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July 5, 2013

VIA RESS

Kirsten Walli  
Board Secretary  
Ontario Energy Board  
2300 Yonge Street, 27th Floor  
Toronto ON M4P 1E4

**Re: EB-2012-0451, EB-2012-0433 and EB-2013-0074**

Dear Ms. Walli:

Further to Procedural Order No. 4 in the above-captioned matters, enclosed for filing is the evidence of TransCanada PipeLines Limited.

TransCanada appreciates the Board's accommodation in extending the deadline for the filing of TransCanada's evidence to today.

Yours very truly,

**Gordon Cameron**

Gordon Cameron

cc: All parties via electronic filing

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**ENBRIDGE GAS DISTRIBUTION INC.  
UNION GAS LIMITED**

**Greater Toronto Area Project  
Parkway West Project  
Brantford-Kirkwall / Parkway D**

**EB-2012-0451  
EB-2012-0433  
EB-2013-0074**

**WRITTEN EVIDENCE**

**Of**

**TRANSCANADA PIPELINES LIMITED**

**July 5, 2013**

## 1 **1.0 Introduction**

2 This evidence will address TransCanada's involvement in Segment A of the Enbridge Gas  
3 Distribution (Enbridge) GTA Project. The evidence begins with a brief review of the evolution of  
4 the role of TransCanada's Mainline in natural gas transportation in Ontario and the impact of  
5 recent regulatory and commercial changes on that role. The evidence then discusses  
6 TransCanada's discussions with Enbridge and Union Gas Limited (Union) regarding the efficient  
7 development of natural gas transportation infrastructure in Ontario, and the Memorandum of  
8 Understanding (MOU) between TransCanada and Enbridge that resulted from those discussions.  
9 Finally, the evidence speaks to the potential impacts of Union's proposed facilities on the existing  
10 transportation pipeline infrastructure in Ontario.

## 11 **2.0 The Evolution of Natural Gas Transportation on the TransCanada Mainline**

12 The TransCanada Mainline was originally conceived as a pipeline to transport Western Canadian  
13 Sedimentary Basin natural gas from Empress, Alberta to eastern markets. With the advent of the  
14 Alliance and Vector pipelines in 2001 came increased market interest in sourcing gas supply at  
15 Union's Dawn Hub and transporting it on the Union and TransCanada systems.

16 Since 2003, TransCanada has worked to provide eastern market customers with short-haul  
17 transportation (e.g. from Dawn) in the most cost effective manner possible. Beginning in 2003  
18 and continuing until 2006, TransCanada was able to provide service away from the Dawn area  
19 with a combination of Union Gas M12 service and the exchange of Mainline long-haul service to  
20 the Dawn area. By serving these contracts using exchanges, TransCanada was able to provide  
21 firm service without adding new facilities to the Mainline, and thus provide the service at a lower  
22 cost to all Mainline shippers. There was no required expansion of the Union system for these  
23 requests.

24 In 2006, 2007 and 2010 both TransCanada and Union coordinated the addition of facilities to their  
25 respective systems to meet new short-haul requests sourced at Dawn that were destined for  
26 markets at Iroquois, the GMi EDA and the Union EDA. In addition, where possible, TransCanada  
27 continued to use its existing capacity away from Parkway to meet short-haul requests.

28 In the winter of 2008/2009, TransCanada determined that it could no longer rely on long-haul  
29 nominations to the Dawn/Niagara/Chippawa area to effect the exchanges required to meet some  
30 of its short-haul requirements. As a result TransCanada, after discussion with its stakeholders  
31 (including Union Gas and Enbridge) at the Tolls Task Force, implemented use of a temporary  
32 "must-nominate" service to Dawn ("DOS-MN") and then eventually contracted for firm capacity  
33 between St. Clair and Emerson on the Great Lakes Gas Transmission ("GLGT") system along  
34 with additional "Dawn to Dawn" service with Union Gas to ensure physical transportation of gas  
35 away from Dawn when required. TransCanada's goal—which was achieved with these  
36 arrangements—continued to be to provide the service at the lowest possible cost to shippers.

37 In 2010, TransCanada and Union Gas worked together to facilitate the transportation of Marcellus  
38 shale gas sourced at the Niagara receipt point on the TransCanada system to Eastern Canadian

1 markets. TransCanada contracted for Union M12 capacity between Kirkwall and Parkway to  
2 transport some of this gas, which began to flow in November 2012.

