficient to attract capital on a long-term sustainable basis given the opportunity costs of capital. As the Coalition of Large Distributors commented:

[t]he fact that a utility continues to meet its regulatory obligations and is not driven to bankruptcy is not evidence that the capital attraction standard has been met. To the contrary, maintaining rates at a level that continues operation but is inadequate to attract new capital investment can be considered confiscatory. The capital attraction standard is universally held to be higher than a rate that is merely non-confiscatory. As the United States Supreme Court put it, 'The mere fact that a rate is non-confiscatory does not indicate that it must be deemed just and reasonable'.

The Role of the Comparable Investment Standard

Continued investment in network utilities does not, in itself, demonstrate that the FRS has been met by a regulator’s cost of capital determination, and in particular, whether the determination of the equity cost of capital meets the requirements of the FRS. This is a particular challenge – how does the regulator determine when investment capital is not allocated to a rate regulated enterprise? These decisions are typically made within the utility/corporate capital budgeting process and rarely, if ever, broadly communicated to stakeholders. The Board notes that acquisition and divestiture activities of regulated utilities are not definitive in this regard, one way or the other, and notes that there are many reasons why investors are willing to acquire or desirous of selling utility assets, notwithstanding their view of whether an allowed ROE meets the FRS.

The primary tool available to the regulator to rectify this lack of transparency is the comparable investment standard. By establishing a cost of capital, and an ROE in particular, that is comparable to the return available from the application of invested capital to other enterprises of like risk, the regulator removes a significant barrier that impedes the flow of capital into or out of, a rate regulated entity. The net result is that the regulator is able, as accurately as possible, to determine the opportunity cost of capital for monies invested in utility works, with the ultimate objective being to facilitate efficient investment in the sector.

There are a number of specific issues relating to the comparable investment standard that the Board considers are relevant in the context of this cost of capital policy.

First, “like” does not mean the “same”. The comparable investment standard requires empirical analysis to determine the similarities and differences between rate-regulated entities. It does not require that those entities be "the same".

Second, there was a general presumption held by participants representing ratepayer groups in the consultation that Canadian and U.S. utilities are not comparators, due to differences in the “time value of money, the risk value of money and the tax value of
money."15 In other words, because of these differences, Canadian and U.S. utilities cannot be comparators. The Board disagrees and is of the view that they are indeed comparable, and that only an analytical framework in which to apply judgment and a system of weighting are needed. The analyses of Concentric Energy Advisors and Kathy McShane of Foster Associates Inc. are particularly relevant in this regard, and substantially advance the issue of establishing comparability to meet the requirements of the FRS. Further, the Board notes that in the consultation session on October 6, 2009, Dr. Booth stated that it is “absolutely possible” to form a sample from a risky universe that is low risk and compare it to the universe or the population of Canadian utilities.16 All participants agreed.

The Board notes that Concentric did not rely on the entire universe of U.S. utilities for its comparative analysis. Rather, Concentric carefully selected comparable companies based on a series of transparent financial metrics, and the Board is of the view that this approach has considerable merit. Commenting on Concentric’s analysis, Union Gas noted that no one else in the consultation performed this kind of detailed analysis of U.S. comparators.17 The use of a principled, analytical, and transparent approach to determine a low risk comparator group from a riskier universe for the purpose of informing the Board’s judgment was supported by various participants in the consultation.

The PWU commented that the position taken by Dr. Booth on the question of the comparability of US utility returns is not based on an appropriate empirical foundation.18 The PWU further commented that:

On the other hand, it is the view of the PWU that the analysis produced by Concentric, as summarized in one of their charts presented at the conference, represents a far more comprehensive analysis of the key characteristics of distribution utilities in Ontario vs. a North American

15 Professor L.D. Booth. Written Comments on behalf of Consumers Council of Canada, the Vulnerable Energy Consumer’s Coalition, the Industrial Gas Users Association, the Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters (CME), the London Property Management Association and the Building Managers and Owners Association of the Greater Toronto Area. September 8, 2009. p. 25.
18 Final Comments of the Power Workers’ Union. October 30, 2009. p. 3.
proxy group. Differences and similarities were thoroughly considered before arriving at the conclusions that based on a careful selection of like companies, a proxy group which includes US distribution utilities adheres to the Comparable Investment Standard. Moreover, Concentric was better suited to complete such as an analysis, having recognized expertise in the risks faced by both Ontario and US electricity distributors.¹⁹

Dr. Vander Weide indicated that since Canadian utility bonds tend to have more covenants than US utility bonds, they would receive a slightly higher credit rating. The PWU observed that it the slight variance in ratings can be attributed to specific features of debt instruments, rather than fundamental differences in the underlying business or regulatory risks faced by the utilities. This observation was also made by Ms. Zvarich of Sun Life Financial, who presented evidence that Canadian utility bonds generally have more restrictive covenants than U.S. utility bonds.²⁰

The Board is of the view that the U.S. is a relevant source for comparable data. The Board often looks to the regulatory policies of State and Federal agencies in the United States for guidance on regulatory issues in the province of Ontario. For example, in recent consultations, the Board has been informed by U.S. regulatory policies relating to low income customer concerns, transmission cost connection responsibility for renewable generation, and productivity factors for 3rd generation incentive ratemaking.

Finally, the Board agrees with Enbridge that, while it is possible to conduct DCF and CAPM analyses on publicly-traded Canadian utility holding companies of comparable risk, there are relatively few of these companies. As a result, the Board concludes that North American gas and electric utilities provide a relevant and objective source of data for comparison.

3.2 The Cost of Capital in Theory and Practice

The Cost of Capital

The Ontario Energy Board has been engaged in the rate regulation of utilities for many years. Over this extended period, the Board notes that there continues to be any of a number of misconceptions about the cost of capital concept, particularly what the cost of capital is and why it is an important consideration.

The Board is of the view that the following points articulated by Dr. Bill Cannon in his presentation at CAMPUT’s 2009 Energy Regulation Conference on July 3, 2009, are principally relevant to defining and understanding the cost of capital concept.

At its simplest, the cost of capital is the minimum expected rate of return necessary to attract capital to an investment. The rate of return includes the income received during the time the investment is held plus any capital gain or loss, realized or accruing during this period, all as a percentage of the initial investment outlay.

The cost of capital can be viewed from both: (a) a company or utility perspective; and (b) from the investor’s or capital provider’s perspective. From the company’s perspective, the cost of capital is the minimum rate of return the company must promise to achieve for investors on its debt and equity securities in order to preserve their market values and, thereby, retain the allegiance of these investors.

[There is interest] in the cost of capital…because all utilities – private or public – at some time…must raise financial capital to pay for investments, and both fairness and practical considerations dictate that the private and/or government investors who provide these capital funds must be adequately compensated. Raising capital is a competitive process. Private investors are under no obligation to buy a particular utility’s securities, and government-owned utilities must compete with other government spending priorities. A utility will be able to secure new capital and replace maturing securities only if investors believe that they will be adequately rewarded for providing new capital funds. That required reward, in turn, must compensate the investors for at least two things: (1) for postponing the consumption of the goods and services that they might otherwise have enjoyed had they not made the investment; and (2) for exposing their funds to the risk that they may not
get all their money back or not get it back as promptly as they anticipated. The reward demanded by investors is therefore a necessary cost of doing business from the utility’s point of view, just as much as the cost of labour or fuel.

From the viewpoint of investors as a group, however, the cost of capital can be defined more clearly and operationalized as “the expected rate of return prevailing in the capital markets on alternative investments of equivalent risk and attractiveness.” There are four concepts embedded in this operational definition:

First, it is **forward-looking**. Investment returns are inherently uncertain and the ex post, actual returns experienced by investors may differ from those that were expected ahead of time. The cost of capital is therefore an *expected* rate of return.\(^{21}\)

Second, it reflects the **opportunity cost** of investment. Investors have the opportunity to invest in a wide range of investments, so the expected rate of return from a given utility-company investment must be sufficient to compensate investors for the returns they might otherwise have received on foregone investments.

Third, it is **market-determined**. This market price - expressed as the expected return per dollar of invested capital - serves to balance the supply of, and demand for, capital for the firm.

And, fourth, it reflects the **risk** of the investment. It reflects the expected returns on investments in the marketplace that are exposed to equivalent risks. Another way of expressing this principle is to say that the cost of capital depends on the *use* of the capital – or, more precisely, the risk associated with the use of the funds – and not on the *source* of the funds.

In Ontario, utilities regulated by the Board in the gas and electricity sectors are structured to operate as commercial entities. As such, the rate setting methodologies used by the Board apply uniformly to all rate-regulated entities regardless of ownership. The determination of rate-regulated entities’ cost of capital is no exception. It follows that the opportunity cost of capital should be determined by the Board based on a systematic and empirical approach that applies to all rate-regulated utilities regardless of ownership. The Board sees no

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\(^{21}\) The word “expected” is used in the statistical sense (i.e., the probability-weighted rate of return). It does not refer to a “hoped for” or “most likely” rate of return.
compelling reason to adopt different methods of determining the cost of capital based on ownership.

**The Equity Risk Premium Approach**

As previously indicated, the Board has determined that the ERP approach remains the most appropriate approach in the current circumstances. The ERP approach is one of four main approaches that are traditionally used by experts during regulatory cost of capital reviews to establish a fair ROE: (1) the comparable earnings approach; (2) discounted cash flow approach; (3) the capital asset pricing model; and (4) ERP approach. These methods are all used in varying degrees to formulate and/or test an opinion regarding a fair return to investors.\textsuperscript{22} The Board’s current formulaic approach is a modified Capital Asset Pricing Model methodology and ERP approach.

Each of these four main approaches has well documented strengths and weaknesses. Notwithstanding the known weaknesses of these differing approaches, the Board agrees with Ms. McShane when she states: “each of the various types of tests brings a different perspective to the estimation of a fair return. No single test is, by itself, sufficient to ensure that all three requirements of the fair return standard are met.”\textsuperscript{23}

Through the consultative process which began in February 2009 and has culminated in this report, the Board has been informed by a number of ex-post analytical approaches, including analysis of experienced ERPs on investments in Canadian utility stocks. The Board observes from these analyses that the ROE produced by various approaches can be expressed as an absolute ROE number or as an ERP over a risk-free rate. Also, the Board agrees that expressing the ROE in terms of a premium above the long-term Canada bond yield does not mean that the initial ROE needs to be estimated by using a single test or a number of tests that might be defined as ERP tests.

