Date: October 24, 2012

Fax: 1-416-440-7656

To: Ontario Energy Board
Attention: Board Secretary Kirsten Walli

Re: Written Submissions for Applications for Feed-in-Tariff Licences EB-2012-0311 NextEra Energy Canadian Operating Services, Inc. and EB-2012-0312 Conestogo Wind LP

From: Preserve Mapleton Incorporated
C/o Elissa Krul
[redacted]

Telephone: [redacted]

Pages including cover page 14

October 24, 2012

Ontario Energy Board
2300 Yonge Street
P.O. Box 2319
Suite 2700, Toronto, Ont. M4P 1E4

Attention: Ms. Kirsten Walli
Board Secretary

Re: NextEra Energy Canadian Operating Services, Inc.
Conestogo Wind LP
Application for Feed-in Tariff Program Licences
Reply Submissions
Board File Nos. EB-2012-0311 and EB-2012-0312

Dear Ms. Walli:

Please accept PMI's response to the applicant's reply to our submission of October 15, 2012.

Mr. Vegh, counsel for the applicant requests an expeditious resolution to this matter because the commercial in-service date is December 7, 2012 for Conestogo and to achieve the in-service date, the generator's licence must be provided to other agencies. PMI also notes that Mr. Vegh, on page 2 of his submissions says that the notice to proceed was received March 8, 2012 which was necessary to have in order to apply for a generator's licence. March 8, 2012 to July 9, 2012 is a five month lapse. July 9, 2012 is when Conestogo Wind LP and NextEra Energy Canadian Operating Services Inc. first submitted their application for a generator's licence. However, because the applicant forgot to send the Notice to Proceed with the application in July, it was delayed another month, creating a six month lapse from the time their application was formally accepted. This six month delay was no one's fault but the applicant's. This in fact demonstrates that NextEra is sloppy and tardy in supplying appropriate documents and perhaps further reflects the way in which the applicant operates their facilities. It also appears NextEra assumed preferential treatment in an application that would be expeditiously granted with no opposition. NextEra's disorganization should not constitute an emergency for either PMI or the OEB.

If NextEra received their Notice to Proceed on March 8, 2012, why did NextEra wait until July 2012 to submit their initial application for their generator's licence? (Interrogatory #1)

The Distribution Connection Agreement was executed with Hydro One on October 18, 2012. Meanwhile since August 2012, NextEra has been busy erecting new Hydro poles, burying cable and building their transformer station. PMI would like to know why counsel for NextEra submitted their reply submission October 19, 2012, the day following the Distribution Connection Agreement with Hydro One. (interrogatory #2)

PMI would like NextEra to clarify why the Distribution Connection Agreement with Hydro One was only executed on October 18, 2012. Why was there such a delay in procuring the licence with Hydro One when NextEra knew well in advance this this was one of the main criteria in relation to the licensing of electricity generators under the FIT program. (Interrogatory #3)

PMI requests that NextEra explain in detail what constitutes the argumentative, irrelevanat and unsubstantiated allegations against NextEra, Conestogo Wind LP and the wind energy sector in general. (interrogatory #4)

PMI also requests evidence that would refute PMI's claims on those specific incidents mentioned. (interrogatory #5)

In Mr. Vegh's reply submission of October 19, 2012, under the heading "Financial Viability and Technical Capability", a quote is included: "I find that the applicant……"PMI notes that the person who made this quote may not be the same person who adjudicates PMI's hearing. The person who adjudicates PMI's hearing may not have the same opinion regarding NextEra's financial viability and technical capabilities as the person who adjudicated the Upper Canada hearing. NextEra's financial viability is not the same as it was in 2010. The Ontario Energy Board should base NextEra's financial viability on current 2012 figures not 2010 figures as anyone in the public business sector would demand. The following financial information has just been found by PMI since our October 15, 2012 submission and leads PMI to further question NextEra's financial viability. On Florida Power and Light's own website, PMI has discovered an article entitled "Cautionary Statements and Risk Factors That May Affect Future Results". PMI requires NextEra to explain the following statements that give rise to concern to PMI. (see Appendix C attached))

1. impact of political, regulatory and economic factors on regulatory decisions important to NextEra and FPL.

