

Elson Advocacy

March 6, 2026

Ritchie Murray

Registrar
Ontario Energy Board
2300 Yonge Street, 27th Floor
Toronto, Ontario M4P 1E4

Dear Mr. Murray,

**Re: Benefit-Cost Analysis Framework for Addressing Electricity System Needs
EB-2023-0125**

I am writing on behalf of Environmental Defence to provide comments on the draft revisions proposed for Phase Two of the Benefit-Cost Analysis Framework (“BCA Framework”) and the discussion questions outlined in the OEB’s letter of February 6, 2026.

Mandatory EST

Although making the EST mandatory is positive, the proposed amendments to the BCA Framework still fall far short of what is required to ensure consistency with provincial policy outlined in the Integrated Energy Plan, including the focus on affordability and the DER Strategy. In short, the BCA Framework will continue to rule out most non-wires solutions even where they would result in an overall lowering of energy costs in Ontario. As the energy transition proceeds, it is critical that all tools are used to ensure we meet electricity demand increases as cost-effectively as possible. The amended BCA Framework will still fall far short of that important goal.

Although it is positive that distributors will be required to examine the EST, the actual impacts will be minor because the amended BCA Framework still singles out the DST as the “primary” test and makes passing the DST mandatory. In particular, the draft continues to state that “[a] passing score on the DST is necessary unless other qualitative benefits warrant proceeding with the NWS.”¹ No matter how many net benefits are generated under the EST, a project will fail if it does not pass the DST (including a consideration of qualitative benefits).

Chris Neme, one of the co-authors of the National Standard Practice Manual (“NSPM”), which is the Bible for cost-effectiveness tests, outlined the negative impacts of relying on the DST in this way. In the attached comment on the BCA Framework, he states as follows:

As alluded to in the discussion above, the implications of a decision to rely on a DST as the primary cost-effectiveness test for DERs are large and significant. They include the following:

¹ Draft Amendments, s. 4.1

- **Energy efficiency and distributed generation resources would be largely precluded from being part of an NWS.** Both energy efficiency and distributed generation (DG) resources can provide numerous electric utility system benefits – including avoided generating capacity costs, avoided transmission costs, avoided distribution system costs, and avoided energy costs. They can also provide GHG emission reduction benefits and sometimes provide other fuel cost savings. However, under the DST, they would only be considered cost-effective as an NWS if the value of just one of those many benefits – distribution cost savings – exceeded the utility cost of acquiring them. Based on my experience with cost-effectiveness analysis such measures, that is only likely to happen in truly unusual and exceptional circumstances.
- **Very few potential NWS projects will be deemed cost-effective.** By requiring the full cost of acquiring DERs to be more than offset by just one of their potential benefits, reliance on the DST as the primary BCA test for NWSs will mean that very few NWS projects will be pursued. That is not *inherently* good or bad, but as discussed in the next bullet, it is problematic if it will lead to higher than necessary total electric system costs.
- **Higher overall costs to electric ratepayers.** By effectively precluding investment in many DER measures that could reduce overall electric utility system costs, the OEB’s proposed reliance on the DST will result in higher overall costs of providing electricity services to the province’s electric ratepayers.
- **Higher GHG emissions.** Many DERs that could lower total electric system costs would also reduce GHG emissions. That is particularly true of energy efficiency and distributed renewable generation. Excluding the value of reduced GHG emissions from the BCA test will result in less investment in DERs that provide such benefits. It is even possible that excluding GHG emission impacts could lead to modest increases in GHG emissions. That could be the case, for example, if a DR program targeting large businesses resulted in some of those businesses relying on their own on-site diesel generators to offset some of their lost grid power during DR events.

The other concerns raised by Mr. Neme will continue to apply as well, such as the following:

The draft BCA framework for NWSs is inconsistent with the NSPM and violates key economic principles. It is worth noting that the NSPM for DERs has a chapter on non-wires solutions and that one of the key points summarized at the beginning of that chapter is as follows:

“NWS initiatives may have broad impacts on the utility system – beyond avoided T&D costs. Cost-effectiveness analyses of NWS initiatives should account for all relevant impacts included in a jurisdictions’ JST.”