A Formulaic Approach

The Board has used a formula-based methodology to determine the rate of ROE since 1998. The advantages identified in the 1997 Draft Guidelines remain appropriate today and include:

- Simplification of the hearing process;
- Is relatively free from conflicting interpretation and is readily understood by all participants;
- Reduces the need for complex, annual risk assessments, while still reflecting major changes in the capital markets; and
- Is capable of producing a rate of return that approximates the result which would have been produced through the traditional process.24

The Board also notes that a formula-based approach:

- Is transparent, resulting in predictable and consistent outcomes, and meets the needs of stakeholders broadly, particularly those in the capital market; and
- Is a practical necessity in Ontario, given the large number of rate regulated entities.

The Board also acknowledges that a formula-based ROE methodology and mechanical approaches in general, have a number of disadvantages, as identified in the 1997 Draft Guidelines:

- Establishing the initial parameters of the generic formula will have a profound influence on the potential success or failure of the process. Over time, these parameters and adjustment factors will have a cumulative or compounding effect on the

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results of the formulaic ROE mechanism. The use of an inappropriate initial ROE will either inflate or understate subsequent rate determinations;

- The present formulaic ROE generally relies predominantly on the ERP method to the exclusion of other methods;

- Adjustment for the impact of timing differences for utilities with different year-ends is a challenge; and

- The Board’s ability to make discretionary adjustments to a utility’s return for the purpose of creating incentives for particular behaviours or sending signals to the marketplace may be restricted.  

Notwithstanding these concerns, the Board is of the view that it is appropriate to continue to use a formulaic approach to determine the equity cost of capital and that the overall advantages of the approach outweigh potential disadvantages.

An Empirical Foundation

The essential elements of a formulaic approach must be empirically derived – the initial ROE, implied ERP and the adjustment factor are determined by the Board based on empirical analysis. It is essential that sufficient empirical analysis be provided periodically to ensure that assumed relationships are not misspecified. This includes the construction and application of a framework to evaluate the degree of comparability between rate regulated natural gas distribution and electricity distribution and transmission utilities in Canada and the United States.

To be clear, the approach to be used by the Board in setting the essential elements of a formula-based rate of ROE (i.e., base ROE, formula terms and adjustment factors) will be based on “economic theory and empirically derived from objective, data-based analysis.”

As such, it is not sufficient for a formulaic approach for determining ROE to produce a

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25 Ibid. p. 7.
numerical result that satisfies the FRS on average, over time. The Board is of the view that each time a formulaic approach is used to calculate an allowed ROE it must generate a result that meets the FRS, as determined by the Board using its experience and informed judgment.

This principle is supported by the Hope decision, which states: “Under the statutory standard of ‘just and reasonable’ it is the result reached not the method which is controlling…”27

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4 The Board’s Approach

4.1 Summary of Key Principles

As discussed previously, the Board confirms the following key principles with respect to its cost of capital policy. The Board has analyzed submissions, discussions at the consultation and the final written comments of participants to the consultation with these general principles in mind.

1. **Fair Return Standard.** All three requirements – comparable investment, financial integrity and capital attraction – must be met and none ranks in priority to the others. It is not sufficient for a formulaic approach for determining ROE to produce a numerical result that satisfies the FRS on average, over time. The Board is of the view that each time a formulaic approach is used to calculate an allowed ROE; it must generate a number that meets the FRS, as determined by the Board using its experience and informed judgment.

2. **The overall ROE must be determined solely on the basis of a company’s cost of equity capital.** It does not mean that in determining the cost of capital that investor and consumer interests are balanced. The opportunity cost of capital should be determined by the Board based on a systematic and empirical approach that applies to all rate-regulated utilities regardless of ownership. The Federal Court of Appeal was clear that the overall ROE must be determined solely on the basis of a company’s cost of equity capital and that the impact of any resulting toll increase is an irrelevant consideration in that determination.

3. **Efficient amount of investment.** As it relates to a rate regulated entity’s cost of capital, the role of the regulator is to determine, as accurately as possible, the opportunity cost of capital to ensure that an efficient amount of investment occurs in the public interest for the purpose of setting utility rates.
4. **Predictability, transparency, and stability.** The approach adopted by the Board to determine the opportunity cost of capital should result in an environment where outcomes are predictable and consistent so that investors, utilities and consumers are better able to plan and make decisions.

5. **Systematic and empirically-based approach.** The methodology used by the Board to determine the cost of debt and equity capital should be a systematic approach that relies on economic theory and is empirically derived from objective, data-based analysis. For example, in establishing comparability, it is possible to build a low-risk sub-set from a higher risk universe using an empirically based approach.

6. **Minimize the time and cost of administering the framework.** Costs imposed on all participants, including the regulated entity and the regulator, should not exceed the benefits available. This objective could be met through a simple process that reflects the concerns of interested participants and reduces the formal process requirements.

### 4.2 Return on Equity

#### 4.2.1 Need to Reset and Refine Existing ROE Formula

In order to ensure that on an ongoing basis changing economic and financial conditions are adequately and appropriately accommodated in the Board’s formulaic approach for determining a utility’s equity cost of capital, the **Board has determined that its current formula-based ROE approach needs to be reset and refined.** As previously indicated, the **Board will continue to use a formula-based ERP approach.** However, informed by the discussion at the consultation and the written comments of participants generated by the consultation, as well as its own analysis, the Board has concluded that the formula needs to be reset to address the difference between the allowed ROE arising from the application of the formula and the ROE for a low-risk proxy group that cannot be reconciled based on differences in risk alone. The formula also needs to be refined to reduce its
sensitivity to changes in government bond yields due to monetary and fiscal conditions that do not reflect changes in the utility cost of equity.

The Board’s current approach to estimating the cost of equity has been in effect for 12 years. The Board notes that in the 1997 Draft Guidelines, the Board stated that “it is persuaded that there exists a non-linear relationship between interest rates and the ERP.”

The existing formula approximates this relationship using a linear specification. The Board is of the view that it is unreasonable to conclude that the current formula correctly specifies this relationship, based on the passage of time, changes in financial and economic circumstances generally, and the empirical analyses provided by participants to the consultation and the discussion at the consultation itself. However, the Board is of the view that its current formulaic approach for determining the equity cost of capital should be reset and refined, not otherwise abandoned or subject to wholesale change.

The events that unfolded earlier this year that triggered this review effectively illustrated that the Board’s approach needs to be refined to reduce the sensitivity of the formula to changes in government bond yields due to monetary and fiscal conditions that do not reflect changes in the utility cost of equity. The Board concludes that the current approach could be more robust and better guide the Board’s discretion in applying the FRS. The Board notes that while the current formula today produces results similar to that in 2008, it does not address the observed behaviour of the formula during the financial crisis – lowering the allowed ROE when the amount and price of risk in the market was increasing.

The view expressed by some participants in the consultation that the Board must wait to be provided with evidence from a regulated utility in Ontario of financial hardship due to the current allowed ROE before its adapts its policies to better reflect market realities is not consistent with the Board’s approach.

The Board is of the view that resetting and refining the current formula-based ERP approach maintains the transparency, predictability and stability associated with the current

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approach, and avoids sudden changes in regulatory policy to address potentially transitory capital market conditions.  

The Board has been informed by the numerous approaches used by various participants to the consultation to determine whether the formula continues to produce results that meet the FRS. The sum of the elements supporting the Board’s decision to reset and refine its formulaic ROE is independent of the recent financial crisis and whether or not the crisis has abated.

4.2.2 The Initial Set Up

Use of Multiple Tests

The Board’s current formulaic approach for determining ROE is a modified Capital Asset Pricing Model methodology, and in his written comments, Dr. Booth recommended that this practice be continued. Dr. Booth recommended that “the Board base its fair ROE on a risk based opportunity cost model, with overwhelming weight placed on a CAPM estimate.”

This view was not shared by other participants in the consultation, who asserted that the Board should use a wide variety of empirical tests to determine the initial cost of equity, deriving the initial ERP directly by examining the relationship between bond yields and equity returns, and indirectly by backing out the implied ERP by deducting forward-looking bond yields from ROE estimates.

Participants argued from a number of different perspectives that a variety of methods should be used to develop the ERP:

- “The Board should not limit itself to one specific method of calculating an ERP; rather it should consider the results produced by multiple approaches in order to 

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30 Ibid. p. 20.
generate a range of reasonable results from which it may select an appropriate ERP. This process requires the exercise of informed judgment\textsuperscript{31}.

- “The Board established the initial risk premium for the Formula, in its decision for Consumers Gas in EBRO 495, by considering an array of risk premium estimates put forward by experts and selecting a risk premium within the range of results presented. The risk premiums put forth by experts were either the result of directly measuring the historical relationship between bond yields and equity returns; or alternatively, by deriving an implied risk-premium, by backing-out forward looking bond yields from ROE estimates produced by using other methodologies, i.e., DCF, CAPM, or Comparable earnings.

Multiple approaches for determining ROE provide greater assurance that the end result will be just and reasonable, as conditions that may bias results could be detected or mitigated by considering alternative results.”\textsuperscript{32}

- “The Board should consider comparable utilities’ rates of return and a minimum spread to long-term debt rates, as well as resetting the reference rate”.\textsuperscript{33}

- “The Board should establish the initial ROE by looking at the best available evidence on the utilities’ required return. This evidence should include results of various cost of capital methodologies…The Board would be remiss to predetermine a single methodology for establishing the initial allowed ROE without reviewing alternative methods for determining cost of equity.” \textsuperscript{34}

- “We propose that the Board, in reviewing cost of capital, would hear the evidence of the various experts with their different views of the ERP result, but would also look at


\textsuperscript{32} Ibid. p. 47.