### 3 **3.0 Events in 2012**

4 In 2012, while TransCanada was preparing for a new open season to test interest in transporting  
5 additional Marcellus shale volumes to market via Niagara and Chippawa, Union Gas and  
6 Enbridge Gas Distribution (“EGD”) proposed their “Parkway Extension” project to bypass the  
7 TransCanada Mainline between Parkway and the Maple compressor station. The Parkway  
8 Extension project came as a surprise to TransCanada. Union was aware that TransCanada was  
9 preparing an open season to attract Marcellus shale volumes and that TransCanada wanted to  
10 coordinate that open season with Union. However, TransCanada proceeded with its open  
11 season as originally planned and offered expansion capacity away from Parkway. Union and  
12 Gaz Metropolitain (Gaz Métro) bid successfully into TransCanada’s open season.

13 TransCanada initially proposed to have the facilities to provide this service available for a 2014 in-  
14 service date, but subsequently amended the in-service date in the Precedent Agreements to  
15 2015 because TransCanada was in discussions with Enbridge to coordinate our respective  
16 expansions, and Enbridge had delayed the in-service date of its facilities. Also, the revised in-  
17 service date of the TransCanada expansion was realistic in light of TransCanada’s experience  
18 (with its 2012 expansion) with the challenges of adding pipeline infrastructure in built-up areas of  
19 Ontario.

20 At the same time, TransCanada participated in Union’s EB-2011-0210 proceeding. The purpose  
21 of TransCanada’s intervention was to explore the necessity of Union’s proposed Parkway West  
22 compressor, which Union indicated was to provide Loss of Critical Unit (LCU) protection to M12  
23 shippers delivering gas through Parkway. TransCanada stated in its evidence that more dialogue  
24 was needed with Union in this regard so that the best solution for Ontario gas consumers could  
25 be found. The OEB concurred with TransCanada in its Reasons for Decision, and suggested that  
26 Union, Enbridge and TransCanada should all be having more coordinated discussion with  
27 regards to infrastructure in Ontario:

28 *The Board is concerned with the apparent lack of cooperation and*  
29 *consultation between Union, Enbridge and TCPL that came to light in*  
30 *this proceeding. The Board is concerned that this may have adverse*  
31 *consequences for Ontario ratepayers – result in higher rates and costs*  
32 *than would otherwise be the case, contribute to the uneconomic bypass*  
33 *of existing natural gas infrastructure, create asset stranding, encourage*  
34 *the proliferation of natural gas infrastructure, and lead to the*  
35 *underutilization of existing natural gas infrastructure.*

36 *The Board agrees that the consideration of the Parkway West facilities requires a wider*  
37 *perspective. The Board therefore encourages Union to engage TCPL, Enbridge and*  
38 *shippers in a consultative process, the purpose of which is to jointly consider the need for*  
39 *the Parkway West project, explore reasonable alternatives (including the repurposing of*  
40 *existing facilities) in order to maximize the benefit to Ontario ratepayers. The result of this*

1                    *process would then be filed with Union's Leave to Construct application for the Parkway*  
2                    *West facilities.*

#### 3    **4.0    TransCanada and Ontario LDC coordination**

4                    Subsequent to the EB-2011-0210 proceeding, TransCanada, Enbridge and Union met several  
5                    times to discuss the optimal infrastructure requirements to serve the Greater Toronto Area  
6                    ("GTA") market and eastern markets downstream of Parkway.

7                    Enbridge's intention prior to discussions with TransCanada was to build Segment A directly from  
8                    its connection with Union at Parkway and into the Enbridge franchise area. Prior to discussions  
9                    with Enbridge, TransCanada's intention had been to expand for the requests received in its May  
10                    2012 new capacity open season by building facilities between Parkway and Maple. In an effort to  
11                    collaborate and build the most efficient expansion to meet market needs, TransCanada and  
12                    Enbridge came together to discuss joint ownership of Segment A to provide both economic and  
13                    environmental benefits. Union also had discussions with TransCanada and Enbridge and all  
14                    three companies subsequently met to coordinate the expansion of this infrastructure.

15                    Through those discussions, it was agreed that TransCanada and Enbridge would collaborate on  
16                    the infrastructure to serve the GTA and markets downstream of Parkway, which led to the  
17                    development and execution of the MOU. It was also agreed that Union would construct the  
18                    Parkway West compressor for loss of critical unit protection and such further compression as  
19                    might be needed to meet new firm contractual requirements.

20                    TransCanada intended to utilize its share of capacity on the new Segment A and new  
21                    TransCanada facilities from Albion to west of Maple (TransCanada's King's North project) to  
22                    satisfy the capacity requirements in the precedent agreements with Union and Gaz Métro.