JST is short for jurisdiction specific test. As the NSPM makes clear, a JST should (1) include all utility system impacts (costs and benefits); and (2) include all additional non-utility system impacts (costs and benefits) that the jurisdiction’s energy policies suggest are important goals or objectives. The core of my concern with the OEB’s proposed BCA framework for assessing NWSs is that the OEB’s proposed primary test of cost-effectiveness – what it calls the Distribution Service Test (DST) – does neither of those things. It excludes many potential impacts of an NWS – both utility-system and non-utility system impacts. Most of the excluded impacts are likely to be benefits for most potential scenarios in which a utility might consider investing in DER deployment as part of an NWS. This is not a minor or inconsequential concern. It is a fundamental concern with huge implications for the number of NWS projects that will appear to be cost-effective, for the range of DERs that might be deployed as part of NWSs, for impacts on the environment, and – perhaps most importantly – for costs to ratepayers.

...

The OEB's rationale for relying primarily on a DST is unclear. The Board states that the perspective of this test is to "optimize...long-term net distribution service benefits".⁷ However, it does not explain why that is the right primary objective. Why would a solution that has lower costs for one part of the utility system (i.e., distribution costs), but higher costs for the utility system as a whole, be better for customers? If a \$1 million energy efficiency resource investment can provide only \$0.5 million in distribution system cost reductions but another \$2 million in avoided generation, avoided transmission and avoided energy benefits (i.e., \$2.5 million total benefits, or \$1.5 million in net utility system benefits), why is that not a good investment for ratepayers? The Board's proposed reliance on the DST is analogous to saying that an individual that has deficiencies in iron, Vitamin D, Vitamin B6 and Vitamin B12 is better off spending \$10 for four different bottles of supplements (one for each mineral or vitamin deficiency) rather than \$20 for a bottle of multi-vitamins that would simultaneously address all of the deficiencies.

Requiring distributors to consider the EST will only be helpful if the process of doing so results in the distributor securing funding for bulk-system benefits from a source such as the IESO. However, this is a very cumbersome and time-consuming approach, which will often be inconsistent with the fast-pace planning decisions that need to be made as electricity demand changes and increase. More importantly, there are far from sufficient mechanisms in place for bulk-system benefits to be remunerated. As a result, utility after utility will decline to pursue cost-effective non-wires solutions because of an inability to monetize non-distribution system benefits, making everybody worse off.

In short, the EST should be mandatory, but the benefit of that is minor while the BCA Framework still makes the DST the primary test and requires a DST result of one or higher.

IESO collaboration

IESO collaboration is ideal. However, the proposed amendments could have unintended adverse consequences if the IESO is swamped with many requests from distributors and is unable to respond in a timely manner. A *requirement* of IESO collaboration is concerning without ensuring sufficient resourcing for the IESO and appropriate and transparent timelines by which the IESO will respond to distributor inquiries. These concerns could be addressed by making the requirement contingent on receiving IESO responses within a reasonable timeframe.

Non-energy benefits

Environmental Defence supports the inclusion of non-energy benefits for eDSM investments. This is necessary for consistency with other OEB frameworks, such as the DSM Framework. It is also consistent with good cost-benefit analysis principles as non-energy benefits are real and therefore should be accounted for.

Usability improvements

The BCA Framework could be improved by calculating more values that can be used to estimate EST benefits in more areas more simply. Transmission system benefits are one example. The BCA Framework requires that a distributor assess this value "through engagement with the IESO's regional planning group." This is entirely untenable and will result in transmission

system benefits being ignored. Distributors are required to consider non-wires solutions for all investments over \$2 million. Requiring them to engage the IESO regional planning group for each is excessively burdensome.

However, we understand the concern that transmission system benefits vary with locality such that a province-wide value is inaccurate. However, this can be addressed by calculating a smaller number of marginal transmission capacity values for different parts of the province. This will result, for example, in a higher value in transmission-constrained areas. These efforts are needed to ensure that important benefits, such as the value of transmission capacity, are accounted for.

Conclusion

The BCA framework is incredibly important because distributed energy resources present a major opportunity to lower energy bills. The exclusion of energy benefits in the primary test undermines the whole initiative and constitutes a step backward from the ad hoc approach that was previously taken by distributors. Without amendments to the BCA Framework that would remove the primacy of the DST, most opportunities to lower energy costs through non-wires solutions will continue to be missed, contrary to the Ontario Government's priority of energy affordability.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'K. Elson', written in a cursive style.

