



# Agenda

**SLIDES: 3-11** | Savings & Budget

**SLIDES: 12-15** Performance Incentives

**SLIDES: 16-21** | Portfolio/Program Design

**SLIDES: 22-24** Discount Rate

**SLIDES: 25-26** Procedural Recommendation







# Why DSM Savings Levels Matter

- DSM lowers customer energy bills a lot
  - \$372 million net benefits just from Enbridge's proposed 2023 programs (Exh. D/1/4)
  - 3.29 benefit-cost ratio
  - These values are conservatively low
    - excludes some benefits (e.g., gas price suppression effects)
    - based on 4% real discount rate (net benefits of \$533 million w/0.5% discount rate)
- Reduces GHG emissions
  - By far the cheapest GHG reductions (net cost reductions vs. \$338/tonne CO2e for RNG\*)
  - Needed to meet climate goals
- Mitigates customer risk e.g., exposure to future fuel price volatility
- Numerous other benefits to program participants, local economy


# **Policy Guidance**

- Nov. 27, 2020 Energy Ministry Letter
  - "...increase the cost-effective conservation of natural gas to simultaneously reduce emissions and lower energy bills."
  - "...supportive of increasing cost-effective ratepayer funding of natural gas conservation..."
- Dec. 1, 2020 OEB DSM letter
  - DSM Plan should be informed by 2015-2020 plans, mid-term review, 2019 APS, post-2020 consultations, and "the government's policies and commitments in the Environment Plan..."
  - Primary objective is to assist customers in becoming more efficient "to help better manage their energy bills"
  - Secondary objectives to "lower overall average annual gas usage", support achievement of province GHG reduction goals and help defer/avoid infrastructure projects
  - Expect "modest budget increases...in the near term in order to increase natural gas savings"
- Nov. 15, 2021 Energy Ministry Mandate Letter
  - Gas DSM should deliver "increased natural gas conservation savings and reductions in GHGs"

Enbridge appears to have focused on only one element of this guidance and applied a very conservative interpretation of it.



### Planned Annual Savings *Lower* than 2017-2019 Achievements




Average Annual Savings (Millions m3)				
2017-2019	2023-2027			
113	111			

Source: EFG Report, Figure 1, p.9



### Planned Savings Are *Less* than Most Constrained APS Scenario



### Note:

- Potential studies are inherently conservative
  - understating savings potential
  - overstating costs of acquiring potential (at least at higher levels of savings)
  - overstating difference in cost between different savings levels.
- This study is no different.
- Jurisdictions outperform potential studies when there is direction to pursue all costeffective savings.

Source: Enbridge Tech Conference Undertaking JT1.1




### Planned Savings Are Less than 0% of Environment Plan Goal

- Environment Plan goal:
  - achieve 3.2 million metric tons of GHG emission reductions by 2030 from increased natural gas conservation <u>relative to baseline of business-as-usual gas DSM</u>
  - Doesn't say how much of that should come from Enbridge DSM (vs. government policies and programs), but as least some DSM contribution expected
- Enbridge DSM Plan
  - Achieves lower savings than recent years, not more
  - Annual average savings is ~12% <u>less</u> than the Environment Plan's assumed starting point for increasing savings (i.e., the 2016 APS constrained scenario)

Reference: EFG Report, pp. 14-15.



### Planned Savings – at Best – ~50% Less than Leading Gas Utilities



- 60-70% less than reported savings of leaders
- ~50% less after adjusting for advantages of leaders (other than higher budgets)
  - Proper adjustments for all issues raised by Enbridge witness Weaver
  - Conservatively made no adjustments in the other direction for advantages
     Enbridge has relative to others (e.g., ability to claim much larger savings from commercial boilers)

Source: EFG Tech Conference Undertaking JT3.3



# **How Can Savings Be Increased?**

- Shifting budget
  - Several program areas with no/little savings
- Improving program designs
- Increasing budget



### **Addressing Concerns about Spending Increases & Rate Impacts**

- Need to consider tradeoffs
  - substantial additional bill reductions
  - meaningful contribution to climate goals
  - reduced risk to future fuel price volatility, environmental regs, etc.
- Rate impacts are really concern about non-participant impacts
  - Best solution is to expand programs so all customers have opportunity to participate
- DSM % of total gas bills is small
  - Average of only 1.9% of total gas bills as proposed by Enbridge (JT1.6 for total gas bill)
  - Significant drop from recent years 2.9% average for 2017-2019
- Amortization an option for mitigating near-term concerns