\textsuperscript{33} Written Comments of the Power Workers’ Union. September 8, 2009. p. 6.

\textsuperscript{34} Dr. J. H. Vander Weide. Written Comments on behalf of Union Gas. pp. 7-8.
other ways in which the market directly speaks about returns…they (the examples provided) and many other examples – are ways in which the market communicates the returns for investment comparable to utility investments. These sources are therefore useful in testing whether the results of various ERP or other market studies of cost of capital are realistic.” 35

- “If the utility is not a stand-alone entity and/or does not have traded shares, then the Board has no alternative but to look at total rates of return earned by investors in a relevant sample of companies.” 36

- “Expressing the ROE in terms of a premium above…long-term Canada bond yield… does not mean that the initial ROE need be estimated solely using a test or tests that might be defined as ERP tests.” 37

“No single model is powerful enough to produce ‘the number’ that will meet the fair return standard. Only by applying a range of tests along with informed judgment can adherence to the fair return standard be ensured.” 38

- “…use of multiple tests. The tests all measure different factors that should be considered in setting a fair return on equity that is consistent with the comparable investment standard, the financial integrity standard and the capital attraction standard. The OEB should not rely on a single method or test.” 39

The Board agrees that the use of multiple tests to directly and indirectly estimate the ERP is a superior approach to informing its judgment than reliance on a single methodology. In particular, the Board is concerned that CAPM, as applied by Dr. Booth, does not adequately capture the inverse relationship between the ERP and the long

38 Ibid. p. 23.
Canada bond yield. As such, the Board does not accept the recommendation that it place overwhelming weight on a CAPM estimate in the determination of the initial ERP.

**Setting the Initial Equity Risk Premium**

The Board is of the view that the initial ERP should be reset to address the difference between the allowed ROE arising from the application of the formula and the ROE for a low risk proxy group that cannot be reconciled based on differences in risk alone.

Therefore, based on the ERP recommendations provided by all participants in this consultation the **Board has determined that an initial ERP of 550 basis points** is appropriate for the purposes of deriving the initial ROE to be embedded in the Board’s reset and refined ROE formula. This includes an implicit 50 basis points for transactional costs.

Consequently, **assuming a forecast long term government of Canada bond yield of 4.25%, the initial ROE to be embedded in the Board’s reset and refined ROE formula will be 9.75%** (i.e., 4.25% + 550 basis points = 9.75%).

The Board has assessed the various empirical tests and recommendations submitted by participants and translated each of the recommended approaches as an ERP assuming a forecast long term government of Canada bond yield of 4.25%, where appropriate, as summarized in Table 1.

The empirical tests of each of the participants to the consultation are also described below. Although the Board maintains its view that each of the tests has empirical strengths and weaknesses, the diversity of approaches tabled and discussed in the consultation was helpful. As a result, the Board has given each test weight in the process to establish the initial ERP to be embedded in the Board’s formula.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct/Indirect Equity Risk Premium</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dr. L. D. Booth</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPM (Adjusted Using CoC Formula to Reflect 4.25% GOC, 0.75 Adj)</td>
<td>3.31%</td>
<td>3.31%</td>
<td>3.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average Dr. L. D. Booth</strong></td>
<td>3.31%</td>
<td>3.31%</td>
<td>3.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concentric Energy Advisors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCF Analysis for Low-Risk Proxy Group (US Gas, Elec, Cdn)</td>
<td>6.03%</td>
<td>6.78%</td>
<td>7.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPM Analysis for Low-Risk Proxy Groups (US Gas, US Elec, Cdn)</td>
<td>4.58%</td>
<td>4.72%</td>
<td>4.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERP Econometric Model (Average Gas and Electric)</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average Concentric Energy Advisors</strong></td>
<td>5.65%</td>
<td>5.96%</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>J. Dalton - Power Advisory LLC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERP Econometric Model #1 and ERP Econometric Model #2</td>
<td>6.05%</td>
<td>6.45%</td>
<td>6.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average J. Dalton - Power Advisory</strong></td>
<td>6.05%</td>
<td>6.45%</td>
<td>6.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>K. McShane - Foster Associates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Formula for Calculating Allowed ROE (NEB Initial Formula Metrics)</td>
<td>6.38%</td>
<td>6.38%</td>
<td>6.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustrative method</td>
<td>5.75%</td>
<td>5.75%</td>
<td>5.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average: K. McShane</strong></td>
<td>6.07%</td>
<td>6.07%</td>
<td>6.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dr. J. H. Vander Weide</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced Equity Risk Premium</td>
<td>4.30%</td>
<td>5.50%</td>
<td>6.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Awarded ROEs Vs. Avg 2008 US LT T-Bills - Gas</td>
<td>6.16%</td>
<td>6.16%</td>
<td>6.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-8 Awarded ROEs Vs. Avg 2006-8 US LT T-Bills - Gas</td>
<td>5.61%</td>
<td>5.61%</td>
<td>5.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Awarded ROEs Vs. Avg 2008 US LT T-Bills - Electric</td>
<td>6.26%</td>
<td>6.26%</td>
<td>6.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-8 Awarded ROEs Vs. Avg 2006-8 US LT T-Bills - Electric</td>
<td>5.71%</td>
<td>5.71%</td>
<td>5.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forecast E(Re) = DCF Expected Return - LT Treasury Yield</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas</td>
<td>6.19%</td>
<td>6.19%</td>
<td>6.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric</td>
<td>6.21%</td>
<td>6.21%</td>
<td>6.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression - Ex-ante ERP (Above) with YTM LT Treasury Yields</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas (Modified to use Canadian LT GOC bond)</td>
<td>6.97%</td>
<td>6.97%</td>
<td>6.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric (Modified to use Canadian LT GOC bond)</td>
<td>7.33%</td>
<td>7.33%</td>
<td>7.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCF Analysis for Value Line Utility Companies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas</td>
<td>7.81%</td>
<td>7.81%</td>
<td>7.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric</td>
<td>8.71%</td>
<td>8.71%</td>
<td>8.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average: Dr. J. H. Vander Weide</strong></td>
<td>6.48%</td>
<td>6.59%</td>
<td>6.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average ERP All Submissions</strong></td>
<td>5.51%</td>
<td>5.67%</td>
<td>5.85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analyses of Dr. J. H. Vander Weide

Dr. Vander Weide performed a number of empirical analyses. The average experienced ERP on an investment in Canadian utility stocks from data on returns earned by investors in Canadian utility stocks compared to interest rates on long-term Canada bonds was approximately 5.50 percent, as set out below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparable Group</th>
<th>Period of Study</th>
<th>Average Stock Return</th>
<th>Average Bond Yield</th>
<th>Risk Premium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;P/TSX Utilities</td>
<td>1956 - 2008</td>
<td>11.84%</td>
<td>7.54%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMO CM Utilities Stock Data Set</td>
<td>1983 - 2008</td>
<td>14.31%</td>
<td>7.66%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>5.5%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


He also provided information on recent allowed ROEs for U.S. utilities which demonstrated implicit ERPs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Natural Gas Distribution</th>
<th>Electric Utilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average U.S. ROE Awarded (%)</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread to OEB September 2009 Long Bond Estimate of 4.25%</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>6.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread to Average Long-Term Canada Bond Yield in 2008 of 4.06%</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread to Average Long-Term Canada Bond Yield in 2006 to 2008 of 4.21%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>6.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread to Average Long-Term U.S. Treasury Bill Yield in 2008 of 4.24%</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread to Average Long-Term U.S. Treasury Bill Yield in 2006 to 2008 of 4.69%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>5.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Government of Canada Bond Yields: Bank of Canada; U.S. Long-Term Treasury Bill Yields: U.S. Department of Treasury

Further, forecast expected required returns by investors were calculated by Dr. Vander Weide by deducting the long-term Treasury bond yield from the DCF expected return (Exhibit 5, Dr. Vander Weide) over the period September 1999 to February 2009. This calculation produced an average ERP of 621 basis points for electric utilities and an average expected ERP of 619 basis points for natural gas utilities (Exhibit 6, Dr. Vander Weide) over the period June 1998 to February 2009.
However, regressing the relationship between the \textit{ex ante} risk premium and the yield to maturity on long-term U.S. Treasury bond produced an ERP equation of:

- ERP = 12.10 – 1.123 x IB for Electric Utilities. Assuming an estimated Canadian Long-Term Bond yield of 4.25%, the Ex-Ante expected ERP is 7.33% and an ROE of 11.58%; and

- ERP = 10.26 – 0.773 x IB for Natural Gas Distribution Utilities. Assuming an estimated Canadian Long-Term Bond yield of 4.25%, the Ex-Ante expected ERP is 6.97% and an ROE of 11.22%.

Finally, Dr. Vander Weide conducted a DCF Analysis for Value Line Natural Gas Companies that resulted in an estimated ROE of 11.5% (Exhibit 9, Dr. Vander Weide) or an ERP of approximately 7.81%, using the average February 2009 long-term composite Treasury bond yield of 3.69%. His DCF Analysis for Value Line Electric Companies (Exhibit 8, Dr. Vander Weide) resulted in an estimated ROE of 12.4% or an ERP of approximately 8.71%, assuming the same long-term composite Treasury bond yield.

\textbf{Analysis of Kathy McShane of Foster Associates Inc.}

Ms. McShane proposed a new formula for calculating the allowed ROE: \[ \text{ROE}_{\text{New}} = \text{Initial ROE} + 50\% \text{ (Change in Forecast GOC Bond Yield)} + 50\% \text{ (Change in Corporate Bond Yield Spread)}, \]
which reflects the analysis provided in her comments.

Ms. McShane also demonstrated that using her recommended approach for 2009, based on the NEB formula contained in RH-2-94 Decision, the ROE would have been 10.73\%\textsuperscript{40}, equal to an ERP of 638 basis points and assuming a forecast GOC yield of 4.35\% for 2009.

\textsuperscript{40} McShane, K., Foster Associates Inc. Written Comments on behalf of the Electricity Distributors Association. Schedule 4.
For illustrative purposes in her analysis, she linked a forecast long-term Canada bond yield of 4.5% and a corporate bond yield spread of 175 basis points to an ROE of 10%. Implied in this ROE is an ERP of 550 basis points.