2. Impacts of new or revised laws, regulations or interpretations or other regulatory iniatives on NextEra Energy and FPL.

3 Effect on NextEra Energy and FPL of changes in tax laws and in judgements and estimates used to determine tax related asset and liability amounts. (interrogatory questions #6, 7, 8)

Also coming from NextEra's own website is Appendix A. NextEra acknowledges that if the Production Tax Credit (PTC) is allowed to expire, Wind Installations in the United States are in question. It also illustrates the wind installations in previous years when the PTC was allowed to expire, plummeted. The diagram on page 2 of Appendix A is further explained by an article from Bloomberg News (http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a2012/01/17/bloomberg_articlesL…..) that says "NextEra didn't include new U.S. wind projects in its financial forecast for 2013, Lew Hay, chief executive officer of the Juno Beach, Florida based company, said in a November conference with investors. NextEra's wind expansion after 2012, when a federal tax credit for wind generators is expected to expire, is contingent upon "public policy support", said Steve Stengel, a spokesman for NextEra, in a telephone interview." PMI requests NextEra to explain this statement if the wind industry is so viable. (interrogatory #9)

Counsel for the applicant reiterates a point he made earlier, that PMI had no standing in the Divisional Court. The applicant's counsel seems to have forgotten the affidavit PMI submitted to support PMI having standing now. As well, PMI has been incorporated for nearly a year and in that time has represented Mapleton residents in a Judicial Review, Environmental Review Tribunal and now PMI is representing Mapleton residents at the Ontario Energy Board hearing. Counsel further continues to raise the outcome of PMI's J.R. and ERT hearings. PMI wishes to submit a motion of request to rule on whether this falls within the scope of this hearing.

At what time did the Board review land owners compensation agreements that the counsel for the applicant refers to? What particular document is Mr. Vegh referencing? Could Mr. Vegh please provide the review that the Board made in which they didn't express any concerns? (interrogatory # 10)

Furthermore consider Appendix B. It is a letter written to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on behalf of a coalition of 47 house representatives. In it, it states their desire to see the Wind Production Tax Credit (PTC) expire and reasons why.

Also on October 15, 2012, a preliminary ruling was released from the World Trade Organization (WTO). WTO agreed with European Unions and Japan that the Ontario Fit Program's domestic content was unfair. This ruling could have a major effect on the whole FIT program. Ontario might have to dismantle part of its controversial "feed-in-tariff" program. (http://m.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and resources/on…)

The next issue at the WTO is subsidies. Will this be the death toll of Ontario's FIT program? Could we see NextEra's rush to exit Ontario, leaving behind unfinished projects because Ontario's FIT program is in jeopardy?

According to World Trade Report 2006, Tab 11, two types of subsidies are prohibited. One being local content or import subsidies. Local content subsidies are those that are contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods. (http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep…)

Concerning Mr. Eveh's reply submission of Oct. 19, 2012, page 3, regarding the mistake made by NextEra on the licence application concerning the transformer station, if the answer to question 7 (b) (iii) has no impact on the licensing issue, why is the question included on the application form? (interrogatory #11)

Concerning the transformer station itself, PMI would like to know details about this transformer. (Interrogatory #12). PMI assumes that the OEB is aware of details such as make, model and capacity of this transformer? PMI respectfully requests that details, as well as the number of wind turbines can be connected to this transformer. (interrogatory #13) PMI also requests the noise study for this particular make and model of transformer (interrogatory #14) in light of the precedent setting case in Melancthon Township, Dufferin County, where a property owner near a transformer station had his property taxes reduced 50% by MPAC because of the noise and vibration from that transformer station.

Why has NextEra failed to acknowledge the circumstances surrounding the Seabrook licence renewal as mentioned in PMI's October 15, 2012 submissions? (interrogatory#15)

Much has changed since November 2011, the date both licences were issue (Upper Canada
Transmission Inc.'s transmission licence and Summerhaven's Leave to Construct a transmission facility).