## **Enbridge Performance Incentive Mechanism Shortcomings**

Incentive Component	Sub-Components	Weight (5-Yrs)	Concerns	EFG Report Pages
Scorecards: Annual Net Gas Savings	Residential Low Income Commercial Industrial Large Volume Energy Performance	57%	* shift from lifetime to annual savings undermines policy objectives of lowering energy bills and pollution * otherwise right focus - and good to have separate targets for diff customer groups - but not enough weight * performance bands of 50% to 150% are too wide - too easy at low end, too hard at high end	pp. 22-26
Scorecards: Participation Goals	Energy Peformance Beyond Building Code	* Not needed for EPP - should stand on its own (savings) merits;  * BBC program not fuel-neutral - should be removed from portfol		pp. 23, 25
Economic Net Benefits (under TRC+ Test)	n.a.	31%	* largely redundant w/savings metrics - and more complex * Earnings start at just 27% of planned savings * Earnings affected by factors beyond utility control * increases incentive to shift \$ from smaller customers	pp. 26-30
Low Carbon Transition (hybrid electric/gas & gas-only heat pumps)	Residential installs Res. contractors trained Commercial installs Com. Engineers trained	2%	* including gas heat pumps is problematic - no chance of meaningful impact on market for foreseeable future  * OK if hybrid heat pumps are to be cold climate models	pp. 30-31
Long-Term GHG Reduction (Sum of Annual <i>Gross</i> Gas Savings)	n.a.	5%	* gross savings means not measuring real GHG reductions - creates perverse incentive to chase free riders * summing annual savings antithetical to "long-term GHG" * essentially redundant w/savings metrics	pp. 31-32



# **Alternative Structure Consistent w/EFG Recommendations**

		Weight			
Incentive Component	Sub-Components	(5-Yrs)	Changes		
	Residential		* shift back to lifetime savings (instead of 1st year savings)		
Scorecards: Lifetime Net Gas Savings	Low Income		* weighting increased w/elimination of participation, net benefit,		
	Commercial	98%	and long-term GHG metrics		
	Industrial	36/0	* performance bands of 75% to 125%		
	Large Volume		* Energy Performance program savings part of commercial sector -		
			no separate performance metric		
Scorecards: Participation Goals	n.a.	0%	* No participation metrics		
			* Beyond Building Code program removed from portfolio		
<b>Economic Net Benefits</b>	n.a.	0%	* no net benefits metric - weight shifed to lifetime savings		
(under TRC+ Test)	II.a.	070	no het benefits metric - weight simed to metime savings		
	Residential installs				
Low Carbon Transition	Res. contractors trained	2%	* gas heat pumps excluded		
(hybrid electric/gas	Commercial installs	270	* hybrid heat pumps must be cold climate models		
cold climate heat pumps)	Com. Engineers trained				
Long-Term GHG Reduction	n.a.	0%	* metric eliminated		
(Sum of Annual Gross Gas Savings)	11.a.	0 /0	medie ciiminatea		



# **Need to Tie Max Performance Incentive to Savings Level**

- Enbridge framework assumes fixed maximum incentive
  - No incentive to propose more aggressive plan, higher savings
  - Perverse incentive to propose modest targets to minimize efforts required
- Max incentive should be tied to level of savings
  - Needs to be conveyed to Enbridge before they propose a plan
  - Applicable to future plans...
  - ...but could also be applicable to requirement to revise current plan

### • Example:

- Current maximum (\$21 million) for savings = 0.6% of eligible sales
- Max incentive scales up or down relative to proposed savings level
- Should also include average measure life expectation (e.g., 15 years)
- Should be adjusted for inflation





# The Need for "Fuel Neutrality" (1)

- Nov. 15, 2021 Energy Ministry Letter
  - DSM should enable "lower energy bills in the most cost-effective way possible, and help customers make the right choices regardless of whether that is through more efficient gas or electric equipment."
- Optimal customer choices require fuel neutrality
- Optimal program designs require fuel neutrality
- Subsidizing gas options without considering electric options leads to:
  - Inefficient choices & higher-than-necessary energy bills
- Must have (a) unbiased approach and (b) multi-fuel expertise
  - Enbridge has neither



