# EVIDENCE OF J. ROSENKRANZ ON BEHALF OF CME, CCC, CCK, \& FRPO 

Answers to Board Staff Interrogatories

## Interrogatory \#1

Ref: Rosenkranz Evidence
Preamble: Mr. Rosenkranz's $4^{\text {th }}$ recommendation is as follows: Union should provide a more detailed description of its proposed methodology for assigning replacement project costs to non-utility storage and utility storage.

Questions/ Requests:
a) Please provide a suggested methodology for assigning replacement project costs to non-utility storage and utility storage.

## Response:

In EB-2011-0038 proceeding, the Board approved a methodology for the one-time separation of non-utility storage plant and utility storage plant for the existing storage pools that were in service at the time of the NGEIR Decision. This methodology used an arithmetic average of the storage space and storage deliverability allocation factors from the EB-2005-0520 cost study to calculate a non-utility storage factor of $37.7 \%$.

Union proposes that the costs of plant additions that are replacement or maintenance projects, and do not result in an increase in storage space or deliverability, will be allocated between non-utility storage and utility storage using the same factors as were used in the original allocation of the base assets (Exhibit J.B-6-16-1). For storage pools where storage space and deliverability has remained unchanged, this makes sense. However, since the time of the NGEIR Decision, Union has expanded the space and/or deliverability of nearly half of the pre-NGEIR storage pools. All of the additional space and deliverability created by these expansions went to Union's non-utility storage operation. For these expanded pools, the original plant allocation factors, based on the storage space and deliverability that existed in 2006, are no longer valid. As the proportion of non-utility storage plant for a storage pool increases, the non-utility storage business should pay a greater portion of the maintenance and replacement project costs, and O\&M costs.

Union should therefore update the allocation factors for each of the pre-NGEIR storage pools to reflect the increase in storage space and/or deliverability that has occurred since the NGEIR decision. The revised allocation factors can be calculated using an arithmetic average of storage space and storage deliverability percentages, just as was done for the one-time separation plant separation that was approved by the Board. An example
showing how the non-utility allocation factors for the storage pools in service at the time of the NGEIR Decision would be updated is provided in the Attachment.