23                    TransCanada and Enbridge intended to have joint ownership of Segment A. Ultimately,  
24                    however, it was decided that the same result could be achieved more practically if Enbridge built  
25                    and owned Segment A and charged TransCanada an amount equal to what would have been  
26                    TransCanada's ownership equity contribution, but in the form of a long term transportation  
27                    contract. This avoided the complication of having two regulators responsible for the same  
28                    facilities. The intention remained that this would be an Enbridge / TransCanada project, with  
29                    access to the facilities being provided by TransCanada using its portion of the capacity on  
30                    Segment A to serve eastern markets in a fair, non-discriminatory way. As noted in Schedule D of  
31                    the MOU, the contractual arrangement between TransCanada and Enbridge was to replicate as  
32                    much as was commercially practicable, the same commercial effect as if Segment A was jointly  
33                    owned by the parties.

34                    It was never the intention of the parties for Enbridge to become a transmission provider in the  
35                    normal sense. Enbridge will use its space on the line solely for local distribution purposes. The  
36                    TransCanada portion of capacity on Segment A will be used by TransCanada to meet its  
37                    contractual obligations to transport gas for its customers.

1 In this regard it is important to note the following distinction between the contractual and  
2 operational features of the MOU. Contractually, TransCanada will deliver gas to Enbridge at  
3 Bram West (the inlet to Segment A). However, operationally, Segment A will act as a loop of the  
4 TransCanada Mainline between Parkway and Maple, with a physical delivery to Enbridge at  
5 Albion. The flows onto Segment A will be controlled by TransCanada.

6 As noted above, TransCanada was initially proposing to construct facilities in the Parkway to  
7 Maple corridor (looping around Brampton and / or Vaughan) to meet its contractual and  
8 operational requirements. Through the MOU, the same operational benefits accrue to  
9 TransCanada without the need for duplication of facilities. That is, TransCanada's capacity on  
10 Segment A, when combined with the Albion to Maple (King's North) TransCanada expansion,  
11 acts as a loop of the TransCanada system.

12 Through the construction and normal operation of Segment A and TransCanada's King's North  
13 expansion, Segment A will act as an integrated portion of the TransCanada system with no  
14 requirement for nomination, flow measurement or other methods of control, of the TransCanada  
15 portion of the flow. The pipeline flow on Segment A will vary based on Enbridge's daily nominated  
16 requirements at Bramwest and the operation of other portions of the TransCanada system and  
17 will be as a result of a hydraulic balance between TransCanada's existing Parkway to Maple Line  
18 and Segment A. Under design day conditions, TransCanada will be utilizing its full allotment of  
19 the capacity (50%) to meet its contractual obligations. Notwithstanding the above, for  
20 maintenance requirements and safety circumstances Enbridge will have the ability to interrupt the  
21 flow on Segment A through valves, while communicating and working with TransCanada as the  
22 specific circumstance requires.

23 TransCanada will not be able to "nominate" service as it would, for example, with Great Lakes or  
24 Union TBO. Gas will simply flow on Segment A past Albion, depending on flows and pressures,  
25 as if Segment A were a loop of the Mainline's Parkway to Maple line (or part of such a loop, as it  
26 will be when TransCanada builds north from Albion in its King's North expansion).

## 27 **5.0 The National Energy Board's RH-003-2011 Decision**

28 In March of 2013 the National Energy Board ("NEB") issued its decision on TransCanada's 2012-  
29 2013 Mainline tolls application (the "RH-003-2011 Decision"). The RH-003-2011 Decision, which  
30 was issued after the MOU was entered into, was not expected by TransCanada, and made it  
31 important to TransCanada and its shippers that TransCanada achieve the long term net revenue  
32 projections on which the tolls set in the RH-003-2011 Decision are based.

33 The RH-003-2011 Decision fixed all of the Mainline firm service tolls for the (approximately five  
34 year) period from 2013 to 2017 (the "Fixed Tolls Period"). The tolls were fixed at levels that will  
35 not recover the costs that TransCanada incurs during the Fixed Tolls Period. Instead,  
36 TransCanada was ordered to defer approximately \$700 million of Fixed Tolls Period costs by  
37 adding them to rate base.

38 The RH-003-2011 Decision also established a deferral account (the "Toll Stabilization Account" or  
39 "TSA") to track variations between TransCanada's actual net revenue and the estimated net

1 revenue for each year of the Fixed Tolls Period. A positive balance in the TSA at the end of the  
2 Fixed Tolls Period will be applied to reduce future tolls. A negative balance in the TSA will be  
3 recovered from TransCanada's shippers unless this would cause a realization of "fundamental  
4 risk" on the Mainline. In this latter case, TransCanada's ability to recover any of the Mainline  
5 revenue requirement (from existing rate base or post-RH-003-2011 Decision capital investment)  
6 will come under review by the NEB.

