

Hydro One Networks Inc.

8th Floor, South Tower
483 Bay Street
Toronto, Ontario M5G 2P5
www.HydroOne.com

Tel: (416) 345-5700
Fax: (416) 345-5870
Cell: (416) 258-9383
Susan.E.Frank@HydroOne.com



Susan Frank

Vice President and Chief Regulatory Officer
Regulatory Affairs

BY COURIER

July 2, 2013

Ms. Kirsten Walli
Board Secretary
Ontario Energy Board
Suite 2700,
2300 Yonge Street
Toronto, ON M4P 1E4

Dear Ms. Walli:

EB-2013-0040 and EB-2013-0041 Bornish Wind, LP, Kerwood Wind, Inc. and Jericho Wind, Inc. – Hydro One Networks Inc.’s Responses to Interrogatory Questions

Please find attached an electronic copy of responses provided by Hydro One Networks Inc. to interrogatory questions. Two (2) hard copies will be sent to the Board shortly.

An electronic copy of the responses have been filed using the Board’s Regulatory Electronic Submission System.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY SUSAN FRANK

Susan Frank

Attach.

C – Intervenors in EB-2013-0040 and EB-2013-0041 (by e-mail)

- 1 b) No modifications or upgrades were made in the past five years (2008 to 2013 YTD).
 2 However, Hydro One recognizes that there could possibly be modification or upgrade
 3 requests from customers in the future.
 4
 5 c) The requested information is tabulated below:
 6

CUSTOMER ARRANGEMENT	DESCRIPTION OR WORK	APPROXIMATE ADDED COST DUE TO THE GENERATOR'S LINE CONSTRUCTION
1) Existing <i>Secondary</i> Overhead Service (Current Customer)	Secondary* overhead road crossings must be re-located from overhead service to underground in order to cross the road and the Applicant's new line. *Secondary lines carry voltage no greater than 600 volts directly into the customer's property.	\$7,300 per existing secondary overhead crossing
2) Existing <i>Primary</i> Overhead Service (Current Customer)	The Applicant will maintain Hydro One's standard clearances on the current customer's primary service when building the new transmission line above existing primary service crossings. Therefore, an existing customer with this arrangement will not be affected by the project.	N/A
3) New <i>Secondary</i> Underground Service (Future Customer)	Utilizing a road bore, Hydro One would install secondary service underground to cross beneath the road and to rise on the customer side of the Applicant's line.	\$5,100 ¹
4) New <i>Primary</i> Underground Service (Future Customer)	Utilizing a road bore, Hydro One would install primary service underground to cross beneath the road and to rise on the customer side of the Applicant's line. This option is needed as the transmission line will not be built with any extra ground clearance to accommodate <i>future</i> primary crossings (and therefore, is not the same as case 2, above).	\$9,850 ²
5) Service Upgrades for Secondary or Primary Services (Current Customer)	Hydro One would provide a service upgrade (e.g., a higher voltage or increased capacity) to a current customer.	Depends on Customer's Request

7

¹ \$9,400 (Total Cost) = \$4,300 (normal situation*) + \$5,100 (incremental).

² \$15,420 (Total Cost) = \$5,570 (normal situation*) + \$9,850 (incremental).

* Normal situation: In the absence of the transmission line proposed by the Applicant.

- 1 More details on the arrangements which would need to be addressed are provided in
- 2 response to HONI IRR to Board Staff 1.

1 **The Corporation of the County of Middlesex INTERROGATORY #1 List 1**

2
3 A: TRANSMISSION AND CONNECTION LINES: ROUTE, ENGINEERING
4 PRINCIPLES AND LAND RIGHTS

5
6 The evidence of Hydro One Networks Inc. (“Hydro One”) indicates:

- 7
8 a. “The co-existence and co-location of two licensed entities with electricity
9 infrastructure on adjacent rights of way introduces new considerations to ensure safe,
10 reliable and economic provision of customer services and supply;” and that
11
12 b. A “satisfactory resolution of these (co-location) issues is a necessary prerequisite to
13 the Board granting a Leave to Construct.”

14
15 **Interrogatory**

16
17 In both applications, at Exh B-4-1, pg. 4-5, the Co-owners indicate that they have
18 consulted with Hydro One with respect to co-location of transmission lines, but that
19 Hydro One would not accommodate their requests. Please provide a summary of all co-
20 location discussions, fully describe the issues and impasse between Hydro One and the
21 Applicants with respect to co-locations and provide an expert engineering opinion as to
22 whether the impasse can be resolved to allow co-location and prevent poles on each side
23 of the travelled portion the roadways.

24
25 **Response**

26
27 For clarity, Hydro One assumes that references to ‘co-location’ mean the joint use of
28 Hydro One’s distribution poles by both high- and low voltage lines (that is, the
29 attachment of transmission lines longitudinally above distribution lines on distribution
30 poles, which is also referred to as ‘over-building.’)