Kent Elson

January 26, 2024

Nancy Marconi
Ontario Energy Board
2300 Yonge Street, 27th Floor
Toronto, Ontario M4P 1E4

RE: Draft Benefit-Cost Analysis Framework for Addressing Electricity System Needs (EB-2023-0125)

Dear Ms. Marconi:

I have been asked by Environmental Defence to provide high-level comments on the Ontario Energy Board's (OEB's) Draft Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) Framework for Ontario's electric utilities to apply when assessing a non-wires solution (NWS). I am providing comments as an economist with extensive expertise in cost-effectiveness analyses of electric and gas utility investments, not as an advocate for the position of any party, including Environmental Defence. What follows is a summary of my background in benefit-cost analysis, an overview of my primary concerns with the OEB's proposed BCA framework, and some commentary on the likely adverse impacts of the OEB's proposed BCA framework on Ontario's electric ratepayers.

I. My Qualifications

I have been involved in leading or critiquing benefit-cost analyses of literally hundreds, if not thousands of energy efficiency, demand response, strategic electrification and other distributed energy resource programs in dozens of U.S. states and Canadian provinces over the past thirty years. I am also one of the co-authors of the 2020 *National Standard Practice Manual for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Distributed Energy Resources* (NSPM for DERs),¹ which is referenced in several places in the OEB's draft framework, as well as one of the co-authors of its 2017 predecessor, the *National Standard Practice Manual for Assessing Cost-Effectiveness of Energy Efficiency Resources* (NSPM for EE).² I have presented on the principles, processes and methods recommended in those manuals to dozens of audiences across the U.S. and Canada. In fact, I am tentatively scheduled to teach a two-day training course on the NSPM and benefit-cost analysis as part of an Association of Energy Services Professionals (AESP) conference in Toronto this coming July. I am also currently part of a team hired by Maryland's energy regulators to lead a working group process to develop a common benefit-cost test to apply to all DER investment decisions, as well as part of a team leading a similar working group process in Nova Scotia.

¹ <https://www.nationalenergyscreeningproject.org/national-standard-practice-manual/>

² <https://www.nationalenergyscreeningproject.org/the-national-standard-practice-manual-for-energy-efficiency/#:~:text=The%20NSPM%20for%20EE%20provides,longer%20be%20updated%20or%20maintained.>

In addition to that benefit-cost analysis expertise, I have extensive experience with consideration of non-wires solutions and gas non-pipe solutions. That includes authoring two seminal reports on the U.S. experience since the 1990s with energy efficiency as part of non-wires solutions.³ It also includes direct, multi-year involvement in the design and development of pilot non-wires pilot projects with the two largest investor-owned utilities in Michigan (DTE and Consumers Energy). The work with DTE, which is still on-going, included development of a benefit-cost analysis framework. A copy of my CV is attached.

II. Comments on Proposed OEB BCA Framework

A. Overview

The draft BCA framework for NWSs is inconsistent with the NSPM and violates key economic principles. It is worth noting that the NSPM for DERs has a chapter on non-wires solutions and that one of the key points summarized at the beginning of that chapter is as follows:

“NWS initiatives may have broad impacts on the utility system – beyond avoided T&D costs. Cost-effectiveness analyses of NWS initiatives should account for all relevant impacts included in a jurisdictions’ JST.”⁴

JST is short for jurisdiction specific test. As the NSPM makes clear, a JST should (1) include all utility system impacts (costs and benefits); and (2) include all additional non-utility system impacts (costs and benefits) that the jurisdiction’s energy policies suggest are important goals or objectives. The core of my concern with the OEB’s proposed BCA framework for assessing NWSs is that the OEB’s proposed primary test of cost-effectiveness – what it calls the Distribution Service Test (DST) – does neither of those things. It excludes many potential impacts of an NWS – both utility-system and non-utility system impacts. Most of the excluded impacts are likely to be benefits for most potential scenarios in which a utility might consider investing in DER deployment as part of an NWS. This is not a minor or inconsequential concern. It is a fundamental concern with huge implications for the number of NWS projects that will appear to be cost-effective, for the range of DERs that might be deployed as part of NWSs, for impacts on the environment, and – perhaps most importantly – for costs to ratepayers.

³ Neme, Chris and Jim Grevatt, *Energy Efficiency as a T&D Resource: Lessons from Recent U.S. Efforts to Use Geographically Targeted Efficiency Programs to Defer T&D Investments*, published by Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships, January 9, 2015 (https://neep.org/sites/default/files/products/EMV-Forum-Geo-Targeting_Final_2015-01-20.pdf) and Neme, Chris and Richard Sedano, *US Experience with Efficiency as a Transmission and Distribution System Resource*, published by the Regulatory Assistance Project, February 2012 (<https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/rap-neme-efficiencyasatanddresource-2012-feb-14.pdf>).