**Analysis of Power Advisory LLC**

Power Advisory evaluated a range of different model specifications in an effort to come up with a formula that will yield more reasonable results than the existing formula under a range of different credit and financial market conditions.\(^4\) Two models performed the best in terms of standard econometric considerations (i.e., goodness of fit, highly significant parameter values, and plausible statistical relationships)\(^2\):

1. \( \text{ROE} = 7.008\% + (\text{US Corp BAA Bond Yield with 6 month lag} \times 0.5356) \); and
2. \( \text{ROE} = 7.451\% + (\text{US Gov 30 Year Bond yield with 6 month lag} \times 0.5122) + (\text{VIX index value with 6 month lag} \times 0.0077) \).

Using current values for these variables produces ROE estimates of 10.5% to 11.3%. Using Canadian values in these models results in ROE estimates of 10.3% to 11.1%. The implied ERP using the results of the models run using a forecast long-term government of Canada bond yield of 4.25% is 605 basis points to 685 basis points.

**Analysis of Concentric Energy Advisors**

Concentric's overall recommended ROE for natural gas distribution utilities, assuming a 40% deemed equity capital structure is 10.5% and for electric transmission and distribution utilities is 10.3%, also assuming 40% deemed equity. The implied ERP assuming a 4.25% forecast GOC bond yield is 625 basis points and 605 basis points, for natural gas and electric transmission and distribution, respectively. These recommendations are supported by multiple analytical approaches; each calculated using data for a specific proxy group for

\(^4\) Power Advisory LLC. Written Comments on behalf of Great Lakes Power Transmission LP. September 8, 2009. p. 16.
\(^2\) Ibid. p. 17.
the natural gas and electric transmission and distribution utilities established by Concentric.\textsuperscript{43}

The results of Concentric’s DCF analysis are presented in the table below\textsuperscript{44}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proxy Group</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Natural Gas Distribution Utilities</td>
<td>9.70%</td>
<td>10.44%</td>
<td>11.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Electric Distribution Utilities</td>
<td>10.08%</td>
<td>10.96%</td>
<td>12.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Utilities</td>
<td>9.97%</td>
<td>10.60%</td>
<td>11.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>9.92%</td>
<td>10.67%</td>
<td>11.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied ERP at 4.25% forecast LT GOC Yield</td>
<td>5.67%</td>
<td>6.42%</td>
<td>7.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied ERP Including 50 basis points Flotation Costs</td>
<td>6.17%</td>
<td>6.92%</td>
<td>7.96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of Concentric’s CAPM analysis are presented in the table below. The results reflect a Market Risk Premium of 586 basis points, which is supported by material provided in Appendix F (page F-10) and Exhibit Concentric-06 of their written comments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proxy Group</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Natural Gas Distribution Utilities</td>
<td>9.05%</td>
<td>9.18%</td>
<td>9.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Electric Distribution Utilities</td>
<td>8.54%</td>
<td>8.68%</td>
<td>8.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Utilities</td>
<td>7.80%</td>
<td>7.95%</td>
<td>8.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>8.46%</td>
<td>8.61%</td>
<td>8.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied ERP at 4.25% forecast LT GOC Yield</td>
<td>4.21%</td>
<td>4.36%</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied ERP Including 50 basis points Flotation Costs</td>
<td>4.71%</td>
<td>4.86%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of Concentric’s ERP analysis are presented in the table below and are explained in detail in Appendix F of their written comments.

\textsuperscript{43} Concentric Energy Advisors. Written Comments on behalf of Enbridge Gas Distribution, Hydro One, and the Coalition of Large Distributors. September 8, 2009. Appendix C.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid. p. F-6.
Concentric’s ERP regression formula is as follows: \( \text{ROE} = \text{Constant} = \text{U.S. Gov 30-year Bond} \times x_1 + \text{Moody’s Utility A-rated Spread} \times x_2 + \% \text{Generation} \times x_3 + \text{Natural Gas Dummy Variable} \times x_4 \).\(^{45}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Natural Gas Distribution Proxy Group</th>
<th>U.S. Electric Distribution Proxy Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>7.634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government 30-year Bond Yield</td>
<td>0.428 x 4.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moody’s Utility A-rate Spread (July 2009)</td>
<td>0.310 x 1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Generation</td>
<td>0.008 x 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Gas Dummy (Electric = 0, Gas = 1)</td>
<td>0.384 x 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized ROE</td>
<td>10.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied ERP at 4.25% forecast LT GOC Yield</td>
<td>6.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied ERP Including 50 basis points Flotation Costs</td>
<td>6.54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The tables below summarize Concentric’s recommended ROEs prior to any adjustment for changes in leverage.\(^{46}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Electric T &amp; D Utilities</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCF</td>
<td>10.08%</td>
<td>10.96%</td>
<td>12.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPM</td>
<td>8.54%</td>
<td>8.68%</td>
<td>8.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>9.31%</td>
<td>9.82%</td>
<td>10.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differential between Vertically Integrated and T&amp;D Utilities</td>
<td>(0.40%)</td>
<td>(0.40%)</td>
<td>(0.40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return before Leverage and Flotation Cost Adjustments</td>
<td>8.91%</td>
<td>9.43%</td>
<td>10.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flotation Cost Adjustment 0.50%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark T&amp;D ROE</td>
<td>9.41%</td>
<td>9.93%</td>
<td>10.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark T&amp;D Equity Ratio</td>
<td>46.32%</td>
<td>46.32%</td>
<td>46.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied ERP using 4.25% forecast LT GOC Yield</td>
<td>5.16%</td>
<td>5.68%</td>
<td>6.31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Natural Gas Distribution Utilities</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCF</td>
<td>9.70%</td>
<td>10.44%</td>
<td>11.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPM</td>
<td>9.05%</td>
<td>9.18%</td>
<td>9.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return before Leverage and Flotation Cost Adjustments</td>
<td>9.37%</td>
<td>9.81%</td>
<td>10.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flotation Cost Adjustment 0.50%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark Natural Gas Distribution ROE</td>
<td>9.87%</td>
<td>10.31%</td>
<td>10.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark Natural Gas Distribution Equity Ratio</td>
<td>44.47%</td>
<td>44.47%</td>
<td>44.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied ERP using 4.25% forecast LT GOC Yield</td>
<td>5.62%</td>
<td>6.06%</td>
<td>6.70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusting for leverage that is higher than the benchmark equity ratio, i.e., deemed equity of 40%, the recommended ROEs increase to 10.5% for natural gas distribution and 10.3% for electric transmission and distribution, representing implied ERPs of 625 basis points and 605 basis points, respectively.

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\(^{45}\) Ibid. p. F-14.
\(^{46}\) Ibid. p. F-16.
Analysis of Dr. Booth

Dr. Booth recommended a fair ROE of 7.75%. This number is based on the following key assumptions. 47

First, a market risk premium of 5.0%. However, Dr. Booth noted that many of his peers believe it to be 6.0%. Second, beta is estimated to be 0.5. Dr. Booth indicated that he “is not using the current beta coefficient”; i.e., the beta of 0.5 used to derive the recommended ERP of 325 (assuming a 4.50% long-term government of Canada bond yield) is not supported by Dr. Booth’s recent beta estimates, where beta is less than 0.5. Thirdly, Dr. Booth also noted that the range of fair return cost of equity estimates could vary by 0.50%. His unadjusted estimate of a fair return was 7.00% and he noted that the estimates of his colleagues would be 7.50%. He therefore added 0.25% to his estimate to “split this difference”, resulting in his ROE recommendation of 7.25%. Finally, Dr. Booth added 0.50% for issuance costs, bringing his fair recommended return to 7.75%.

The Board notes that in the course of the consultation, Dr. Booth indicated that he would be prepared to recommend “fixing ROE at 8.5% or 8.75% over the business cycle, for say, a five-year period.” 49 Dr. Booth did not support this estimated ROE with empirical analysis, and as such, there is no principled basis upon which the Board can rely on Dr. Booth’s recommendation of 8.5% or 8.75%.

47 Professor L.D. Booth. Written Comments on behalf of Consumers Council of Canada, the Vulnerable Energy Consumer’s Coalition, the Industrial Gas Users Association, the Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters, the London Property Management Association and the Building Managers and Owners Association of the Greater Toronto Area. September 8, 2009. p. 40.
4.2.3 The Formula-based Return on Equity

4.2.3.1 Long Canada Bond Forecast

The Board is of the view that the LCBF continues to be an appropriate base upon which to begin the ROE calculation. In particular, the Board is of the view that the sensitivity of the allowed ROE to changes in government of Canada bond yields arising from monetary and fiscal conditions that do not reflect changes in utility cost of equity will be addressed, in part, by the use of multiple methods to determine the initial ERP or ROE in the formula. The Board also agrees with Ms. McShane’s comment that the LCBF provides an important forecast component to the formula\(^50\) and with the Industrial Gas Users Association’s comment that “there is an intrinsic logic to using the same parameter to adjust ROE as was used to set the ROE in the first place.”\(^51\)

4.2.3.2 Long Canada Bond Forecast Adjustment Factor

In its 1997 Draft Guidelines, the Board determined that the difference between the LCBF for the current test year and the corresponding rate for the immediately preceding year should be multiplied by a factor of 0.75 to determine the adjustment to the allowed ROE.\(^52\) In that same document, however, the Board noted that there was a significant difference of opinion concerning the relationship between interest rates and the ERP and that ratios contained in the evidence from generic rate of return proceedings in other Canadian jurisdictions ranged from 0.5:1 to 1:1.\(^53\) Moreover, the Board notes that the selection of the 0.75 adjustment factor is described in the 1997 Draft Guidelines as “admittedly somewhat arbitrary.”\(^54\)


\(^{53}\) Ibid.