31
32 The Applicants’ response to Interrogatory #10 of the County of Middlesex, filed May 23,
33 2013, provides an accurate summary of the discussions between the Applicants and
34 Hydro One on this issue. Hydro One Distribution’s safety and reliability concerns with
35 the joint use arrangement proposed by the Applicants stem primarily from inductive
36 coupling and possible electrical contact between high- and low- voltage circuits. A fuller
37 discussion of these concerns and Hydro One’s review of mitigation measures is provided
38 below:

39
40 **Inductive Coupling**

41
42 Hydro One conducted engineering studies on two proposals to attach 69 kV circuits to its
43 distribution poles, and determined that, as the 69 kV circuits are designed to deliver the
44 output of a generating facility, they can be expected to be loaded close to capacity on a
45 recurrent basis. The current on these circuits will be higher than the traditional 400 Amp
46 capacity of Hydro One Distribution feeders; therefore, inductive coupling from the

1 proposed circuit is likely to reach levels beyond those experienced in normal Hydro One
2 practice. This raised the following concerns:

- 3
- 4 i. *Induction contributing to Temporary Over-voltage* – Temporary Overvoltage
5 (“TOV”) is expected to be elevated dramatically in the presence of an unbalanced
6 fault on the proposed line, since the resulting coupling to the lower voltage circuit is
7 not moderated by cancellation of magnetic field contributions from balanced 3-phase
8 currents. Hydro One’s design practice requires such TOV levels to be limited to 1.3
9 pu (corresponding to industry requirement for an effectively grounded system).
- 10
- 11 ii. *Induction contributing to increased Neutral to Earth Voltage levels* – Balanced load
12 currents on the proposed circuit will contribute to Neutral to Earth Voltage (“NEV”)
13 levels on Hydro One’s 4-wire feeders. This contribution may raise NEV levels
14 beyond the 10 V limit mandated by the Ontario Electrical Safety Code (“OESC”) for
15 all customer service entrances and result in the supply system’s contribution to
16 Animal Contact Voltage (“ACV”) at livestock farming operations exceeding the
17 permissible off-farm contribution limit of 0.5 V established in the Distribution
18 System Code.
- 19
- 20 iii. *Voltage Unbalance* -- Although the proposed circuit is expected to carry balanced
21 currents in normal operation, the resulting voltages induced into Hydro One’s 3-
22 phase feeders would not be balanced because the respective phase conductor pairs
23 are not symmetrically displaced. Voltage unbalance on the Hydro One feeder is
24 therefore likely to be impacted, depending on the relative phasing of the system
25 voltage waveform versus the inductive contribution. Hydro One must comply with
26 the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) C84.1 standard, which indicates
27 that electric supply systems should be designed and operated to limit the maximum
28 voltage unbalance to 3% when measured at the revenue meter under no-load
29 conditions. At the same time, the National Equipment Manufacturers Association
30 (“NEMA”), which represents motor and drive manufacturers, requires motors to give
31 rated output for only 1% of voltage unbalance per NEMA MG-1-1998, and to be
32 derated for application at higher unbalance.

33

34 **Potential Conductor Breakage Leading to Electrical Contact**

35

36 Hydro One Distribution’s 44 kV feeders have a design rating of about 30 MVA,
37 potentially serving 10,000 customers at an average 3 kW residential load. Over-building
38 arrangements introduce the risk of direct conductor contact between the respective
39 circuits, whether caused by natural or by contingent hazards. Contact between a high-
40 and a low-voltage conductor would subject customers served from the lower voltage
41 circuit to temporary over-voltages, which would be significantly higher than normal.
42 Such over-voltages would in turn, potentially lead to permanent equipment damage and
43 large-scale service disruptions, requiring extensive restoration times. Hydro One has
44 determined that the probability of a breakage occurring at least once in a 40 km circuit
45 over 50 years is 25% for a 230 kV line and 44% for a 115 kV line.

46

1 **Increased Potential for Lightning Strikes**

2
3 The higher poles used in over-building arrangements introduce an increased possibility of
4 lightning strikes, with resulting potential pole fires and outages.

5
6 **Mitigation Measures**

7
8 *Mitigating Inductive Coupling* -- Induction issues may or may not be substantial,
9 depending on project specifics, and the effects can vary along the route. At minimum, to
10 accommodate over-building, Hydro One would have to replace its current distribution
11 wood poles, which are 45 to 60 feet in height, with 100-foot steel poles, and implement
12 framing which maintains specified distances between the high- and low-voltage wires.
13 Such mitigation measures would require case-by-case assessment, design, monitoring,
14 and additional technical “fixes” as may be needed to address issues which arise at
15 individual locations. Even with these measures, complete elimination of the issues is not
16 guaranteed.

17
18 *Mitigating Potential Electrical Contact between High- and Low-Voltage Conductors* --
19 Hydro One is not aware of any utility finding a sound engineering solution to the issue of
20 potential electrical contact that does not compromise safety or service reliability. As
21 utilities have become aware of these issues after the fact, surge arresters have been used
22 to mitigate problems, but problems, nonetheless, remain. For example, in response to
23 several instances of conductor contact on shared poles, the British Columbia Utilities
24 Commission (“BCUC”) issued a directive requiring installation of surge arresters as
25 sacrificial devices to mitigate customer impact, and contemplation of changes to certain
26 operating (reclosing) practices that involve a tradeoff between service reliability versus
27 personnel and equipment safety.¹ It should be noted that the Commission’s directive
28 concludes that the installation of surge arresters, as directed, “will substantially but not
29 entirely mitigate the damage” caused by over-voltages resulting from conductor contact.
30 Hydro One’s design philosophy is not to use underrated protective equipment (in this
31 case, surge arresters), because it is not a safe or prudent engineering practice.