⁴ NSPM for DERs, p. 12-1.

B. Failure to Include All Utility System Impacts in Primary Test

As just noted, one of the core principles of the NSPM is that all utility system impacts associated with a DER investment should be included in any benefit-cost analysis of that investment. The OEB's proposed DST includes 100% of the utility system cost of deploying DERs as an NWS. However, the only utility system benefits that it includes are reductions in costs associated with investments in the distribution system. Many other electric system impacts are excluded, most notably impacts on generating capacity, transmission capacity and electric energy costs. For most DERs, those excluded impacts are likely to be benefits. Thus, the OEB's proposed DST also violates the NSPM principle of symmetrically treating cost and benefits – i.e., it includes 100% of the utility system costs of investing in NWS resources, but only a portion (the impacts on distribution system costs) of the benefits.

The OEB offers electric utilities the option to also conduct an Energy System Test (EST) that includes those other system impacts. However, it has made clear that (1) though it is encouraged, an EST is not required; (2) the results of the DST “will be the primary consideration for assessing rate funding of an NWS”;⁵ and (3) EST results are likely to affect decisions on NWS investments only in cases in which “an NWS was found to be marginal non-cost-effective when applying the DST.”⁶ Thus, the inclusion of the EST as an optional secondary test is likely to have relatively little effect on NWS investment decisions.

The OEB's rationale for relying primarily on a DST is unclear. The Board states that the perspective of this test is to “optimize...long-term net distribution service benefits”.⁷ However, it does not explain why that is the right primary objective. Why would a solution that has lower costs for one part of the utility system (i.e., distribution costs), but higher costs for the utility system as a whole, be better for customers? If a \$1 million energy efficiency resource investment can provide only \$0.5 million in distribution system cost reductions but another \$2 million in avoided generation, avoided transmission and avoided energy benefits (i.e., \$2.5 million total benefits, or \$1.5 million in net utility system benefits), why is that not a good investment for ratepayers? The Board's proposed reliance on the DST is analogous to saying that an individual that has deficiencies in iron, Vitamin D, Vitamin B6 and Vitamin B12 is better off spending \$10 for four different bottles of supplements (one for each mineral or vitamin deficiency) rather than \$20 for a bottle of multi-vitamins that would simultaneously address all of the deficiencies.

It is possible that the intent of the OEB's focus on the DST is to address only those impacts of an NWS investment that affect the costs paid by distribution utility customers, which I understand is somewhat complicated because cost reductions associated system peak demand reductions produced by a local distribution company (LDC) may not accrue entirely to just that LDC's customers, but also to other

⁵ Section 2.3

⁶ Section 2.3

⁷ Section 4.1

Ontario LDCs' customers. For reasons stated above (and in the NSPM), that is an inappropriate focus because it conflates the question of cost-effectiveness with cost allocation issues. Moreover, the DST does not actually measure impacts on a given LDC's customers because it excludes substantial utility system benefits – beyond avoided distribution system costs – that those customers will realize in the form of avoided energy costs and the portion of avoided transmission and avoided generation capacity costs that will actually flow to them.

One irony of the OEB's proposal is that system-wide utility DER programs, through which DERs will be installed randomly across the entire distribution system, will often appear more cost-effective than initiatives to promote the very same DER measures in geographic areas that have distribution system constraints and where they therefore should provide greater value. It is hard to see why it would be appropriate to suggest it may be in ratepayers' collective interest to provide system-wide rebates for efficient central air conditioners, but that it is not in their interest to provide such rebates in a geographic area where they can provide greater value because of a distribution system constraint.

The Board's discussion in the Appendix to the draft framework of a hypothetical NWS focused on Demand Response (DR) provides another concrete example of how the proposed focus on the DST as a primary test is problematic. Part of the description of the example is that DR resources would only be deployed to address the distribution need because that distribution system need may occur at different times than the system peak generation need.⁸ But what if there was a different DR program design – one that allowed dispatching a larger number of hours per year and/or for longer durations – that could simultaneously address both distribution and generation needs? Such a program may be more expensive, but what if the increase in cost was significantly outweighed by the increase in total utility system benefits? The OEB's proposed reliance on the DST as a primary BCA test provides no incentive for utilities to consider such alternatives. Indeed, it tells utilities that ratepayers are better off and that the OEB prefers the DR program design that provides less overall cost savings.