In conclusion, PMI would like an indepth explanation for the 15 aforementioned interrogatories and opposes the granting of a licence to the applicant.

PMI is making a genuine effort to participate meaningfully and responsibly in this process.

PMI respectfully requests a fax of any correspondence between the OEB and NextEra as a result of this written submission to 519-848-2227.

Preserve Mapleton Incorporated
Elissa Krul

Cc: NextEra Energy Canadian Operating Services Inc.
Conestogo Wind LP

Appendix A

6

Extension of the Wind Production Tax Credit Delivers Fiscal Benefits to Government and Saves Jobs

A one-year extension of the Production Tax Credit (PTC) would result in a ***fiscal net benefit to the government of $768 million.***[1] Alternatively, the uncertainty created by inaction on this issue will delay investment decisions and result in significant job losses.

The net benefit to government stands in stark contrast to cost figures often cited in public discussion that focus exclusively on tax outflows from the U.S. Treasury. While that metric is important for the purposes of budgetary scoring, it ignores the positive impact of federal, state and local tax inflows.

Federal impact: Tax revenues flow from wind development projects for the life of the wind farm, well beyond the 10 years that the PTC is awarded. Income taxes on corporate profits and worker payroll also help offset the cost of the PTC to the U.S. Treasury.

State and local impact: Wind projects deliver significant tax revenues to state and local governments through state income tax on wages and profits, property taxes and sales taxes.

Jobs impact: If the PTC is not extended in early 2012, annual U.S. wind installations are forecast to be as low as zero in 2013, down from 5-8 GW in each of the past few years.[2] Total wind supported jobs will drop by nearly half, from 78,000 in 2012 to 41,000 in 2013.[3]

A one-year PTC extension results in a net government benefit of $768M

(All figures shown net present value)



Unlike permanent tax credits, the PTC is only earned by wind projects that are operational before January 1, 2013. Wind projects are developed over several years and have significant lead times for permitting, ordering equipment, component manufacturing and construction.

Because PTC eligibility depends on project completion, the current uncertainty surrounding extension prevents developers from committing to projects for 2013 and beyond. This means that there are no orders being placed for equipment, and turbine manufacturers will need to scale back staffing and their supply chain accordingly beginning in the second quarter of 2012.

1 – The $768 million fiscal net benefit is based upon an estimated 5,000 MW of wind installations in 2013.
2 – EIA AEO 2011 forecast zero installations with no PTC.
3 – Job loss estimates based upon 2011 Navigant study.

NEXTera ENERGY

Impact of PTC expiration: The PTC was originally enacted as part of the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Since then the PTC has been set to expire seven different times. On three occasions the PTC has been allowed to expire (1999, 2001 and 2003). In the years following expiration, installations dropped between 73 and 93%, with resulting severe job losses.

The wind industry has grown significantly since the last expiration of the PTC in 2003. The American wind industry has increased domestic content from 25% prior to 2005 to 60% today. There are over 400 domestic manufacturers of wind components, accounting for over 20,000 manufacturing and supply chain jobs. The other 58,000 jobs reside in development, engineering, construction and operation of wind projects.

PTC Expiration Causes Sharp Falloff in US Wind Installations
(Gigawatts installed by year)



(Data source: AWEA installations for '99-'11, under construction for '12, and EIA AEO 2011 for '13 without PTC)

PTC Background: The Section 45 Production Tax Credit (PTC) is the main federal incentive for wind project investment. The PTC is a tax incentive that helps keep electricity rates low and encourages development of renewable energy projects. This performance-based incentive is available to owners of wind farms when projects become operational.

In 2012 the PTC provides wind farm owners with a 2.2 cent per kilowatt-hour tax credit for the first ten years of electricity production. The PTC is an effective tool that allows wind developers to raise private capital and effectively lowers the price of electricity for the consumer.

Study details: Calculations in this study are based on research performed by NextEra Energy. NextEra is the largest U.S. developer of wind projects with almost 9 GW of operating assets and over 1 GW expected to be built in 2012.