\(^{54}\) Ibid. p. 32.
The Board views the determination of the LCBF adjustment factor to be an empirical exercise, and as such, based on the empirical analysis provided by participants in conjunction with the consultation, the Board is of the view that the LCBF adjustment factor should be set at 0.5. The Board notes that four participants in this consultation empirically tested the relationship between government bond yields and ROE:

- Dr. Vander Weide determined that when the yield to maturity on long-term government bonds increases by 100 basis points, the allowed ERP tends to decrease by approximately 55 basis points, and when the yield to maturity on long-term government bonds decreases by 100 basis points, the allowed ERP tends to increase by approximately 55 basis points.\(^{55}\)

- Kathy McShane of Foster Associates, Inc. submitted that a regression analysis used to estimate the relationship between government bond yields and the utility cost of equity indicates that the ROEs increased (decreased) by approximately 50 basis points for every one percentage point increase (decrease) in long-term government bond yields.\(^{56}\)

- Concentric Energy Advisors also conducted a regression analysis in which the litigated ROEs of U.S. LDC utility returns demonstrated an elasticity factor to government bond yields of 0.45. This implies that the risk premium should have actually increased by approximately 0.55 for each percentage point drop in the government bond yield (as opposed to the 0.25 implied by the current formula).\(^{57}\)

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\(^{57}\) Concentric Energy Advisors. Written Comments on behalf of Enbridge Gas Distribution, Hydro One, and the Coalition of Large Distributors. September 8, 2009. pp. 41-42.
• John Dalton of Power Advisory also used a regression analysis to determine that the ERP changes by less than 50% of the change in the long-term government bond rate.\(^{58}\)

The Industrial Gas Users Association also stated that it sees some merit in further consideration of adjusting downwards to 0.5 the coefficient for application of changes in long Canada bond yields to ROE.

### 4.2.3.3 Additional Term – Changes in Utility Bond Spread

The Board is of the view that the sensitivity of the formula to changes in government bond yields due to monetary and fiscal conditions that do not reflect changes in the utility cost of equity is addressed, in part, by using multiple methods to determine the initial ERP and ROE in its formulaic ROE approach and by reducing the LCBF adjustment factor to 0.5 from 0.75. The Board also is of the view, however, that **the specification of the relationship between interest rates and the ERP in the formula would be improved by the addition of a further term to the formula.**

In particular, the Board is of the view that there is a relationship between corporate bond yields and the equity return, and the Board agrees with Dr. Booth, who stated, with respect to corporate bond spreads, that “this is not to say that spreads have no information about required risk premium.”\(^{59}\) The Board notes that three participants to the consultation conducted empirical analysis to specify the relationship between corporate bond yields and the equity return:

\(^{58}\) Power Advisory LLC. Written Comments on behalf of Great Lakes Power Transmission LP. April 17, 2009. p. 15.

\(^{59}\) Professor L.D. Booth. Written Comments on behalf of Consumers Council of Canada, the Vulnerable Energy Consumer’s Coalition, the Industrial Gas Users Association, the Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters (CME), the London Property Management Association and the Building Managers and Owners Association of the Greater Toronto Area. September 8, 2009. p. 29.
Concentric demonstrated by using a regression analysis that there is a statistically significant relationship between ROE and corporate bond yields and specified that the sensitivity of allowed returns to corporate bond yields is about 0.45 to 0.55. Concentric also demonstrated empirically that Treasury bonds have been more volatile than corporate bonds since January 1997.

Kathy McShane of Foster Associates tested the relationship between corporate bond yields and the utility cost of equity. She determined the cost of equity using two approaches: first, by using approved returns on equity for utilities not governed by formulas as a proxy for the utility cost of equity, and second, by relying on a time series of utility costs of equity developed by using the discounted cash flow approach against which yields on utility bonds can be compared. By using regression analysis, Ms. McShane determined that allowed ROEs have increased (decreased) by approximately 45 basis points for every one percentage point increase (decrease) in the A rated utility bond yield. Similarly, the DCF cost of equity increased (decreased) by approximately 55 basis points for every one percentage point increase (decrease) in long-term A rated utility bond yields.

John Dalton from Power Advisory LLC conducted an econometric analysis, which established that the relationship between ROE and U.S. corporate BAA bond yields with a six month lag is approximately 0.53.

Based on the analysis provided by participants to the consultation, the Board concludes that there is a statistically significant relationship between corporate bond yields and the cost of equity, and that a corporate bond yield variable should be incorporated in the ROE formula. The Board notes that the presence of a corporate bond yield variable in its

current ROE formula would have served to increase the allowed ROE during the recent credit crisis, which, in the Board’s view, would have been directionally correct.\textsuperscript{64}

The Board has determined that it is appropriate to use a corporate yield variable that is reflective of the borrowing costs of Canadian utilities, one that is well-understood and is based on an established index from a recognized source. The Board has accordingly determined that it will use a utility bond spread based on the difference between the Bloomberg Fair Value Canada 30-Year A-rated Utility Bond index yield and the long Canada bond yield. This is further described in Appendix B.

The Board agrees with the comment of Ms. McShane that separating the LCBF and the utility bond spread variables, as opposed to using one corporate bond yield variable that would implicitly incorporate the LCBF, provides transparency as it shows “what part is causing the ROE to move in either direction.”\textsuperscript{65}

The Board also determines that the utility bond spread reflected in the reset and refined formulaic ROE approach will be subject to a 0.50 adjustment factor, consistent with the empirical analyses provided by participants to the consultation.

\textbf{4.3 Capital structure}

The Board's current policy with regard to capital structure for all regulated utilities continues to be appropriate. As noted in the Board’s draft guidelines, capital structure should be reviewed only when there is a significant change in financial, business or corporate fundamentals.\textsuperscript{66} The Board’s current policy is as follows:

The Board has determined that a split of 60% debt, 40% equity is appropriate for all electricity distributors. Capital structure was not a primary focus of the consultation and the Board notes that the comments made by participants in the consultation largely supported the continuation of the Board’s existing policy.

For electricity transmitters, generators, and gas utilities, the deemed capital structure is determined on a case-by-case basis. The Board’s draft guidelines assume that the base capital structure will remain relatively constant over time and that a full reassessment of a gas utility’s capital structure will only be undertaken in the event of significant changes in the company’s business and/or financial risk.

4.4 Debt Rates

4.4.1 Long-term debt

The determination of the cost of long-term debt was not a primary focus of the consultation and the Board notes that the comments made by participants in the consultation largely supported the continuation of the Board’s existing policies and practices.

While the Board agrees with this approach, it is important to note that the determination of the cost of long-term debt has typically received significant interest in the processes to establish electricity distribution and, to a lesser extent, electricity transmission rates. In contrast to the difficulty establishing the utility cost of equity that arises from a lack of transparency, the issues associated with the determination of a utility’s long-term debt cost arise from different factors, including the relatively short period of time since the corporatization of electricity distribution and transmission utilities, the relatively short history of rate regulation by the Board, and the presence of significant amounts of affiliate debt.

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**Natural gas distributors**

The Board has a long history of determining the cost of long-term debt for natural gas distributors. Based on this experience and in the absence of any material comments in the consultation suggesting otherwise, the Board is of the view that **the current policy of using the weighted cost of embedded debt should continue**. Consistent with the current practice, in a forward test year rate application the onus is on the applicant utility to forecast the amount and cost of new long-term debt. These values are then factored into the estimated cost of existing long-term debt for the purpose of setting regulated natural gas distribution rates. Debt instruments and debt rates are subject to a prudence review in an application for rates. However, it is the Board’s policy that the total estimated cost of debt should be a close proxy for the actual long-term debt cost incurred by the natural gas utility in the rate year.

**OPG’s prescribed rate-regulated baseload generation**

Consistent with the Board’s practice in OPG’s 2008 Cost of Service application, considered under Board file number EB-2007-0905, the Board is of the view that **OPG’s cost of long-term debt should be set in a manner similar to that adopted for natural gas distributors**.

**Electricity transmitters**

Consistent with the Board’s current practice as set out in various Decisions and Orders arising from rate applications by electricity transmitters, the Board is of the view that **an electricity transmitter’s cost of long-term debt should be set in a manner similar to that adopted for natural gas distributors**.

**Electricity distributors**

In the 2000 Electricity Distribution Rate Handbook, the Board adopted deemed long-term debt rates and deemed capital structures that varied based on the size of utility rate base.
The deemed long-term debt rates applied regardless of a utility’s actual cost of debt and actual capitalization. This deemed approach reflected the ongoing corporatization of the sector and the fact that many electricity distribution utilities had no debt.

The 2006 Electricity Distribution Rate Handbook, issued by the Board on May 11, 2005, documented an evolution of the treatment of long-term debt for electricity distributors. While the size-related capital structure and (updated) deemed debt rates were retained, the handbook outlined that long-term debt costs could also reflect the cost of embedded debt. The cost of affiliate debt was also capped by the deemed debt rate at the time of issuance.

In April of 2006, Board Staff undertook research, commissioned expert advice and consulted with stakeholders on the methods for setting the cost of capital and 2nd Generation Incentive Rate Making. These consultative activities culminated in the December 20, 2006 Report. In that report, the Board provided additional guidance on the treatment of long-term debt, and emphasized that while there should be increased reliance on actual or embedded debt costs, the need for a deemed debt rate that would continue to apply (either in itself or as a ceiling on affiliate debt) was recognized.

In distribution utility rate applications heard by the Board since the issuance of the December 20, 2006 Report, the Board has made determinations on the treatment of long-term debt that not only reflect the 2006 guidelines, but are based on the record before it in each application. The Board has also been informed by the findings made in relation to completed applications. The Board is of the view that it is appropriate for this cost of capital policy to reflect the current practices of the Board with respect to determining the cost of long-term debt based on recent Board decisions.

The following guidelines on the treatment of long-term debt are intended to provide more certainty for applicants and all participants in general. The Board wishes to emphasize that the long-term debt guidelines relating to electricity distribution utilities are expected to evolve over time and are expected to converge with the process used by the Board to determine the amount and cost of long-term debt for natural gas distributors. The Board recognizes that there is still a need for the deemed long-term debt rate, however its usage should become more limited in application. The Board wishes to
reiterate that the onus is on the distributor that is making an application for rates to document the actual amount and cost of embedded long-term debt and, in a forward test year, forecast the amount and cost of new long-term debt to be obtained during the test year to support the reasonableness of the respective debt rates and terms.