32
33 *Mitigating Lightning Strikes and Pole Fires* -- The risk of pole fires can be managed by
34 resorting to steel poles, and the adverse impact on feeder service reliability can be
35 addressed by installing lightning arresters on each under-built lower voltage circuit,
36 placed at regular intervals along the entire exposure. These types of mitigation measures,
37 however, increase initial capital costs and ongoing future maintenance costs related to an
38 ongoing program of arrester inspections and possible replacement.

39
40 Following its review of these considerations, Hydro One decided not to allow new joint
41 use agreements involving transmission voltages on distribution poles and formalized this
42 decision in the change to its joint use policy in 2012.

¹ Letter L-35-11 Re: British Columbia Utilities Commission Directives to British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (BC Hydro) in Letter L-60-10 originating from Order G-54-09 Mission/Stave Falls Power Outage Event, Log No. 33625, April 27, 2011.

1 **The Corporation of the County of Middlesex INTERROGATORY #2 List 1**

2
3 A: TRANSMISSION AND CONNECTION LINES: ROUTE, ENGINEERING
4 PRINCIPLES AND LAND RIGHTS

5
6 The evidence of Hydro One Networks Inc. (“Hydro One”) indicates:

- 7
8 a. “The co-existence and co-location of two licensed entities with electricity
9 infrastructure on adjacent rights of way introduces new considerations to ensure safe,
10 reliable and economic provision of customer services and supply;” and that
11
12 b. A “satisfactory resolution of these (co-location) issues is a necessary prerequisite to
13 the Board granting a Leave to Construct.”

14
15 **Interrogatory**

16
17 In EB-2013-0040 Exh B-4-1, the Co-owners identify two areas on Elginfield Road/Nairn
18 Road where the transmission line route is not specified as being within a County road
19 allowance. The reasoning is related to Bell Canada overhead telecommunications
20 facilities and Hydro One distribution facilities.

21
22 Please identify the extent to which the transmission line route in these locations can avoid
23 cross overs and can co-locate. Please advise as whether or not the cross over is absolutely
24 necessary and whether or not there is any possibility of co-location, which could prevent
25 poles on each side of the travelled portion the roadway.

26
27 **Response**

28
29 For the safety and reliability reasons provided in HONI IRR to County of Middlesex #1,
30 Hydro One’s joint use policy does not allow joint use of high- and low-voltage lines on
31 its distribution poles. Therefore, Hydro One’s position is that this cross-over of the
32 transmission line from the south to the north side of Elginfield/Nairn Road, as described
33 by the Applicant, is absolutely necessary.

1 ***The Corporation of the County of Middlesex INTERROGATORY #3 List 1***

2
3 A: TRANSMISSION AND CONNECTION LINES: ROUTE, ENGINEERING
4 PRINCIPLES AND LAND RIGHTS

5
6 The evidence of Hydro One Networks Inc. (“Hydro One”) indicates:

- 7
8 a. “The co-existence and co-location of two licensed entities with electricity
9 infrastructure on adjacent rights of way introduces new considerations to ensure safe,
10 reliable and economic provision of customer services and supply;” and that
11
12 b. A “satisfactory resolution of these (co-location) issues is a necessary prerequisite to
13 the Board granting a Leave to Construct.”

14
15 ***Interrogatory***

16
17 In EB-3013-0041 Exh B-4-1, the Applicants identify that the transmission line route at
18 the crossing of Ausable River is on the opposite side of the travelled portion of the road
19 as existing Hydro-One distribution facilities.

20
21 Please identify the extent to which the transmission line route in these locations can avoid
22 cross overs and can co-locate. Please advise as whether or not the cross over is absolutely
23 necessary and whether or not there is any possibility of co-location, which could prevent
24 poles on each side of the travelled portion the roadway.

25
26 ***Response***

27
28 There appears to be a misunderstanding respecting this location. The following quotes
29 lines 11-13 of the Applicant’s evidence in Exhibit B, Tab 4, Schedule 1, page 4:

30
31 “Along the portion of the route that crosses the Ausable River, while **there**
32 **are no Hydro One facilities**, there are existing Bell Canada overhead
33 facilities on one side of the ROW.” [Emphasis added]

34
35 Accordingly, the Applicant’s original need to cross the road in this location was due, not
36 to the presence of Hydro One’s assets, but to those of Bell Canada. In the meantime, the
37 Applicant’s response to Middlesex County’s Interrogatory #11 filed May 23, 2013,
38 indicates that the Applicant believes that there is no longer a necessity to cross the road
39 there, because Bell Canada has agreed to re-locate its assets underground.