C. Failure to Include Any Non-Utility System Impacts in Primary Test

As briefly noted above, another core principle of the NSPM is that, in addition to all utility system impacts, a jurisdiction's primary benefit-cost test should include other fuel impacts, host customer impacts, greenhouse gas (GHG) emission impacts and/or other societal impacts that are identified as important to addressing the jurisdiction's energy policy goals. No such additional impacts are included in the OEB's proposed BCA framework. While I have not conducted an exhaustive assessment of Ontario energy policy goals, it seems clear from current gas efficiency policy that the OEB considers impacts on all fuels to be important.⁹ Given Canadian federal policy commitments, it also seems reasonable to

⁸ Appendix Section 1.1.3

⁹ For example, the current TRC+ cost-effectiveness test used to assess cost-effectiveness of gas DSM programs includes the value of impacts on both gas system costs and electric system costs (as some DSM measures affect

conclude that impacts on GHG emissions should be considered important. The value of both changes in consumption of other fuels and changes in the magnitude of greenhouse gas emissions should therefore be included in a primary test of whether an NWS is cost-effective.

III. Implications of the OEB's Proposal to Use the DST as the Primary BCA Test for NWSs

As alluded to in the discussion above, the implications of a decision to rely on a DST as the primary cost-effectiveness test for DERs are large and significant. They include the following:

- **Energy efficiency and distributed generation resources would be largely precluded from being part of an NWS.** Both energy efficiency and distributed generation (DG) resources can provide numerous electric utility system benefits – including avoided generating capacity costs, avoided transmission costs, avoided distribution system costs, and avoided energy costs. They can also provide GHG emission reduction benefits¹⁰ and sometimes provide other fuel cost savings.¹¹ However, under the DST, they would only be considered cost-effective as an NWS if the value of just one of those many benefits – distribution cost savings – exceeded the utility cost of acquiring them. Based on my experience with cost-effectiveness analysis of such measures, that is only likely to happen in truly unusual and exceptional circumstances.
- **Very few potential NWS projects will be deemed cost-effective.** By requiring the full cost of acquiring DERs to be more than offset by just one of their potential benefits, reliance on the DST as the primary BCA test for NWSs will mean that very few NWS projects will be pursued. That is not *inherently* good or bad, but as discussed in the next bullet, it is problematic if it will lead to higher than necessary total electric system costs.
- **Higher overall costs to electric ratepayers.** By effectively precluding investment in many DER measures that could reduce overall electric utility system costs, the OEB's proposed reliance on the DST will result in higher overall costs of providing electricity services to the province's electric ratepayers.
- **Higher GHG emissions.** Many DERs that could lower total electric system costs would also reduce GHG emissions. That is particularly true of energy efficiency and distributed renewable generation. Excluding the value of reduced GHG emissions from the BCA test will result in less investment in DERs that provide such benefits. It is even possible that excluding GHG emission impacts could lead to modest increases in GHG emissions. That could be the case, for example, if a DR program targeting large businesses resulted in some of those businesses relying on their own on-site diesel generators to offset some of their lost grid power during DR events.

both). Also, the Board recently instructed Enbridge Gas to support customer adoption of heat pumps. Support for electrification measures can only be justified as cost-effective if policy dictates that cost-effectiveness be assessed using an "all fuels" perspective.

¹⁰ For DG resources, this would be the case only for distributed renewables.

¹¹ Some efficiency measures, such as attic insulation, can reduce both electric cooling energy consumption (including during peak hours) and gas heating energy consumption.

IV. Recommendation

I urge the OEB to reconsider its approach. As discussed above, it is conceptually very problematic. It is also much more limited in its consideration of the range of benefits provided by an NWS than the primary cost-effectiveness tests used by all other leading jurisdictions with which I am familiar, including the neighboring states of New York and Michigan.

Ideally, the OEB should undertake a process to identify provincial energy policy goals to inform the addition of other non-utility system impacts in its cost-effectiveness test. As discussed above, that would likely lead to including costs and/or benefits associated with changes in consumption of other fuels as well as costs or benefits associated with changes in GHG emissions. Less ideal, but still a major step in the right direction, would be making the EST the primary test. If the OEB is not prepared to do even that, I would suggest that the OEB at least (A) modify the DST to include the portion of other utility system benefits that accrue to an LDC's customers; (B) require (rather than just encourage) an EST; and (C) convey that the EST will be given equal weight with the modified DST when considering the merits of an NWS.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide these comments. I would be more than happy to discuss them further if the OEB would find that helpful.



Chris Neme, EFG Principal