The following guidelines are relevant with respect to the determination of the amount and cost of long-term debt for electricity distribution utilities.

The Board will primarily rely on the embedded or actual cost for existing long-term debt instruments. The Board is of the view that electricity distribution utilities should be motivated to make rational decisions for commercial “arms-length” debt arrangements, even with shareholders or affiliates.

In general, the Board is of the view that the onus is on the electricity distribution utility to forecast the amount and cost of new or renewed long-term debt. The electricity distribution utility also bears the burden of establishing the need for and prudence of the amount and cost of long-term debt, both embedded and new.

Third-party debt with a fixed rate will normally be afforded the actual or forecasted rate, which is presumed to be a “market rate”. However, the Board recognizes a deemed long-term debt rate continues to be required and this rate will be determined and published by the Board. The deemed long-term debt rate will act as a proxy or ceiling for what would be considered to be a market-based rate by the Board in certain circumstances. These circumstances include:

- For affiliate debt (i.e., debt held by an affiliated party as defined by the Ontario Business Corporations Act, 1990) with a fixed rate, the deemed long-term debt rate at the time of issuance will be used as a ceiling on the rate allowed for that debt.

- For debt that has a variable rate, the deemed long-term debt rate will be a ceiling on the rate allowed for that debt. This applies whether the debt holder is an affiliate or a third-party.
The deemed long-term debt rate will be used where an electricity distribution utility has no actual debt.

For debt that is callable on demand (within the test year period), the deemed long-term debt rate will be a ceiling on the rate allowed for that debt. Debt that is callable, but not within the period to the end of the test year, will have its debt cost considered as if it is not callable; that is the debt cost will be treated in accordance with other guidelines pertaining to actual, affiliated or variable-rate debt.

A Board panel will determine the debt treatment, including the rate allowed based on the record before it and considering the Board’s policy (these Guidelines) and practice. The onus will be on the utility to establish the need for and prudence of its actual and forecasted debt, including the cost of such debt.

**Deemed Long-term Debt Formula for Electricity Distributors**

While the Board is of the view that greater reliance should be placed on embedded debt, including forecasts of the amount and cost of new debt expected to be incurred during the test year, the Board recognizes that there is a continuing need for a deemed long-term debt rate.

While there were no specific suggestions for how the deemed long-term debt rate should be calculated, the Board sees merit in modifying the formula in a manner consistent with the changes adopted for the ROE adjustment formula.

Specifically, the Board considers that the deemed long-term debt rate for the test year should be an estimate based on the long (30-year) Government of Canada bond yield forecast plus the average spread between an A-rated Canadian utility bond yield and 30-year Government of Canada bond yield for all business days in the month three (3) months in advance of the (proposed) effective date for the rate changes. This change is only in the source of the data, in the following ways:
• The 30-year A-rated Canadian utility bond yield data from Bloomberg will replace the BBB/A-rated Canadian Corporate bond yield series that was obtained from PC Bond, an affiliate of TSX. 69

• The monthly average of business daily data will be used, instead of the weekly data used previously.

The changes are due to the data availability, and to transparency and cost. Both Bloomberg and PC Bond corporate bond series are proprietary and available on subscription bases. Using the same A-rated Canadian utility bond yield series from Bloomberg will reduce costs and work and increase transparency of the calculations. The Board does not consider the changes in methodology will have any material impact on the calculated deemed long-term debt rate. The Board also notes that this methodology was supported by LPMA and BOMA in their final written comments. 70

Appendix C provides a detailed description of the methodology for calculating the deemed long-term debt rate.

4.4.2 Short-term debt

Natural gas distributors

For rate regulated natural gas distributors, short-term debt is used for an unfunded portion to true-up the deemed capitalization to the utility’s actual capitalization. As the variance between actual and deemed capital structures is generally small, the unfunded portion is typically a small fraction of total capitalization for rate-setting purposes.

69 The PC Bond data was, prior to mid-2007, produced by Scotia Capital Inc., and publicly available from Statistics Canada and the Bank of Canada.
70 Written Comments of the London Property Management Association and the Building Managers and Owners Association of the Greater Toronto Area. October 30, 2009, p. 32
In a Cost of Service application, the applicant natural gas distributor forecasts the cost of short-term debt for the test year, and this is subject to review. The Board notes that no participant questioned the Board’s policy and practice for natural gas distributors, and has determined that it is appropriate to continue with this approach. With the development of a new deemed short-term debt rate for use in the electricity transmission and distribution sector, the Board notes that it and other participants may take into consideration the deemed short-term debt rate, as discussed below and documented in Appendix D.

**OPG’s prescribed rate-regulated baseload generation**

Consistent with the Board’s practice in OPG’s 2008 Cost of Service application (EB-2007-0905), the Board is of the view that OPG’s cost of short-term debt should be set in a manner similar to that adopted for natural gas distributors.

**Electricity transmitters and distributors**

Prior to the issuance of 2008 rates, short-term debt was not factored into electricity distribution and transmission rate-setting. In the December 20, 2006 Report, the Board adopted a deemed short-term debt rate that would apply to a deemed 4% of the capital structure. The formula for the deemed short-term debt rate was established as the average 3-month Bankers’ Acceptance rate plus a 25 basis point spread, determined three months in advance of the effective date for rates. The short-term debt rate, and deemed 4% component of the capital structure was introduced in Cost of Service applications for 2008 distribution rates.

In the consultation, certain electricity distributors commented that they are unable to borrow at rates as predicted by the current deemed short-term debt formula. 71,72 These electricity distributors indicated that a high-grade utility would be Bankers’ Acceptance + 175 basis points, for smaller operating company entities, it would be Bankers’ Acceptance + 250-275 basis points.

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71 Written Comments of FortisOntario Inc. September 10, 2009. p. 8, bullet at bottom of page. FortisOntario Inc. indicates that a high-grade utility would be Bankers’ Acceptance + 175 basis points, for smaller operating company entities, it would be Bankers’ Acceptance + 250-275 basis points.
distributors have documented that the cost of short-term debt is much higher and depends on market conditions and on the rating of a distributor. The concern was not with using the Bankers’ Acceptance rate, but primarily with the spread over Bankers’ Acceptances. The suggestion was that the Board should obtain estimates of the spread from major Canadian banks, and add this to the average Bankers’ Acceptance rate as calculated for rate-setting. To lessen the burden, it was suggested that this spread be calculated annually in January of the year, and used as needed. The Board could obtain quotes from banks more frequently if market conditions warranted it.

The Board is of the view that this approach to establishing the deemed short-term debt rate has merit. The Board thus will adopt the following approach to determining the deemed short-term debt rate:

- In mid-January of each year, the Board will contact major Canadian banks to obtain estimates of the spread of a typical short-term loan for an R1-low utility over the 3-month Bankers’ Acceptance rate. The selection of R1-low is to reflect the fact that most distributors currently going to market would fall in that category; only Toronto Hydro Electric Systems Limited and Hydro One Networks Inc. would be R1-Mid or R1-High. Up to six quotes will be obtained. Ideally, the high and low estimates will be discarded to reduce the influence of outliers, and the average spread will be calculated. In the event that less than four quotes are obtained, the average spread will be calculated without discarding high and low estimates. The identity of the banks providing quotes will be protected.

- For the month three months in advance of the effective date for rates, the average 3-month Bankers’ Acceptance rate should be calculated based on data for all business days in the month. To this will be added the average spread calculated above, giving the deemed short-term debt rate for rate-setting purposes.
Full documentation on the deemed short-term debt rate methodology is provided in Appendix D.

In its final comments, LPMA/BOMA submitted that the current formula should be retained, but the spread increased from 25 basis points to 50 basis points, on the basis of recent economic history.73 The Board has determined that distributors and other participants provided sufficient documentation that the spread over bankers’ acceptance rates with which they can borrow short-term debt is much higher than the 25 basis points currently used, or even the 50 basis points proposed by LPMA/BOMA. Further, LPMA/BOMA’s proposal could possibly need review in the future. The Board is of the view that its adopted approach, while entailing some more work by the Board to obtain the spread quotes from the banks each year, is more flexible and will provide more reasonable estimates of the cost of short-term debt in each year.

4.5 Summary

The key elements of the Board’s cost of capital policy are summarized in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Components of the Board’s Cost of Capital Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capital structure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 60% debt (56% long-term and 4% short-term) and 40% equity for electricity distributors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gas distributors, electricity transmitters and OPG will continue with approved capital structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Short-term debt rate</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Once a year, in January, obtain real market quotes from major banks, for issuing spreads over Bankers Acceptance rates for the cost of short-term debt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The short term rate will be calculated as the average Bankers’ Acceptance for the month 3 months in advance of the effective date for the rates, plus the spread for the year calculated above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Long-term debt rate</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The deemed long-term debt rate will be based on the Long Canada Bond Forecast plus an average spread with an A-rated long-term utility bond yield).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Third-party embedded/actual debt with fixed rates, terms and maturity will get the actual rate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Affiliate embedded/actual debt with fixed rates, terms and maturity will get the lower of actual and deemed debt rate at time of issuance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Utility provides forecasts of new debt for a forward test year, where possible. New third-party debt will be accepted at the negotiated market rate. If a forecasted new rate is not available (i.e., due to timing), the deemed long-term debt rate may apply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• For new affiliated debt, the deemed long-term debt rate will be a ceiling on the allowed rate. The onus will be on the utility to demonstrate that the applied for rate and terms are prudent and comparable to a market-based agreement and rate on arms-length commercial terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Variable-rate debt will be treated like new affiliated debt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Renegotiated or renewed debt will be considered new debt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Where a utility has no actual debt, the deemed long-term debt rate shall apply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common equity return</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refined formula-based ROE will be calculated as the base ROE + 0.5 X (change in Long Canada Bond Forecast from base year) + 0.5 X (change in the spread of (A-rated Utility Bond Yield – Long Canada Bond Yield) from the spread in the base year). This includes an implicit 50 basis points for transactional costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The ROE (and the short-term and long-term debt rates) will be based on data for the month 3 months in advance of the effective date for rates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reset formula for 2010: The base ROE in the refined formula will be calculated for 2010 as Long Canada Bond Forecast rate plus an ERP of 550 basis points, and reflects multiple, empirically supported, estimates provided in consultation which led to this report.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5 Implementation

5.1 Transition to Recommended Cost of Capital

The policy set out in Chapter 4 of this report will come into effect for the setting of rates, beginning in 2010, by way of a cost of service application.