Economic multiplier effects were estimated using the "Jobs and Economic Development Impact" (JEDI) Model from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory.

You can download a copy of this document by visiting:
http://www.nexteraenergyresources.com/pdf_redesign/wind_ptc.pdf.

NEXTera ENERGY

Appendix B

8

MIKE POMPEO
4TH DISTRICT, KANSAS

107 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
(202) 225-6216

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515–1604

September 21, 2012

The Honorable John Boehner
Speaker of the House
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Speaker Boehner:

We are writing to urge you to allow the wind Production Tax Credit (PTC) to expire at the end of 2012 under current law and not to include an extension of the PTC in a package of tax extenders should the House consider one later this year.

The Obama Administration has poured billions of dollars into subsidizing its favored "green energy" sources. The Solyndra scandal and the administration's squandering of $535 million in taxpayer dollars is a clear example of this agenda. Under this administration, federal subsidies for wind have grown from $476 million per year when the President took office to $4.98 billion per year today. However, wind remains an intermittent resource; the wind does not blow all the time, and wind farms do not produce power constantly the way traditional power plants do.

The wind energy production tax credit was established by the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and provides wind energy producers a 2.2 cent subsidy for every kilowatt hour of electricity produced. The subsidy attaches to a wind farm when it is built and continues for its first ten years of operation. A one-year extension of the PTC would cost American taxpayers over $12 billion.

Even if the PTC expires, a wind farm built in 2012 will continue to receive subsidies until 2022 and, as a consequence, the bipartisan Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that will add $6.8 billion to the deficit between 2011 and 2015. Today, when the U.S. is more than $15 trillion in debt and borrowing $0.40 of every dollar it spends, we cannot afford to borrow money to subsidize the operations of a politically preferred technology.

In the case of wind, doing so would not only be costly to taxpayers but ultimately would hurt consumers by distorting energy markets. Since the PTC provides a tax benefit for new projects, it often drives wind developers to build projects with little regard to consumer demand, as long as they can be placed on line and their power brought to market to collect the subsidy. In fact, because the tax subsidy is tied to the amount of electricity generated, wind producers will sometimes sell their electricity for nothing or even pay wholesale electricity markets to take their

9

power in order to collect the tax subsidy. This subsidized and intermittent power distorts markets and threatens around-the-clock baseload power producers, forcing them to pay as well or shut down for long periods of the day when their power is needed most. This will ultimately harm consumers who need power that is affordable and available around the clock.

We believe that the Solyndra scandal has demonstrated that it is time for the federal government to stop picking winners and losers in the energy marketplace. Twenty years of subsidizing wind is more than enough. Our nation can simply no longer afford to pick winners and losers in the energy marketplace. The PTC should expire at the end of the year under current law.

Sincerely,

(10)

[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] Tom Graves

[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

John R. Carter [illegible]

Joseph R. Pitts [illegible]

[illegible] Steve Scalise

Joe Walsh Doug Lamborn

11

Paul C Broun

[illegible]

[illegible]

Marsha Blackburn

[illegible]

Ed Royce

[illegible]

Raúl R. Labrador

Pete Olson

Brett Guthrie

[illegible]

Vicky Hartzler

Jim Jordan

John Fleming

Sandy Adams

12

Page 2

Mike Pompeo (KS-04)
Jeff Flake (AZ-06)
Ed Whitfield (KY-01)
Joe Barton (TX-06)
John Culberson (TX-07)
Cliff Stearns (FL-06)
Mike Simpson (ID-02)
Jeff Miller (FL-01)
Lynn Westmoreland (GA-03)
Trent Franks (AZ-02)
John Kline (MN-02)
Louie Gohmert (TX-01)
Jo Bonner (AL-01)
Joe Wilson (SC-02)