7 The TSA relies on a forecast of throughput on the Mainline for the Fixed Tolls Period. Long term  
8 throughput forecasts come with a substantial possibility of variances between the forecasts and  
9 actual throughput, and if there is a negative variance in throughput there could be a negative  
10 balance in the TSA when the time comes for its disposition.

11 The RH-003-2011 Decision has had a major impact on the terms under which TransCanada is  
12 able to invest in new facilities on the Mainline, for several reasons.

13 First, the NEB held that TransCanada's investments in the Mainline were not protected by a  
14 "regulatory compact" or other regulatory principle that entitled TransCanada to a reasonable  
15 opportunity to recover the Mainline's costs. The NEB said that it had the authority to, and would if  
16 appropriate, disallow TransCanada's recovery of its prudently incurred costs. As noted, this  
17 would apply to future investments as well as existing rate base.

18 Second, tolls will be fixed from 2013 to 2017, so (absent an exception being made by the NEB)  
19 there will be no way to adjust tolls during that period so as to recover any costs associated with  
20 new facilities. The estimates that the NEB used to set the benchmark net revenues for the period  
21 did not include any amount for new facilities. Accordingly, any costs not recovered in tolls that  
22 are incurred constructing new facilities during this period would have a negative impact on the  
23 TSA balance and thus increase the possibility that the NEB will disallow some part of  
24 TransCanada's future revenue requirements.

25 As a result of the RH-003-2011 Decision: (1) TransCanada requires greater assurances than it  
26 has had in the past that it will recover its investment in any new facilities and its existing rate base  
27 from customers; and (2) TransCanada must recover its investment in the Mainline in a way that  
28 does not exert a negative pressure on the TSA balance and, by doing so, put the recovery of the  
29 entire Mainline revenue requirement in issue.

30 One consequence of the RH-003-2011 Decision is that TransCanada decided not to build  
31 facilities to serve the 2012 open season precedent agreement with Gaz Métro or the service  
32 request from Union, given that those arrangements were entered into under the pre-RH-003-2011  
33 Decision regime, when TransCanada believed that the National Energy Board would at least give  
34 TransCanada a reasonable opportunity to recover its prudently incurred costs.

35 Despite the disincentives to invest in new capacity on the Mainline that arise from the RH-003-  
36 2011 Decision, TransCanada is in discussions with the eastern LDCs to find a way to expand  
37 TransCanada's capacity in the Eastern Triangle in a manner that meets the incremental  
38 requirements of the LDCs while providing TransCanada with a reasonable expectation that it will  
39 recover its existing and future investments. In addition to discussions with the eastern LDCs,

1 TransCanada has recently posted a new capacity open season for short-haul and long-haul  
2 capacity to eastern markets. TransCanada will invest capital in the Mainline as long as doing so  
3 does not expose the company to increased risk that it will not recover its revenue requirement.

4 TransCanada intends to apply to the NEB by the end of 2013 for approval to construct the  
5 interconnections required to accommodate Segment A of Enbridge's GTA Project and the  
6 facilities associated with TransCanada's King's North Project.

## 7 **6.0 Item 14 of the OEB Filing Guidelines**

8 Item 14 of the OEB Filing Guidelines on the Economic Tests for Transmission Pipeline  
9 Applications states:

10 "Any project brought before the Board for approval should be supported  
11 by an assessment of the potential impacts of the proposed natural gas  
12 pipelines on the existing transportation pipeline infrastructure in Ontario,  
13 including an assessment of the impacts on Ontario consumers in terms  
14 of cost, rates, reliability, and access to supplies."

15 TransCanada is providing the following comment in support of this guideline.

16 The decision of Union and Gaz Métro to decontract TransCanada long-  
17 haul capacity and replace it with short-haul capacity has two major  
18 impacts on Ontario gas users. The first major impact is that  
19 TransCanada loses substantial long-haul revenue—approximately \$150  
20 million—with a potential consequential impact long-term on all  
21 TransCanada tolls paid by Ontario gas users. The second major impact  
22 is that Ontario gas users incur additional costs as a result of constructing  
23 facilities to accommodate the new short-haul capacity. TransCanada  
24 will continue to analyze these impacts in comparison to the savings that  
25 Ontario gas consumers could realize by sourcing more gas through  
26 short-haul transportation services.