The Board’s “Minimum Filing Requirements for Natural Gas Distribution Cost of Service Applications” and the Board’s “Filing Requirements for Transmission and Distribution Applications” are sufficient for the purposes of implementing the policies set out in this report. Those requirements include information to be filed in support of a utility’s proposed cost of capital in a cost of service application. There is no need for additional filing requirements. The onus is on an applicant to adequately support its proposed cost of capital, including the treatment of and appropriate rates for debt instruments. The Board notes that this is being done in cost of service applications. However, the Board wishes to point out the increased emphasis that it is placing on applicants to support their existing and forecasted debt, and the treatment of these in accordance with the guidelines, or to support any proposed different treatment.

5.1.1 Continued Migration to Common Capital Structure

The Board will continue to include an adjustment to rates in 2010, as applicable, as outlined in its December 20, 2006 Report, in order to transition electricity distributors to the single deemed capital structure of 60% debt and 40% equity.

With 2010 rates, most electricity distributors will have completed the transition to the deemed capital structure of 60% debt (56% long-term and 4% short-term) and 40% equity. However, some distributors have not completed the transition. The Board will deal with the transition to the common deemed capital structure for these distributors when they file applications for rates.
5.2 Impact on Other Board Policies

5.2.1 Prescribed Interest Rates

The deemed short-term debt rate and the prescribed interest rate for deferral and variance accounts use closely related methodologies. Distributors commented that changes to the deemed short-term debt rate should be reflected in the prescribed interest rate. Further, there was acknowledgement that any new formula for the prescribed interest rate for deferral and variance accounts, used to calculate carrying charges on balances, would apply to both credit and debit balances. The Board agrees. While the policy in this report does not cover the prescribed interest rates, the Board intends to initiate a review of its approach to calculating the prescribed interest rate to align it with the approaches set out in this report.
6 Annual Update Process and Periodic Review

6.1 Annual Update Process

The Board will apply the methods set out in this report annually to derive the values for the ROE and the deemed long-term and short-term debt rates for use in cost of service applications.

If the application of these methods produces numerical results that, in the view of the Board, raise doubt that the FRS is met, the Board may then use its discretion to begin a consultative process to determine whether circumstances warrant an adjustment to the formulaic approach, in general, or to any of the cost of capital parameter values specifically. The Board also may, at its discretion and based on the circumstances at the time, use the previous year’s formula-generated values on an interim basis until its final determination is made following the consultative process.

Stakeholders proposed a variety of tests and approaches that could be used to supplement the Board’s annual review of the cost of capital parameters. The Board is of the view that any tests or approaches used to assess the reasonableness of the cost of capital parameters should be consistent with the formulaic ROE adjustment mechanism adopted. Accordingly, the Board will not attempt to annually derive the ROE using CAPM, DCF or other cost of capital methodologies to assess the reasonableness of the formula-generated ROE. The Board notes that participants are free to perform such calculations and ask the Board to review the formula when they feel it is appropriate.

For the purposes of assessing the reasonableness of results on an annual basis, the Board will examine the values produced by the Board’s cost of capital methodology, and the relationships between them, in the context of the economic and financial conditions of the day. Further and consistent with the 1997 Draft Guidelines, the Board will review its approach as conditions arise that may call into question its validity. Further, parties may ask the Board to review its cost of capital policies when they feel it is appropriate or the
Board may do so on its own initiative. In either case it will be the Board’s decision as to the time for a review. Finally, the Board may request the presentation of other tests or require some weighting for other tests should the Board want to assure itself that its approach does not lead to perverse results and is directionally in line with other market indicators.

6.2 Periodic Review

The Board has determined that it will periodically review its formulaic ROE adjustment mechanism. The use of any formulaic approach to approximate a change in the ROE is bound to be imperfect and any such imperfection may, over time, result in cumulative or compounding effects such that the application of it may not continue to meet the FRS.

The Board notes that the time period for a review suggested by stakeholders varied from 3-5 years, with Energy Probe suggesting that “4-5 years is probably too short.”

The Board has determined that a review period of five years provides an appropriate balance between the need to ensure that the formula-generated ROE continues to meet the FRS and the objective of maintaining regulatory efficiency and transparency. Accordingly, the Board intends to conduct its first regular review in 2014 and any changes to the policy made as a result of that review would apply to the setting of rates for the 2015 rate year.

At the time of the review, the Board will provide guidance to stakeholders through, for example, an issues list similar to that issued on July 30, 2009, and the relevant period over which to estimate the risk-free rate. This latter approach will promote the use of a common basis to derive cost of capital estimates, increasing their direct comparability.

The periodic review will not necessarily result in a resetting of the base ROE or refining of the adjustment factors and/or terms of the formula. The Board will seek the views of

75 Written Comments of Energy Probe Research Foundation, September 8, 2009, p. 12.
stakeholders on the need to reset the ROE and the need to revise the formula. If the Board is satisfied that its approach remains appropriate, the base ROE and the formula will remain unchanged and the review will conclude.
Appendix A: Summary on the Formula-Based Return on Equity Guidelines in Effect in the 2009 Rate Year

The Board’s existing formula-based approach using the equity risk premium (“ERP”) method for determining the fair rate of return for natural rate regulated natural gas utilities is set out in its 1997 Draft Guidelines on a Formula-Based Return on Common Equity. The 1997 Draft Guidelines were first applied in the EBRO 495 proceeding which set fiscal 1998 rates for the Consumers’ Gas Company Ltd. The Board’s December 2006 Report of the Board on Cost of Capital and 2nd Generation Incentive Regulation for Ontario’s Electricity Distributors reaffirmed the continued use of this approach for electricity distribution utilities subject to a number of minor modifications, as described below.

Draft Guidelines on a Formula-Based Return on Common Equity for Regulated Natural Gas Utilities:

The 1997 Draft Guidelines, have two phases: an initial setup and an ongoing adjustment mechanism.

Initial Set-Up

Step 1: Establish the forecast of the long Government of Canada yield for the test year

The forecast yield of long-term Government of Canada bonds is established for the test year by taking the average of the 3 and 12 months forward 10-year Government of Canada bond yield forecasts, as stated in the most recent issue of Consensus Forecasts, and adding the average of the actual observed spreads between 10 and 30-year Government of Canada bond yields, for each business day in the month corresponding to the most recent Consensus Forecast issue.

Step 2: Establish implied risk premium

A utility’s test year ROE will consist of the projected yield for 30-year long Canada bonds plus an appropriate premium to account for the utility’s risk relative to long Canada bonds. The primary methodological approach to be used in evaluating the appropriate risk premium should be the ERP test.

The ERP test is designed to measure the cost of equity capital from the capital attraction perspective. It relies on the assumption that common equity is riskier than debt and that investors will demand a higher return on shares, relative to the return required on bonds, to compensate for that risk. The premium required by an investor to assume the additional risk associated with an equity investment is taken to be the difference between the relevant debt rate, usually the yield on long-term government bonds, and some estimate of the stock’s cost of equity. The recommended cost of equity value under the ROE approach is therefore usually computed as the sum of the test-period forecast for the government yield...
and the utility-specific risk premium the analyst has estimated based on historical ROE evidence and forward-looking considerations.

**The Adjustment Mechanism**

Once the initial ROE has been set for each of the utilities, a procedure must be put in place to automatically adjust the allowed ROE for each utility to account for changes in long Canada yield expectations. The timing of the adjustment mechanism process for each utility will be consistent with its fiscal year-end.

**Step 1: Establish the forecast long Canada rates**

The formula-based ERP approach annually adjusts a utility’s allowed ROE based on changes in forecast long-term Government of Canada bond yields. Each year the process outlined in Step 1 of the initial setup phase will be repeated and an updated, consensus-based forecast of 30-year long-Canada bond yields will be obtained. The current test year rate forecast will then be compared to the previous test year forecast.

**Step 2: Apply adjustment factor**

The difference between the forecast long Canada rate calculated in Step 1 and the corresponding rate for the immediately preceding year should be multiplied by a factor of 0.75 to determine the adjustment to the allowed ROE. This adjustment will then be added to the utility’s previous test year ROE and the sum should be rounded to two decimal points.

**Term of the Rate of Return Formula**

The rate of return formula should be reviewed as conditions arise that may call into question its validity. Parties may ask the Board to review the formula when they feel it is appropriate or the Board may do so on its own initiative. In either case it is the Board’s decision as to the time for a review.

The Board may request the presentation of other tests or require some weighting for other tests in the formula should the Board want to assure itself that the ERP formula approach does not lead to perverse results and is directionally in line with other market indicators.

**December 20, 2006 Report of the Board on Cost of Capital and 2nd Generation Incentive Regulation for Ontario’s Electricity Distributors:**

Since 1999, the cost of capital for electricity distributors has been governed by the Board’s Decision with Reasons in proceeding RP-1999-0034. This decision established a size-related capital structure for distributors and set the return on equity at 9.88%. In the December 20, 2006 Report, the Board determined that the current approach to setting ROE would be maintained. The ROE will continue to be determined based on the Long Canada

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Bond Forecast plus an ERP. The approach is a modified Capital Asset Pricing Model method and includes an implicit 50 basis points for transaction costs. At that time, the Board also adopted deemed equity of 40% for all distribution utilities.