# The Need for "Fuel Neutrality" (2)

- Era of climate crisis and huge challenge of reducing GHG emissions
- All independent studies suggest significant electrification of gas needed
  - Not a question of whether gas end uses need to be electrified, just how much
  - Massachusetts utilities just filed decarbonization plans that reflect this
    - Utilities preferred statewide "hybrid electrification" scenario = 73% reduction in gas throughput
    - National Grid plan specifies total reduction in throughput of 60% by 2050
    - Many stakeholders challenging these reductions as based on unrealistically optimistic views of RNG availability, costs, impacts on GHGs, and sustainability (as well as conservative views of electrification costs)
- In that context, gas DSM programs need to be:
  - Fuel-blind not putting a thumb on the scales in favor of gas equipment (vs. electric)
  - Emphasizing reductions in load over efficiency of gas-consuming equipment




# **Enbridge DSM Plan Biases Customer Fuel Choices**

- Building Code program requires use of gas
  - Program should be scrapped, budget reallocated to other programs
- "Low-Carbon Transition" program includes gas heat pumps
  - No chance of meaningful impact on the market until 2030s or later
  - Not cost-effective
  - Gas heat pump measure should be removed from program, budget reallocated to other measures/program
- Res. Whole Building program includes gas furnace & gas water heater rebates
  - \$250 rebate for 96% furnace provides on \$110 in benefits because of min standard of 95%
  - Gas water heaters clearly not cost-effective
  - Rebates for gas-consuming appliance should be eliminated from residential programs, budget reallocated to other measures/programs



# **Enbridge DSM Plan Reduces Emphasis on Low Income**

### **Enbridge Low Income Spending**



### Low Income Spending %

			Low Income Spend as % of
Utility	Jurisdiction	Years	Total Program
Centerpoint	Minnesota	2019	16.6%
DTE	Michigan	2019	24.8%
Consumers Energy	Michigan	2019	23.6%
Eversource	Massachusetts	2019	19.4%
National Grid	Massachusetts	2019	25.4%
National Grid	Rhode Island	2019	23.4%
Enbridge	Ontario	2019	19.1%
Enbridge	Ontario	2023-27	17.5%

- Enbridge declining (drops to 16.5% by 2027)
- Enbridge lower than most leaders



# Enbridge's Flagship Residential Program is a Big Unknown

- Residential program cannot be approved too many unknowns
- Huge questions re integration with Greener Homes Grant still under negotiation
  - Savings attribution (no proposal made public yet)
  - No new targets or shareholder performance metrics
  - OEB cannot assess reasonableness or be asked to "pre-approve" so many future unknowns
- Preliminary details are problematic
  - No increases in program rebate levels are proposed
  - Therefore, it appears that ratepayer funding will displace federal funding
  - If so, incremental savings would be zero i.e., 100% free riders?
- ~\$32 million/yr (~75%) of Enbridge Res. DSM \$ is for Whole Home program






# **Enbridge Proposed Discount Rate is Too High**

- Discount rates should reflect policy goals (see NSPM for DERs)
- Ontario policy goals suggest broad societal perspective on DSM
  - Not just gas bill savings
  - Climate goals, other fuel savings, participant costs, non-energy benefits all in TRC+
- This suggests a societal discount rate should be used
- Societal discount rates vary...
  - 0% to 3%, depending on jurisdiction
- But all are below the 4% real rate proposed by Enbridge
  - 4% adopted in 2014 framework
  - Breadth of social concerns particularly climate significantly increased since then
- High discount rates can significantly understate value of long-lived savings
  - See GEC/ED response to 13.0EB Staff.3.GEC/ED.1



### **Suggest Real Discount Rate of 0.5% Based on Canadian Bond Yields**



Several other jurisdictions (e.g., Massachusetts, Illinois) also rely on long-term government bond yields as a proxy for a real societal discount rate to be used in their TRC tests.





### **Procedural Recommendations**

- OEB should reject plan and require Enbridge to file a revised one
  - Need to understand what major residential program will be
  - Should significantly increase proposed savings levels
    - If concerned about rate impacts from increased budget, consider amortization
  - Should eliminate building codes program, gas heat pumps, residential gas equipment rebates
  - Should increase low income emphasis (maybe others too small business?)
- OEB should tie max performance incentive to level of savings
  - Per our recommendation
  - Would encourage Enbridge to be creative and do better
  - Revised plan to be filed and to start as early as possible
  - Even if mid-year 2023



### **Chris Neme**

**PRINCIPAL** 