## ATTACHMENT

SUGGESTED METHODOLOGY FOR UPDATING NON-UTILITY STORAGE FACTOR

| Storage Pool | $\begin{gathered} \text { Storage } \\ \text { Capacity } \\ \text { 12/31/2006 } \end{gathered}$ | Maximum Deliverability W06/07 | Non-Utility Allocation as of 12/31/2006 |  |  | Post-NGEIR Expansions (Example) |  | StorageSpace | Storage Deliv. | Updated Non-Utility Allocation |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Space | Deliv. | Factor | Space | Deliv. |  |  | Space | Deliv. | Factor |
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) | (h) | (i) | (j) | (k) | (I) | (m) |
| Bentpath | 5,382,000 | 405,600 | 2,029,014 | 152,911 | 0.377 |  |  | 5,382,000 | 405,600 | 2,029,014 | 152,911 | 0.377 |
| Bentpath East | 4,711,000 | 0 | 1,776,047 | 0 | 0.377 |  |  | 4,711,000 | 0 | 1,776,047 | 0 | 0.377 |
| Bickford | 22,325,000 | 164,400 | 8,416,525 | 61,979 | 0.377 |  |  | 22,325,000 | 164,400 | 8,416,525 | 61,979 | 0.377 |
| Bluewater | 2,007,000 | 13,300 | 756,639 | 5,014 | 0.377 | 500,000 |  | 2,507,000 | 13,300 | 1,256,639 | 5,014 | 0.439 |
| Booth Creek | 1,962,000 | 0 | 739,674 | 0 | 0.377 |  |  | 1,962,000 | 0 | 739,674 | 0 | 0.377 |
| Dawn 156 | 28,121,000 | 467,300 | 10,601,617 | 176,172 | 0.377 |  |  | 28,121,000 | 467,300 | 10,601,617 | 176,172 | 0.377 |
| Dawn 167 | 4,990,000 | 19,200 | 1,881,230 | 7,238 | 0.377 |  |  | 4,990,000 | 19,200 | 1,881,230 | 7,238 | 0.377 |
| Dawn 47-49 | 4,937,000 | 55,200 | 1,861,249 | 20,810 | 0.377 |  |  | 4,937,000 | 55,200 | 1,861,249 | 20,810 | 0.377 |
| Dawn 59-85 | 5,977,000 | 492,100 | 2,253,329 | 185,522 | 0.377 |  | 500,000 | 5,977,000 | 992,100 | 2,253,329 | 685,522 | 0.534 |
| Dow A | 6,462,000 | 74,700 | 2,436,174 | 28,162 | 0.377 |  |  | 6,462,000 | 74,700 | 2,436,174 | 28,162 | 0.377 |
| Edys Mills | 2,587,000 | 40,100 | 975,299 | 15,118 | 0.377 |  |  | 2,587,000 | 40,100 | 975,299 | 15,118 | 0.377 |
| Enniskillen | 3,581,000 | 51,000 | 1,350,037 | 19,227 | 0.377 |  |  | 3,581,000 | 51,000 | 1,350,037 | 19,227 | 0.377 |
| Mandaumin | 3,909,000 | 29,400 | 1,473,693 | 11,084 | 0.377 |  |  | 3,909,000 | 29,400 | 1,473,693 | 11,084 | 0.377 |
| Oil City | 1,725,000 | 27,900 | 650,325 | 10,518 | 0.377 |  |  | 1,725,000 | 27,900 | 650,325 | 10,518 | 0.377 |
| Oil Springs East | 3,736,000 | 27,900 | 1,408,472 | 10,518 | 0.377 |  |  | 3,736,000 | 27,900 | 1,408,472 | 10,518 | 0.377 |
| Payne | 24,946,000 | 161,500 | 9,404,642 | 60,886 | 0.377 | 2,000,000 |  | 26,946,000 | 161,500 | 11,404,642 | 60,886 | 0.400 |
| Rosedale | 3,356,000 | 234,100 | 1,265,212 | 88,256 | 0.377 |  |  | 3,356,000 | 234,100 | 1,265,212 | 88,256 | 0.377 |
| Sombra | 2,203,000 | 10,700 | 830,531 | 4,034 | 0.377 |  |  | 2,203,000 | 10,700 | 830,531 | 4,034 | 0.377 |
| Terminus | 11,788,000 | 135,600 | 4,444,076 | 51,121 | 0.377 |  |  | 11,788,000 | 135,600 | 4,444,076 | 51,121 | 0.377 |
| Waubano | 10,179,000 | 46,200 | 3,837,483 | 17,417 | 0.377 |  |  | 10,179,000 | 46,200 | 3,837,483 | 17,417 | 0.377 |
| Dow Moore | 6,114,000 | 106,800 | 2,304,978 | 40,264 | 0.377 |  |  | 6,114,000 | 106,800 | 2,304,978 | 40,264 | 0.377 |
|  | 160,998,000 | 2,563,000 | 60,696,246 | 966,251 | 0.377 | 2,500,000 | 500,000 | 163,498,000 | 3,063,000 | 63,196,246 | 1,466,251 | 0.433 |


| Cols. $(b)$ \& (c) | EB-2011-0038, Exhibit B3.29 | (Units are GJ and GJ/day) | Column $(k)$ | $(d)+(g)$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Column $(d)$ | $(b){ }^{*}(f)$ |  | Column $(l)$ | $($ e $)+(h)$ |
| Column $(e)$ | (c) ${ }^{*}(f)$ |  | Column $(m)$ | $((k) /(i)+(l) /(j)) / 2$ |

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Answers to Board Staff Interrogatories

## Interrogatory \#2

Ref: Rosenkranz Evidence

Preamble: Mr. Rosenkranz noted that of the $\$ 419,000$ of system integrity costs that are allocated to Excess Utility Storage Space, Union reports that $\$ 75,300$ is associated with the 13 PJ of Excess Utility storage Space and $\$ 343,500$ is associated with the 66.5 PJ of non-utility storage space. All of this cost is included in the Excess Utility Cross Charge. However, because the Excess Utility Cross Charge is subtracted from utility storage revenue to calculate the storage margins that will be shared with ratepayers, this charge is borne by Union's utility customers, not the non-utility storage business.

Union noted in Exhibit J.D-16-10-1 that it has allocated system integrity costs associated with the non-utility storage business to the Excess Utility Storage Space category in the cost allocation study. The system integrity costs of the non-utility storage business and are included in the non-utility cross charge and paid for by the non-utility. This approach recognizes that the system integrity space is a utility function required to support the integrity of the system as a whole for all customers.