In the December 20, 2006 Report, the Board clarified the starting point to be used for each annual update and determined that it is appropriate to use the ROE calculated at that time as the starting point. This figure was 9.35%, as per the Board’s determination in Hydro One Network Inc.’s RP-1998-0001 Decision. The Board indicated that it will use 9.35% as the starting point for the update. As a result of the December 20, 2006 Report, the ROE for any period would be:

\[ \text{ROE}_t = 9.35\% = 0.75 \times (\text{LCBF}_t - 5.50\%) \]

Where:

- The ROE is set three months in advance of the effective date for the rate change. Therefore, for May 1 rate changes the ROE will be based on January data.

- The Long Canada Bond Forecast (LCBF\(_t\)) for any Period is the average of the 3-month and 12-month forecasts of the 10-year Government of Canada bond yield as published in Consensus Forecasts at time \(t\) plus the average of the actual observed spreads between 10 and 30-year Government of Canada bond yields, for each business day during the month corresponding to the Consensus Forecasts at time \(t\).
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Appendix B: Method to Update ROE

With the release of this report, the Board is resetting and refining its formulaic approach for determining a utility’s Return on Equity (“ROE”) applicable to the prospective test year. The formula has been reset to address the difference between the allowed ROE arising from the application of the formula and the rate of ROE for a low risk proxy group that cannot be reconciled based on differences in risk alone. The formula has been refined to reduce the sensitivity of the approach to changes in government bond yields due to monetary and fiscal conditions that do not reflect changes in utility cost of equity.

The formula as set out in this report includes (a) a term to reflect the change in the Long Canada Bond forecast (“LCBF”) and (b) a term to reflect the change in the spread between A-rated Utility bond yields over the Long Canada Bond yield.

The adjustment factor for the LCBF term is set at 0.5. The adjustment factor for the A-rated Utility bond term is set at 0.5. The methodology for calculating the Long Canada Bond forecast is the same as that set out in the Board’s December 20, 2006 Report.

The base for the ROE adjustment formula is set at 9.75%. The corresponding base LCBF is 4.25% and the spread in 30-year A-rated Canadian utility bonds over the 30-year benchmark Government of Canada bond yield is 1.415%.

While there is a change in the base numbers and the adjustment formula, the general approach for calculating the updated ROE is the same as that set out in the Board’s December 20, 2006 Report.

The ROE for the prospective test year \( ROE_t \) will be calculated by the following adjustment formula:

\[
ROE_t = BaseROE + 0.5 \times (LCBF_t - BaseLCBF) + 0.5 \times (UtilBondSpread_t - BaseUtilBondSpread)
\]

Where:

- \( LCBF_t \) is the Long Canada Bond Forecast for the test year, and is calculated as:

\[
LCBF_t = \left[ \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{30} (CBF_{3,i} + CBF_{12,i}) \right] + \left[ \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{30} (CB_{i,t} - CBF_{10,i})}{I} \right]
\]

Where

- \( CBF_{3,i} \) is the 3-month forecast of the 10-year Government of Canada bond yield as published in Consensus Forecasts three (3) months in advance of the implementation date for rates;

[December 11, 2009]
Ontario Energy Board

- $10^{th} CBF_{12,i}$ is the 12-month forecast of the 10-year Government of Canada bond yield as published in Consensus Forecasts three (3) months in advance of the implementation date for rates;

- $30^{th} CB_{i,i}$ is the benchmark bond yield rate for the 30-year Government of Canada bond at the close of day $i$ of the month that is three (3) months in advance of the implementation date for rates, as published by the Bank of Canada [Cansim Series V39056];

- $10^{th} CB_{i,i}$ is the benchmark bond yield rate for the 10-year Government of Canada bond at the close of day $i$ of the month that is three (3) months in advance of the implementation date for rates, as published by the Bank of Canada [Cansim Series V39055]; and

- $I$ is the number of business days for which Government of Canada and A-rated Utility bond yield rates are published in the month three (3) months in advance of the implementation date for rates.

- $UtilBondSpread_i$ is the average spread of 30-year A-rated Canadian Utility bond yields over 30-year Government of Canada bond yields over all business days in the month three (3) months in advance of the implementation date for rates, and is calculated as

$$UtilBondSpread_i = \frac{\sum_i (30UtilBonds_{i,i} - 30CB_{i,i})}{I}$$

Where:

- $30UtilBonds_{i,i}$ is the average 30-year A-Rated Canadian Utility bond yield rate, from Bloomberg L.P., for business day $i$ of the month that is three (3) months in advance of the implementation date for rates [Series C29530Y];

- $30^{th} CB_{i,i}$ is the benchmark bond yield rate for the 30-year Government of Canada bond at the close of day $i$ of the month that is three (3) months in advance of the implementation date for rates, as published by the Bank of Canada [Cansim Series V39056]; and

- $I$ is the number of business days for which Government of Canada and A-rated Utility bond yield rates are published in the month three (3) months in advance of the implementation date for rates.

As noted above, based on September 2009 data, the base ROE is set at 9.75% and the corresponding BaseLCBF is 4.25% and BaseUtilBondSpread is 1.415%. Thus the ROE adjustment formula is specified as:

$$ROE_i = 9.75\% + 0.5 \times (LCBF_i - 4.25\%) + 0.5 \times (UtilBondSpread_i - 1.415\%)$$

The ROE for any period will be rounded and expressed as a percentage with two decimal places (i.e., XX.XX%).
As for other cost of capital parameters, data will be for the month that is three months prior to the effective date for the new rates. For example, for rates effective May 1, January data will be used to calculate the updated ROE. This means is that Consensus Forecasts published in the month of January, and Bank of Canada and Bloomberg L.P. data for all business days during the month of January will be used to calculate the updated ROE.

The necessary data are available shortly after the end of the month, and thus poses no undue delays for rate-setting.

The use of the ROE will be in accordance with the policy described in section 4.2 of this report.
Appendix C: Method to Update the Deemed Long-term Debt Rate

The Board will use the Long Canada Bond Forecast plus an average spread of A-rated Corporate Utility bond yields over the actual Long Canada Bond yield to determine the updated deemed long-term (“LT”) debt rate.

This approach is consistent with the methodology adopted in the December 20, 2006 Report, to represent a fair market rate for a long-term debt instrument in the test period. The only change is the source of the corporate bond yields, which is now the A-rated Corporate Utility bond index yield obtainable from Bloomberg L.P.

Consistent with the approach used in prior guidelines, the 2006 Electricity Distribution Rate Handbook and the December 20, 2006 Report, the ROE and the deemed long-term debt rates are based on the same forecast of the risk-free rate. For certainty, the Long Canada Bond Forecast (\( LCBF_t \)) used in the ROE formula will be used in the calculation of the deemed LT rate.

The deemed LT debt rate (\( LTDR_t \)) will be calculated as follows:

\[
LTDR_t = LCBF_t + \frac{\sum_{i}^{30} (UtilBonds_{i,t} - 30 CB_{i,t})}{I}
\]

Where:

- \( LCBF_t \) is the Long Canada Bond Forecast for the prospective test year, as defined in Appendix B for the calculation of the ROE;
- \( UtilBonds_{i,t} \) is the average 30-year A-Rated Canadian Utility bond yield rate, from Bloomberg L.P., for business day \( i \) of the month that is three (3) months in advance of the implementation date for rates [Series C29530Y];
- \( CB_{i,t} \) is the benchmark bond yield rate for the 30-year Government of Canada bond at the close of day \( i \) of the month that is three (3) months in advance of the implementation date for rates, as published by the Bank of Canada [Cansim Series V39056]; and
- \( I \) is the number of business days for which Government of Canada and A-rated Utility bond yield rates are published in the month three (3) months in advance of the implementation date for rates.

As for other cost of capital parameters, data will be for the month that is three months prior to the effective date for the new rates. For example, for rates effective May 1, January data will be used to calculate the updated deemed LT debt rate.

The use of the deemed LT debt rate will be in accordance with the policy described in section 4.4.1 of this report and based on the evidentiary record in the particular application.
Appendix D: Method to Update the Deemed Short-term Debt Rate

The Board will use a new methodology to estimate the deemed short-term ("ST") debt rate, consisting of the average 3-month Bankers’ Acceptance rate as published by the Bank of Canada plus a forecasted average spread of short-term debt issuances over 3-month Bankers’ Acceptance rates for R1-low Canadian utilities.

This is a change over the previous methodology, specifically in the spread above the Bankers’ Acceptance rate which previously was fixed at 25 basis points. The new methodology will use spread forecasts obtained from Canadian prime banks to better reflect the short-term rates that utilities can obtain short-term financing for.

The calculation of the deemed ST debt rate will be done through a two-step process.

1. **Annual calculation of the average spread over 3-month Bankers’ Acceptance Rates**

   Once a year, in January, the average spread of short-term debt issuances over 3-month Bankers’ Acceptance rates will be obtained by Board staff contacting major Canadian banks. Up to six quotes will be obtained to calculate the average spread to be used during the calendar year. Ideally, the high and low estimates will be discarded to reduce the influence of outliers, and the average spread will be calculated. In the event that less than four quotes are obtained, the average spread will be calculated without discarding high and low estimates.

   If market conditions materially change, the Board could decide that the average spread may need to be updated at some point other than January.

2. **Calculation of the Deemed Short-Term Debt Rate**

   The deemed short-term debt rate \( (STDR) \) for the prospective test year will be calculated as:

   \[
   STDR_{i} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} BA_{i}}{I} + AnnSpread_{i}
   \]

   Where:

   - \( BA_{i} \) is the 3-month Bankers’ Acceptance Rate for day \( i \) in the selected month, as published by Statistics Canada and the Bank of Canada [Cansim Series V39071];
• $I$ is the number of business days for which published Government of Canada and A-rated Utility bond yield rates are published in the month three (3) months in advance of the implementation date for rates; and

• $AnnSpread$, is the average annual spread in short-term debt issuances for an R1-low utility over 3-month Bankers’ Acceptance rates for the test year $t$, calculated in step 1 above.

As for other cost of capital parameters, data will be for the month that is three months prior to the effective date for the new rates. For example, for rates effective May 1, January data will be used to calculate the updated deemed ST debt rate.

The use of the deemed ST debt rate will be in accordance with the policy described in section 4.4.2 of this report.