Page 3

Marlin Stutzman (IN-03)
Bill Flores (TX-17)
Richard Nugent (FL-05)
Dave Schweikert (AZ-05)
Alan Nunnelee (MS-01)
Tom Graves (GA-09)
Jason Chaffetz (UT-03)
Mick Mulvaney (SC-05)
Justin Amash (MI-03)
Andy Harris (MD-01)
John Carter (TX-31)
Dennis Ross (FL-12)
Joe Pitts (PA-16)
Randy Hultgren (IL-14)
Tom McClintock (CA-04)
Steve Scalise (LA-01)
Joe Walsh (IL-08)
Doug Lamborn (CO-05)

Page 4

Paul Broun (GA-10)
Pete Olson (TX-22)
Richard Hanna (NY-24)
Brett Guthrie (KY-02)
Dave McKinley (WV-01)
Jeff Landry (LA-03)
Marsha Blackburn (TN-07)
Vicky Hartzler (MO-04)
Stephen Fincher (TN-08)
Jim Jordan (OH-04)
Ed Royce (CA-40)
John Fleming (LA-04)
Phil Roe (TN-01)
Sandy Adams (FL-24)
Raul Labrador (ID-01)

Appendix C

13

Cautionary Statements and Risk Factors That May Affect Future Results

This press release contains "forward-looking statements" within the meaning of the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements are not statements of historical facts, but instead represent the current expectations of NextEra Energy, Inc. (NextEra Energy) and Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) regarding future operating results and other future events, many of which, by their nature, are inherently uncertain and outside of NextEra Energy's and FPL's control. In some cases, you can identify the forward-looking statements by words o phrases such as "will," "will likely result," "expect," "anticipate," "believe," "intend," "plan," "seek," "aim," "potential," "projection," "forecast," "predict," "goals," "target," "outlook," "should," "would" c similar words or expressions. You should not place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which are not a guarantee of future performance. The future results of NextEra Energy and FPL are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause their actual results to differ materially from those expressed or implied in the forward-looking statements. These risks and uncertainties include, but are n limited to, the following: effects of extensive regulation of NextEra Energy's and FPL's business operations; inability of NextEra Energy and FPL to recover in a timely manner any significant amount c costs, a return on certain assets or an appropriate return on capital through base rates, cost recovery clauses, other regulatory mechanisms or otherwise; impact of political, regulatory and economic factors on regulatory decisions important to NextEra Energy and FPL; risks of disallowance of cost recovery by FPL based on a finding of imprudent use of derivative instruments; effect of any reductions to or elimination of governmental incentives that support renewable energy projects of NextEra Energy Resources, LLC and its affiliated entities (NextEra Energy Resources); impact of new or revised laws, regulations or interpretations or other regulatory initiatives on NextEra Energy and FPL; effect on NextEra Energy and FPL of potential regulatory action to broaden the scope of regulation of OTC financial derivatives and to apply such regulation to NextEra Energy and FPL; capital expenditures, increased cost of operations and exposure to liabilities attributable to environmental laws and regulation applicable to NextEra Energy and FPL; effects on NextEra Energy and FPL of federal or state laws or regulations mandating new or additional limits on the production of greenhouse gas emissions; exposure of NextEra Energy and FPL to significant and increasing compliance costs and substantial monetary penalties and other sanctions as a result of extensive federal regulation of their operations; effect on NextEra Energy and FPL of changes in tax laws and in judgments and estimates used to determine tax-related asset and liability amounts; impact on NextEra Energy and FPL of adverse results of litigation; effect on NextEra Energy and FPL of failure to proceed with projects under development or inability to complete the construction of (or capital improvements to) electric generation, transmission and distribution facilities, gas infrastructure facilities or other facilities on schedule or within budget; impact on development and operating activities of NextEra Energy and FPL resulting from risks related to project siting, financing, construction, permitting, governmental approvals and the negotiation of projec development agreements; risks involved in the operation and maintenance of electric generation, transmission and distribution facilities, gas infrastructure facilities and other facilities; effect on NextEra Energy and FPL of a lack of growth or slower growth in the number of customers or in customer usage; impact on NextEra Energy and FPL of severe weather and other weather conditions; risks associated wi threats of terrorism and catastrophic events that could result from terrorism, cyber attacks or other attempts to disrupt NextEra Energy's and FPL's business or the businesses of third parties; risk