## Questions/ Requests:

a) Please explain your understanding of how the system integrity costs related to the nonutility storage business are recovered from ratepayers.

## Response:

The $\$ 343,500$ of system integrity costs associated with 66.5 PJ of non-utility storage space is a cost to ratepayers because including this cost in the Excess Utility Storage Cross Charge reduces the storage margin that is credited to in-franchise rates.

The storage margin calculation is described in Exhibit H1, Tab 1, starting on page 4. The total storage margin associated with the sale of 13.0 PJ of excess utility storage space is the total revenue--forecast to be $\$ 11.488$ million--minus the allocated costs. The allocated costs are the cost of gas ( $\$ 1.692$ million) and the Excess Utility Storage Cross Charge ( $\$ 4.569$ million). In the EB-2011-0038 decision, the Board determined that all of the margin from the sale of the 13.0 PJ of excess utility storage space will be credited to ratepayers, after a 10 percent incentive amount retained by Union. As shown in Table 3, column (b) (H1, Tab 1, page 6), the total storage margin is $\$ 5.227$, million and the margin included in in-franchise rates is $90 \%$ of this amount, or $\$ 4.704$ million.

Union states, correctly, that the cross charge is the cost associated with the 13.0 PJ of excess utility storage space (H1, Tab 1, page 5). This appears to be what Union has done, except when it comes to system integrity costs. In Exhibit J.D-16-10-1(b), Union says that of the \$419,000 of system integrity cost that is included in the Excess Utility Storage Cross Charge, only $\$ 75,300$ is associated with the 13.0 PJ of Excess Utility Space. The other $\$ 343,500$ is associated with the 66.5 PJ of non-utility storage space. By including this additional $\$ 343,500$ in the Excess Utility Storage Cross Charge, instead of assigning this cost to Union's non-utility storage operation where it belongs, the storage margin credited to in-franchise rates is reduced by \$309,150 (90\% of $\$ 343,500$ ). This causes the in-franchise rates to increase, which is a cost to ratepayers, not to Union's non-utility storage operation.

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## Interrogatory \#3

Ref: Rosenkranz Evidence

Preamble: Mr. Rosenkranz noted that Union included a new proposal to allocate total Short Term Peak Storage revenue between utility storage and non-utility storage on a calendar year basis. Under Union's proposal, Excess Utility Storage Space would be sold as Short Term Peak Storage and Union would sell additional Short Term Peak Storage from its non-utility storage assets. The total Short Term Peak Storage revenue for each calendar year would be allocated pro-rata between utility storage and non-utility storage. Mr. Rosenkranz argued that Union's proposal is flawed and should be rejected by the Board.

Questions/ Requests:
a) Please provide a proposed alternative methodology for allocating short term peak storage revenue between utility and non-utility storage operations that would, in your opinion, result in a more reasonable outcome for ratepayers.

## Response:

Union should separately account for the revenues from each ex-franchise transaction that is underpinned by utility storage assets. This level of detail is necessary to document that nonutility assets are being optimized on behalf of ratepayers, and to avoid cross-subsidies from utility ratepayers to Union's non-utility storage business.

In the NGEIR Decision, the Board determined that functional separation or full divestiture of non-utility storage assets was not necessary, and that utility storage and non-utility storage could continue to be operated as an integrated asset. However, even though operations may be integrated, Union must maintain an accounting separation of utility storage revenues and costs and non-utility storage revenues and costs. From a storage marketing perspective, the same individuals can continue to sell ex-franchise storage services from both utility assets and nonutility assets. The non-utility storage operation is essentially an agent for Union ratepayers, with responsibility for managing a separate utility storage "book".

This arrangement requires that appropriate organizational structures and transaction management systems be put in place to provide accountability and avoid conflicts of interest. However, it is not clear whether Union has done this. ${ }^{1}$ Based on the information Union has provided, it appears that Union's proposal to artificially restrict storage sales from excess utility assets to a single type of service (short term peak storage), and allocate total short term peak storage revenues pro rata between its utility and non-utility operations, may be intended as a "work around" for the deficiencies of Union's revenue tracking system that is not in the best interests of Union's ratepayers.

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[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ In Exhibit J.C-6-10-7(c), Union states that is revenue tracking system "tracks revenues by service type, not by customer". The fact that Union has, on at least two occasions, oversold non-utility storage space and encroached on utility storage, without compensation, also raises concerns about Union's transaction management systems and internal controls.