of lack c availability of adequate insurance coverage for protection of NextEra Energy and FPL against significar losses; risk to NextEra Energy Resources of increased operating costs resulting from unfavorable supply costs necessary to provide NextEra Energy Resources' full energy and capacity requirement services; inability or failure by NextEra Energy Resources to hedge effectively its assets or positions against changes in commodity prices, volumes, interest rates, counterparty credit risk or other risk measures; potential volatility of NextEra Energy's results of operations caused by sales of power on the spot mark or on a short-term contractual basis; effect of reductions in the liquidity of energy markets on NextEra Energy's ability to manage operational risks; effectiveness of NextEra Energy's and FPL's hedging and trading procedures and associated risk management tools to protect against significant losses; impact of unavailability or disruption of power transmission or commodity transportation facilities on sale and delivery of power or natural gas by FPL and NextEra Energy Resources; exposure of NextEra Energy a FPL to credit and performance risk from customers, hedging counterparties and vendors; risks to NextE Energy and FPL of failure of counterparties to perform under derivative contracts or of requirement for NextEra Energy and FPL to post margin cash collateral under derivative contracts; failure or breach of NextEra Energy's and FPL's information technology systems; risks to NextEra Energy and FPL's retail businesses of compromise of sensitive customer data; risks to NextEra Energy and FPL of volatility in t market values of derivative instruments and limited liquidity in OTC markets; impact of negative publicity; inability of NextEra Energy and FPL to maintain, negotiate or renegotiate acceptable franchis agreements with municipalities and counties in Florida; increasing costs of health care plans; lack of a qualified workforce or the loss or retirement of key employees; occurrence of work strikes or stoppages and increasing personnel costs; NextEra Energy's ability to successfully identify, complete and integrat acquisitions; environmental, health and financial risks associated with NextEra Energy's and FPL's ownership of nuclear generation facilities; liability of NextEra Energy and FPL for significant retrospective assessments and/or retrospective insurance premiums in the event of an incident at certain nuclear generation facilities; increased operating and capital expenditures at nuclear generation facilitie of NextEra Energy or FPL resulting from orders or new regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; inability to operate any of NextEra Energy Resources' or FPL's owned nuclear generatior units through the end of their respective operating licenses; liability of NextEra Energy and FPL for increased nuclear licensing or compliance costs resulting from hazards posed to their owned nuclear generation facilities; risks associated with outages of NextEra Energy's and FPL's owned nuclear units; effect of disruptions, uncertainty or volatility in the credit and capital markets on NextEra Energy's and FPL's ability to fund their liquidity and capital needs and meet their growth objectives; inability of NextEra Energy, FPL and NextEra Energy Capital Holdings, Inc. to maintain their current credit ratings risk of impairment of NextEra Energy's and FPL's liquidity from inability of creditors to fund their crec commitments or to maintain their current credit ratings; poor market performance and other economic factors that could affect NextEra Energy's and FPL's defined benefit pension plan's funded status; poor market performance and other risks to the asset values of NextEra Energy's and FPL's nuclear decommissioning funds; changes in market value and other risks to certain of NextEra Energy's investments; effect of inability of NextEra Energy subsidiaries to upstream dividends or repay funds to NextEra Energy or of NextEra Energy's performance under guarantees of subsidiary obligations on NextEra Energy's ability to meet its financial obligations and to pay dividends on its common stock; an effect of disruptions, uncertainty or volatility in the credit and capital markets of the market price of NextEra Energy's common stock. NextEra Energy and FPL discuss these and other risks and uncertainties in their annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2011 and other SEC filings, and this press release should be read in conjunction with such SEC filings made through the dat of this press release. The forward-looking statements made in this press release are made only as of the date of this press release and NextEra Energy and FPL undertake no obligation to update any forward-looking statements.

SOURCE Florida Power & Light Company
For further information: Florida Power & Light Co. Media Line, +1-305-552-3888